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Abstract
This work reviews the Inter-American and European human rights regimes
and their abilities to respond to point-source pollution, climate change, and
ecosystem conservation. It begins by reviewing leading human rights theories
and the development of the relationship between human rights and the
environment. It then focuses on European human rights, both under the
ECHR and the CFREU, and highlights the ECHR’s ability to respond to
instances of point-source-pollution though the right to privacy. The work then
looks at the Inter-American human rights regime, its structure, history and
ability to respond to environmental challenges. It reviews the regime’s
tendency to use the right to property to protect the environments of
indigenous populations and provides a detailed analysis of the regime’s
potential ability to respond to climate change based on the recent
Athabaskan Petition. Finally this work looks at how environmental
protection can be developed within both regimes, comparing their abilities to
adapt and progressively interpret each regime’s human rights laws. It
concludes that the European regime is in a better position to expand its
human rights, potentially to the degree of recognizing a right to a healthy
environment.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Overview

Human activities have a number of unwanted impacts on the natural
environment and human rights laws are a potential means for responding to
environmental challenges. Pollution, climate change and loss of ecosystems
are problems worthy of quick and effective responses; international human
rights laws are seen by many as a potentially robust system of laws that
could protect the environment.
This research explores this idea and looks at the abilities of the European
and Inter-American1 human rights regimes to respond to point-source
pollution, climate change and conservation. This work provides a detailed
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of both of these regimes with
regard to their current interpretation of human rights and the environment.
It also compares the development of the two regimes in order to illustrate
their historic differences and emphasize the potential challenges associated
with transferring jurisprudential principles between the regimes.
The structure of this analysis is as follows: first, it provides an introduction to
human rights theory to define the foundations of human rights as well as the
primary

arguments

for

integrating

environmental

protection

into

international human rights. To this end Section 2 of this chapter looks at
traditional human rights theory and the theories linking human rights to the
environment. Section 3 reviews some of the previous and ongoing efforts to
For clarity, it should be noted that the terms “Inter-American” and “American” are used in
this work to refer to the nations of North, South and Central America which are members of
the Organization of American States. When reference is to be made to the country of the
United States of America, it will be called “the United States” or USA.
1

1

formally integrate environmental protection and international human rights,
including the recognition of a human right to a healthy environment.
Sections 4 and 5 introduce the parameters of the remainder of this work, with
Section 4 overviewing the various international human rights regimes and
Section 5 describing the environmental challenges of point-source pollution,
climate change and ecosystem conservation.
Chapters 2 and 3 begin the analytical chapters of this work and they
respectively review the abilities of the European and Inter-American human
rights regimes to respond to environmental challenges. Both chapters first
outline the histories of the regimes and the development of their human
rights. Then, each chapter look at the respective regimes ability to respond to
point-source pollution, climate change, and conservation.
Chapter 4 provides a comparative analysis of the two regimes in order to
highlight not only opportunities for mirroring jurisprudence between the
regimes, but also the major challenges associated with doing so. The chapter
addresses the role of the principle of non-intervention in shaping the InterAmerican human rights regime and its lingering effect on the regime’s
workings. It also looks at how early decisions of both regimes’ courts
influenced participation and foreshadowed their adjudicatory styles. Finally
it looks at the tendency of participant nations to comply with the decisions of
both regimes. The chapter then describes how these factors complicate the
direct transfer of jurisprudential principles between the two regimes, but it
goes on to explore avenues for both regimes to independently expand their
human rights law in order to provide greater environmental protection.
Chapter 5 concludes and summarizes this work.
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1.2 Human rights theory

The overarching purpose of this thesis is to explore the potential abilities of
the European and Inter-American human rights regimes to respond to
environmental challenges. In order to properly conduct this analysis it is vital
to understand what constitutes a human right as human rights theory is not
always consistent with human rights law. The following theoretical analysis
looks at the main theories underlying human rights; it lays out their purpose
and relationship with other laws. It also shows how human rights theories
may influence developments in human rights law.
There are multiple competing theories to explain “human rights” and their
role in law and society. Unfortunately, modern human rights law is complex
and most theories struggle to provide a comprehensive explanation of their
presence and function. The two most prominent legal theories, natural law
and positivist law, can be applied to human rights and are capable of
explaining different aspects of modern human rights law. The following
analysis looks at these two competing and conflicting theories and how they
shape human rights law.

1.2.1 Natural law, positivist law, and human rights law

Explaining human rights on the basis of either natural law or positivist law
is difficult because, while natural law and positivist law. While natural law is
commonly cited as the foundation for modern human rights regimes,2 it can

Donald K Anton & Dinah Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 121; Maurice William Cranston & United Nations
General Assembly, What are human rights? (Basic Books, 1963) at 1 Cranston states that
human rights are simply the modern name for natural rights.
2

3

be difficult to apply to modern human rights in practice. Positivist law, can
step in to provide a theoretical explanation for modern human rights where
natural law falters, but it can simultaneously struggle to explain the special
status often given to human rights as being superior to other laws.
Natural law theories interpret law as being based on “a fundamental
underlying truth”. This truth provides the foundation and structure for all
laws, but what the truth is can vary depending on the natural law theorist.
Some theorists, such as Locke, use “God” as the foundation for law, while Bay
focuses on “human needs” and Dyke on “the needs of the community”.
Natural law theories are often closely associated with religion, particularly
Christianity, with their advocates either explicitly or implicitly basing their
“fundamental underlying truth” on the Bible. For Locke, natural law and
natural rights were founded in his religion such that human rights were
effectively granted by God.
Locke introduced one of the first concepts of human rights in his Second

Treatise of Government.3 He wrote that humans, as creations of God, are
God’s property and that human survival is part of God’s will. Since there are
certain things humans need for survival, Locke concluded that humans must
have God given rights to: life, health, liberty and property. These protections,
according to Locke, provide the most basic requirements for survival. He
called this the “law of nature” as it was, in his view, the law which would
exist in a natural state, devoid of formal government.4
Today, Locke’s theory of rights leaves a lot to be desired. First, its explicit
reliance on the Christian god as the foundation for rights is broadly
incompatible with the modern global religious reality. Furthermore, the four
rights listed by Locke are curious choices for being the rights “necessary for
survival”. Certainly, life and health are important requirements for human
3
4

John Locke, Two Treatises on Government (R. Butler, 1821).
Ibid at 305.
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survival, but so are shelter, water, and food. On the other hand, humans can
undoubtedly survive without liberty (slaves and prisoners survive, albeit not
particularly well) and humans can also survive without owning property in
the modern sense of the term.5 Modern urbanites renting tiny apartments,
traditional nomadic peoples, those living communally, and many indigenous
populations might question that the right to property is one which is
necessary for survival.
Modern natural law theorists move away from Locke’s explicit religious
references to God and rely on “nature”, “human nature”, or “human needs” as
the “underlying truth” which establishes human rights. Christian Bay sees
“human needs” as the proper starting point for establishing human rights. He
argues that “acknowledgement of a basic human need ipso facto establishes
human rights”6 and he builds on the work of another prominent natural law
theorist, Maurice Cranston. Cranston believes that human rights must be:
practical, universal, and of paramount importance,7 to which Bay adds that
they be given the highest-priority legal protection.8 According to Bay, human
rights exist to meet human needs and conversely, human needs establish
human rights.
Arthur Dyck also focuses on human needs as a foundation for human rights
but describes needs as those things serving “the moral requisites of
community”.9 He emphasizes that human rights should be based on the
moral responsibilities created by our natural tendency to create communities
and sustain individuals. Dyck begins with a focus on humanity’s propensity
It should be noted that the interpretation of Locke’s right to property is hotly debated by
academics, see: Alex Tuckness, “Locke’s Political Philosophy” in Edward N Zalta, ed, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, spring 2016 ed (2016), but all theories about the
meaning of Locke’s right to property are based the principle of exclusive ownership.
6 Christian Bay, “Self-Respect as a Human Right: Thoughts on the Dialectics of Wants and
Needs in the Struggle for Human Community” (1982) 4:1 Human Rights Quarterly 53 at 61.
7 Maurice Cranston, “Are There Any Human Rights?” (1983) 112:4 Daedalus 1 at 13–14.
8 Bay, supra note 6 at 62.
9 Arthur J Dyck, Rethinking Rights And Responsibilities: The Moral Bonds of Community
(Georgetown University Press, 2005) at 9.
5
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to form communities but also relies on the idea that human beings act with
faith that they will have an ultimate vindication of their moral actions.10 This
latter element of Dyck’s argument leads back, obviously but not explicitly, to
a religious foundation for natural law and human rights. This is not
surprising because for many, morality and religion are intertwined, but it
does raise issues about the universality of morality and a natural law
foundation for human rights.
While specific natural law theories about human rights may have their
flaws,11 there are some common descriptors of human rights which can be
extracted from most natural law theories. Irrespective of their thoretical
foundation, human rights are expected to be universal and inalienable – that
is, they apply to all humans regardless of their nationality, social status,
wealth, ethnicity, religion, etc. and cannot be taken from people by
government or law. In tune with this, human rights should also be prioritized
above other laws and given greater legal protection. These three properties of
human rights, which stem from natural law, can be found in the majority of
the international human rights documents and rhetoric.
In many ways, natural law is appealing and the role of natural law as
establishing the foundation for human rights makes sense. As Cranston
points out, there is something instinctual about how we feel about unjust
laws. We feel rather than think that laws are unjust and it seems more
emotional than logical.12 People are repulsed by the idea of obeying an unjust
law. Natural law theorist point to the German atrocities during World War 2

Ibid at 10.
As well as the criticisms which can be levied at Locke’s theories, the theories of Bay and
Dyck also have issues when closely scrutinized. Bay, for instance, follows his theory of
‘human need’ to eventually argue that every individual has a human right to self-respect, a
right to which it would be impossible to provide the high level of legal protection promoted by
Bay. Similarly, Dyck’s focus on the needs of community eventually leads him to the
conclusion that physician-assisted suicide is inherently immoral, a position which may be
more of a reflection of his personal religious beliefs than a universal moral truth.
12 Cranston, supra note 7 at 5–6.
10
11

6

as examples of unjust laws - created legally by the German government,
these oppressive laws go against our internal morality and natural law.13
Furthermore, there is something attractive about Dyck’s observation that
humans tend to naturally coalesce into community groups: undeniably, social
cohesion has been an important factor in our success as a species. Therefore,
if we have an innate feeling of what a constitutes a just law and we naturally
congregate into communities for our shared prosperity, it seems logical that
there should be some laws or “rights” which should be guaranteed in order to
support communities and uphold our common sense of justice. While such a
statement can be attractive in theory, it can be difficult to apply in practice.
First, it is difficult to establish universal concepts of morality and
community. Even taking for example arguably the most broadly accepted
human right, the right to life; it can be difficult to agree upon a common
definition. How the right to life should treat abortion, assisted dying, and
capital punishment is the source of major cultural and moral disagreement.
Similarly, with regard to Dyck’s theory of community, although humans do
obviously

form

community

groups,

community

structures

can

vary

dramatically, including: democracies, communes, monarchies, and semidemocratic republics. A modern, Western audience would likely see an “open
democracy” as the “morally correct” community structure; however, history
provides evidence that long-lasting and prosperous communities can be
established by oligarchical and dictatorial empires. While communities may
be a natural part of human nature, the design of these communities, and
therefore the human rights necessary to sustain them, can vary greatly.
The second major challenge to natural law theories is determining and
defending which rights are established (and not established) by the specific
theories. When human rights are based in natural law, that natural law is

13

Cranston & Assembly, supra note 2 at 16; Cranston, supra note 7 at 5.
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founded on a singular principle: “human needs” are cited by some14 and
“human survival” by others.15 However, a ‘need’ is hard to define outside a
simplistic ‘survival need;’ i.e. what is strictly required by humans to survive.
Defining human rights based on what is necessary for survival would create a
narrow definition that could not justify the many modern human rights, such
as the rights to privacy, movement, paid holidays, education, etc. Dyck’s
assertion that needs include ‘what is necessary for sustained communities’ is
no more helpful as ‘community’ then becomes the indefinable term. The
challenges posed by defining the terms used by natural law theorists, often
lead one to search for a foundation of human rights that does not require a
“great underlying truth”. Legal positivism responds to natural law’s
shortcoming by providing a theoretical basis where laws (and rights) are
created by man and can be explained without any underlying morality or
natural guidance.
The theories of legal positivists such as HLA Hart,16 Raz,17 Watson, and
Lane, are best introduced by Bentham who wrote that rights are “a child of
law; from real law come real rights; but from imaginary laws, from ‘law of
nature’, come imaginary rights… Natural rights is simple nonsense; natural
and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts.”18
Bentham’s basic premise is laws and rights can only be created by man and
enforced by man. HLA Hart and Joseph Raz provide a particularly accessible
modern view of positivist law, broadly stating that laws are separate from
morals and established by man.19 Laws are guided by “external” aspects

Reginald Herbold Green, “Basic human rights/needs: some problems of categorical
translation and unification” (1981) 27 International Commission of Jurists Review 53; Bay,
supra note 6.
15 Locke, supra note 3.
16 Hart is claimed by Cranston to be a natural law theorists, but Hart is clearly a legal
positivist who, at times, challenged other legal positivist theories in favour of his own.
17 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1986).
18 Jeremy Bentham & Sir John Bowring, Works of Jeremy Bentham (W. Tait, 1839) at 501.
19 H L A Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” (1958) 71:4 Harvard Law
Review 593.
14
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which outline a rule and how one should conform to it, and “internal” aspects
which oblige individuals to conform to rules.20 These “internal” aspects are
not necessarily emotional or moral feelings of right or wrong behaviour, but
can simply be understood and agreed upon social pressures.21
Positivist law treats human rights as though they are identical in quality to
all other laws. Sections 2.1 and 3.1 of this work explore how both European
and Inter-American human rights were created in response to specific
geopolitical pressures and how the States were motivated by desires for
cohesion, unity, and stability. Certainly a natural law theorist could argue
that “human rights are those laws necessary for geopolitical cohesion, unity,
and stability”, but such an approach still fails to account for variations in the
regional regimes. On could then argue that human rights protect “regional
geopolitical cohesion”, but this would undermine natural laws appeal of a
“fundamental underlying truth”. Positivist law is not emotional or mystical
and because of this it can be less attractive. There is something pleasing
about the idea that human rights are somehow greater than other laws, but
this is denied by positivism. However, as natural law repeatedly fails to
supply a clear theory that justifies specific human rights, positivism becomes
an attractive alternative.
This work is not intended to determine if Inter-American or European human
rights are founded upon or developed under either natural law or positivist
legal theories. Its purpose is to determine the practical ability of both regimes
to respond to environmental challenges; the underlying legal theories used by
those drafting regional human rights documents and those developing the
law though jurisprudence are not considered as part of this work. This is in
part because these decision-makers do not consistently reference the legal
theories upon which their work is based and also because the interest of this
H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law Series), 2nd Ed., 2d ed, Penelope A.
Bulloch & Joseph Raz, eds. (Clarendon Press, 1997) at 56.
21 Ibid at 57–58.
20

9

work is on the law’s application more so than its underlying principles. A
major exception to this is in the discussion of potential development to both
the European and Inter-American legal regimes. While it can be difficult to
determine which laws have been developed based on a particular legal
theory, it is useful to look at potential developments in law to determine if
they are compatible with dominant legal theories.
The following section looks closely at many of the modern arguments for the
general integration of environmental protection into human rights law.

1.2.2 The theoretical basis for integrating environmental protection into
human rights

There are many authors who support the idea that environmental protection
should be integrated into international human rights law. They can generally
be categorized into one of two groups: pragmatists and idealists. Pragmatists
see human rights law as providing environmental conflicts with access to
established

human

rights

legislation

and

resolution

mechanisms.22

International human rights agreements are often perceived to have stronger
legal protection, more avenues for resolution, and greater public support than
international environmental law.23 International environmental agreements
rarely possess strong compliance mechanisms, whereas international human
rights frequently have some form of established complaint procedures. At
their best, human rights dispute resolution procedures: (1) allow individual
victims or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to bring claims against
national governments; (2) allow claims to be made in the absence of national
Jorge Daniel Taillant, “Environmental Advocacy and the Inter-American Human Rights
System” in Linking Human Rights and the Environment (Tucson, Arizona: The University of
Arizona Press, 2003).
23 Ibid at 120.
22
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laws; and, (3) provide redress to those most commonly impacted by
environmental degradation such as the disenfranchised or those lacking
political influence.24 While it needs to be noted that not all human rights
treaties have strong conflict resolution mechanisms, most have some means
of highlighting human rights violations and even non-binding findings of
violations can exert pressure on States to take action. Human rights law is
seen by many as a practical tool for facilitating environmental protection and
as environmental protection is incorporated into the international human
rights regime it should open new, and in some cases unique, avenues for
individuals to challenge a government’s environmental laws or a lack
thereof.25
Environmental protection can be easily incorporated into human rights law
when an individual’s human right(s) can only be protected in a way which
simultaneously protects the environment. Some forms of environmental
degradation are more conducive to this form of integration than others.
Where degradation affects a person’s life, health or enjoyment of property, a
connection can be made relatively easily.26 Similarly, the rights to equality
and participation may be affected when environmental damage is unfairly
inflicted on marginalized sectors of society.27 This approach can provide
environmental protection without requiring alterations or additions to
existing human rights agreements.28 A shortcoming of this approach is that
the environment is only protected in cases where an individual’s human right
is violated; “the environment” is not given its own protection.
Caroline Dommen, “How Human Rights Norms Can Contribute to Environmental
Protection” in Linking Human Rights and the Environment (Tucson, Arizona: The
University of Arizona Press, 2003); Caroline Dommen, “Claiming Environmental Rights:
Some Possibilities Offered by the United Nations’ Human Rights Mechanisms” (1998) 11 Geo
Int’l Envtl L Rev 1 at 3.
25 Dinah Shelton, “The Environmental Jurisprudence of International Human Rights
Tribunals” in Linking Human Rights and the Environment (Tucson, Arizona: The University
of Arizona Press, 2003) at 2.
26 See below, Section 8.1.1
27 Taillant, supra note 22 at 122.
28 Shelton, supra note 25 at 1.
24
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Environmental protection would not be available in cases where people were
not present or where protection cannot be connected to an individual’s
traditional

human

right.

This

is

an

anthropocentric

approach

to

environmental protection such that the only value of the environment is as it
benefits humans.29 In theory, this approach could eventually provide broad
environmental protection by developing the idea that humanity is reliant on
a clean environment for life and, as there is an established human right to
life, there should also be a right to a clean environment. As Gormley
proposes, “the right to a pure and clean environment falls within the scope of
the right to a mere physical existence,”30 but this rationale is more closely
associated with the other major rationale for making the environment a
human rights issue: that there is a moral obligation to establish a distinct

right to environment or right to a healthy environment.31 This second
approach is based in natural law and while it could provide more
comprehensive protection, it is a much more ambitious change to the current
law.
In contrast to the pragmatists, the idealists rely on what they see as a clear
moral obligation to establish a fundamental right to “a healthy environment”
which has equal status to other human rights. Authors including Boyd,32
Hayward,33 Shelton,34 Birnie, and Boyle35 argue that a human right to a
healthy environment meets the requirements of all human rights based on a
broad interpretation of natural law: the right is universally applicable to all
Dinah Shelton, “Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment”
(1991) 28 Stan J Int’l L 103 at 109; Laurence H Tribe, “Ways Not to Think about Plastic
Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law” (1973) 83 Yale LJ 1315.
30 W Paul Gormley, Human rights and environment: the need for international co-operation
(Sijthoff, 1976) at 42.
31 Shelton, supra note 29 at 105.
32 David Richard Boyd, The environmental rights revolution: a global study of constitutions,
human rights, and the environment (UBC Press, 2011) at 22.
33 Tim Hayward, Constitutional Environmental Rights (OUP Oxford, 2004).
34 Shelton, supra note 29 at 104.
35 Patricia W Birnie & Alan E Boyle, International law and the environment (Clarendon
Press, 1992).
29
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humans; it possesses a moral basis, and it serves the dignity of all human
beings. Boyd is a particularly strong advocate of this position arguing that we
have a moral obligation to integrate environmental protection into human
rights, because a human right to a healthy environment carries just as much
validity as any other recognized human right. 36
Boyd argues that a human right to a healthy environment is a “moral right,
one which is ‘universal, inalienable and permanent’”.37 To make this claim,
Boyd uses establishes three criteria to determine what constitutes a human
right: (i) universal applicability, (ii) a foundation in morality, and (iii) an
intention to ensure the dignity of humanity.38 Many authors support the idea
that a clean environment is a basic human right, based either explicitly or
implicitly on Boyd’s criteria.39 Boyd believes that “[the] right to a healthy
environment possesses the essential characteristics of all human rights”.40
Following this idea, environmental protection should not be integrated into
traditional human rights for pragmatic reasons, instead there is a moral
obligation to recognize the right alongside other traditional human rights.
The idea that a right to a healthy environment is a fundamental human right
is strengthened by the various international, regional and, national
documents which reference it. In his extensive survey of national and
international laws, Boyd concludes that “of 193 UN nations, 153 are legally
obligated to respect, protect and fulfill the right to a healthy environment,
through constitutions, constitutional case law, legislation, regional treaties,
and regional court decisions.”41 That said, the nations which Boyd recognizes
as not supporting the right at a national level include: Canada, the United

Boyd, supra note 32 at 21.
Ibid at 22.
38 Ibid at 21.
39 See Kiss and Alvarez in Romina Picolotti, Linking Human Rights and the Environment
(University of Arizona Press, 2010).
40 Boyd, supra note 32 at 21.
41 Ibid at 111–112.
36
37
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States, China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.42 This is not to say that
these nations do not recognize the right at a provincial, state, or municipal
level, but only that is it not found in the national law. The resistance of these
nations to adopt a right to a clean or healthy environment undermines the
right’s status at the level of international law and in comparison to
traditional human rights. Boyd dismisses those who challenge the existence
of the right to a healthy environment as “in the minority;”43 however, without
acceptance from the aforementioned nations, and in the absence of an
international treaty, it is difficult to see Boyd as not idealizing the law:
describing the law that he wants, not the law as it is.
The moral argument for recognizing a human right to a healthy environment
is complicated by the same challenge associated with establishing any moral
position – the lack of a specific, shared, human morality. While the advocates
for integrating environmental law into human rights law do not openly
classify themselves as “pragmatist” or “idealist”, this distinction tends to
work well and generally aligns with the overarching human rights theories of
“positivist law” and “natural law”. Idealists tend to rely on natural law and a
moral obligation as a basis of integration whereas pragmatists tend to simply
see laws as tools capable of accomplishing tasks. Again, as with general
human rights theory, natural law and the idealists provide the emotionally
more compelling argument for human rights integration – one based on
morals, but this is also the more difficult justification to implement as a
single global morality is likely impossible to define. In contrast, the use of
existing human rights law as a tool for facilitating environmental protection
is compelling due to its relative ease, but its ability to protect the
environment is more limited.
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Chapters 2 and 3 of this work look specifically at the practical application of
human rights law to environmental challenges. In all of these cases, the
human rights applied were not intended to apply to the environment. The
European and Inter-American human rights regimes are two of the most
robust and developed rights regimes, but neither has an enforceable human
right directed at environmental protection. To understand why this is the
case, the following section reviews the history of the relationship between
international human rights laws and environmental protection.

1.3 The history of an environmental human right

Historically, human rights have not been easily applied to environmental
challenges in large part because the environment was not given consideration
in early human rights documents. The environment is not mentioned in any
of the United Nations’ primary human rights documents: the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,44 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),45 or the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).46 The environment is also not mentioned
in the founding documents of the European and Inter-American human
rights regimes.47 Today, those in favour of incorporating environmental
issues into human rights law attribute this historical omission to a lack of
appreciation for the importance of environmental issues at the time these
documents were drafted. However, others acknowledge the exclusion of rights
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relating to the environment could also illustrate an intentional effort to
exclude the environment from having the status of a human right.48
Today, environmental rights have been incorporated into various regional
and international agreements, national constitutions, national laws, and are
regularly supported by international courts and tribunals. Environmental
rights are growing in importance, but it has been a slow disjointed process.
While there have been significant developments since the 1960s, we are far
from having an internationally recognized “human right to a healthy
environment”.
Efforts to create an internationally recognized environmental right are easily
broken down into three time periods: pre-1970, the 70s and 80s, and post1990.

1.3.1 Prior to 1970

Silent Spring49 was published in 1962 and has been called the first document
to promote a distinct human right to a healthy environment.50 1962 also saw
the Council of Europe undertake the first serious review of the impacts of
pollution. The European Conference of Local Authorities, a division of the
Council, acknowledged “that air pollution has serious effects upon human

Gormley, supra note 30 at 40–1; Boyd, supra note 32 at 81; Kerry Kennedy Cuomo,
“Keynote Address: Human Rights and the Environment: Common Ground” (1993) 18 Yale J
Int’l L 227 at 227.
49 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2002).
50 David R Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada’s Constitution
(UBC Press, 2012) at 1. Boyd cites a passage in Silent Spring where Carson does not directly
mention a right to a healthy environment but argues that the absence in the American Bill of
Rights of a right protecting the environment is illustrative of the a lack of awareness of its
authors rather than the absence of such a fundamental right.
48
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health, the economy, animals, plants, buildings, etc.”51 Air pollution was
considered a “public danger” and a formal recommendation was made to hold
a European Conference on Air Pollution.52 The conference, held in 1964,
produced a number of recommendations, which, inter alia, focused on
strengthening the scientific knowledge on air pollution and creating national
regulating legislation.53 The Council’s continued work led to the European
Conservation Year 1970 which began with the European Conservation
Conference. It was here that a recommendation was made for the Council of
Europe to be responsible for drafting a Protocol to the European Convention
on Human Rights that would guarantee “the right of every individual to a
healthy and unspoiled environment.”54 This marked the first time such a
right was proposed at an international level.
At the global level, the United Nations was working on establishing binding
human rights that would build on its Universal Declaration. On December
16, 1966 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These two
documents helped to define and give authority to the rights prescribed in the
Universal Declaration.
Initially in the negotiation of the ICCPR and the ICESCR they were a
singular covenant, but as nations became divided over their support for

Resolution 27 on the Participation of Local Authorities in the Clean Air Campaign,
European Conference of Local Authorities, 4th Sess (1962) [Resolution 27 (1962)].
52 Ibid at 1–2.
53 Recommendation 402 on the European Conference on Air Pollution, Assembly debate on
5th November 1964 (12th Sitting) (see Doc 1827, report of the Social Committee)
[Recommendation 402].
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various rights, the covenant was divided in two.55 Although divided, the two
covenants mirror each other at times including explicit support for state
sovereignty, manifested in both covenants with the phrase “[n]othing in the
present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all
peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and
resources.”56 This statement has been attributed to an international reaction
to historical colonial exploitation,57 but has also been seen as “retarding the
development of a philosophy of environmental law.”58 Fundamentally, the
inclusion of this phrase hampers the development of an international right to
a healthy environment, since any such right would likely restrict “a full and
free usage of nature,” in order to protect it.

1.3.2 The 70s and 80s

In 1968, through the UN’s Economic and Social Council, the Swedish
government proposed that the General Assembly review “the problems of
human environment”.59 Placing this item on the UN’s agenda eventually
resulted in the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
more commonly known as the Stockholm Conference. The Stockholm
Conference produced the Stockholm Declaration60 which outlines 26
principles and the Action Plan with 109 recommendations. During the
negotiations, the United States pressed for strong international supervision,

Richard B Bilder, “Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic Questions” (1969)
1969 Wis L Rev 171 at 176.
56 See ICCPR, supra note 46 Art 47; ICESCR, supra note 45 Art 25.
57 Gormley, supra note 30 at 36.
58 Ibid.
59 Philippe Sands, Richard Tarasofsky & Mary Weiss, Documents in international
environmental law: princples of international environmental law IIA & IIB (Manchester
University Press ND, 1994) at 7.
60 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972,
824 UNTS 216 [Stockholm Declaration].
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and the Netherlands advocated for a specific right to a clean environment;61
neither of these was accomplished.
The Stockholm Declaration and Action Plan were a compromise between
those countries who wanted to raise public awareness and those who
advocated for specific guidelines for future government actions.62 The final
wording of the declaration, while falling short of providing a human right to a
healthy environment, did establish a relationship between human rights and
the environment: Proclamation 1 acknowledges that “[both] aspects of man’s
environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being
and to the enjoyment of basic human rights the right to life itself;”63 Principle
1 states that “man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and

adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life
of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and
improve the environment for present and future generations.”64 These two
statements, particularly Principle 1, are frequently cited as an important
first step toward firmly establishing an international human right to a
healthy environment.65 However, the strength of the rhetoric in Proclamation
1 and Principle 1 is undermined by other problems with the Stockholm
Declaration.
The Stockholm Declaration is a weak document for several reasons. First,
from a legal perspective, as a “declaration” it is not binding upon signatories:
a point which should not be under emphasized. Leading into the conference
the Council of Europe advocated recognition of a legal right to a healthy

Gormley, supra note 30 at 37.
Sands, Tarasofsky & Weiss, supra note 59 at 7.
63 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 60 Proclamation 1, emphasis added.
64 Ibid Principle 1 emphasis added.
65 Alexandre Kiss, “The Right to the Conservation of the Environment” in Linking Human
Rights and the Environment (Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 2003) at 31;
Boyd, supra note 32 at 13; Marie Soveroski, “Environment Rights versus Environmental
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environment, therefore the subsequent, non-binding declaration must be seen
as a failure.
The Stockholm Declaration was further undermined by the absence of
important signatories. The Stockholm Conference was challenged from its
inception because the USSR and most of the Eastern Bloc of Socialist States
boycotted the conference in response to the “Western nations” effectively
blocking the participation of East Germany.66 The absence of this large group
of globally significant States further reduced the authority of the already
non-binding declaration. The Stockholm Convention resulted in the creation
of the UN Environment Program (UNEP) and a the Stockholm Declaration,
but a proposal to create a Universal Declaration on the Protection and
Betterment of the Environment, a document akin to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, was explicitly rejected.67 There was a major
gap between “what could have been” and “what was” coming out of Stockholm
and it signalled the start of a trend away from the previous European push
toward developing a binding right to a healthy environment; toward a softer
international approach to environmental rights.
It was not until 1981 that States made further progress toward developing an
internationally respected right to a healthy environment. The regional,
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights established the first formal
right to a healthy environment: “[a]ll people shall have the right to a general
satisfactory environment favourable to their development.”68 At the time, the
African Charter was progressive, not only establishing a right akin to a
‘healthy environment’ but also by allowing claims to be brought against
participant nations by other parties, individuals and NGOs.69 Any claims of

Gormley, supra note 30 at 121; Sands, Tarasofsky & Weiss, supra note 59 at 7.
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non-compliance were to be reviewed by the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights and while this established a decent review procedure, it
was limited by the Commission’s authority to only produce non-enforceable
recommendations.70
In the Americas, human rights protections were also expanded to incorporate
a right to a healthy environment. In 1988 the Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights,71 the San Salvador Protocol,
established that “[e]veryone shall have the right to live in a healthy
environment and to have access to basic public services” and “[t]he States
Parties shall promote the protection, preservation, and improvement of the
environment”.72

The

San

Salvador

Protocol

was

another

important

international gesture toward establishing a globally recognized human right
to a healthy environment, but its practical application in the Americas was
minimal. One shortcoming of the Protocol is participation: only sixteen of the
twenty-four parties to the American Convention have ratified it.73
Furthermore, Article 1 restricts the application of the Protocol by specifying
that it be implemented in a progressive, rather than immediate, manner74
and Article 19.6 prevents individuals from petitioning either the IA Court or
the IA Commission from considering cases stemming from the Protocol’s right
to a healthy environment.75 Thus, even though the Protocol appears to create
a right to a healthy environment, no time line has been created for the
progressive implementation of the right and, even after the right is
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implemented, it will not be afforded the same protection as other rights in the
American Convention.
At the UN, development of a human right to a healthy environment was not
revisited after the 1972 Stockholm Conference until 1987 and the publication
of Our Common Future, also known as the Bruntland Report.76 The
Bruntland Report describes the challenges facing a growing global population
and the impact of humanity on the environment. It not only outlines the
problems caused by environmental degradation, but also provides possible
responses and recommendations. Appendix 1 of the Bruntland Report
provides a list of proposed legal principles for moving forward with
international environmental protection. Principle 1 reiterates the right to a
healthy environment such that: “[a]ll human beings have the fundamental
right to an environment adequate for their health and well being [sic].”77
While the Bruntland Report was not an internationally negotiated document,
it was commissioned by the then Secretary-General of the UN, Javier Pérez
de Cuéllar,78 was formally welcomed by the UN General Assembly.79 The
publication of the Bruntland Report was an important motivation for the Rio
Summit in 1992.80

1.3.3 1990 and beyond

Echoing the Stockholm Conference in 1972, the Rio Summit in 1992 began
with high expectations. At the time, the summit saw the highest attendance
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of Heads of State to any environmental meeting.81 Leading into the summit,
many were again advocating for the international recognition of a human
right to a healthy environment. The US Subcommittee on Human Rights and
International Organizations heard impassioned arguments encouraging the
US to promote the development of this human right at the summit, but the
official US policy preceding the summit was not disclosed.82 The UN’s
Preparatory Committee for the Rio Summit expected the summit to produce
multiple documents, including at least one convention which would, inter

alia, “enshrine certain basic legal principles.”83
While there was no specific mention of a right to a healthy environment in
the Preparatory Committee’s report, the Preparatory Committee had heard
many proposals for the inclusion of environmental rights and it is likely that
the creation of such a right was on their agenda.84 The primary product of the
Rio Summit was the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development:85
another non-binding agreement which would informally mark the end of the
drive, at least at the UN level, to provide legal recognition for the right to a
healthy environment.
At its best, the Rio Declaration provides in Principle 1 that “[h]uman beings
are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled
to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.”86 Although
Soveroski notes that an “entitlement” can “carry the weight of a right”, she
Ibid.
U.S. Policy Toward the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International
Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representivities, One Hundred
Second Congress, First Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992) at 46,
81
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rightly calls this principle weak.87 Its wording is ambiguous and marks a
distinct reversal from the explicit recognition of an individual right to a
healthy environment found in the Stockholm Declaration. The wording in the
Rio Declaration could guarantee a healthy environment, but it could also
refer to balancing human health and (economic) productivity with nature – a
balance which would not necessarily favour the health of the environment.
The Rio negotiations illustrated the challenge associated with attaining
global consensus on ambitious environmental protection. Negotiation began
slowly and was delayed by debate over procedure rather than content.88 The
conference’s Secretary-General intended for the conference to produce an
“Earth Charter”, but this was flatly rejected by the G-77 and China as being
unbalanced: it was perceived as protecting the environment over the interest
of development.89 The text reflects the conflict between Western countries
and the G-77 and China with many Western countries preferring a shift
away

from

human-centered

environmental

protection

toward

the

environment having an intrinsic value. The G77 and China argued that
Western countries did not understand the challenges associated with poverty
and development and their prioritization on “the environment and
development” eventually prevailed in Principle 1 of the text.90
International support for a human right to a healthy environment has only
decreased since the Rio Summit. The 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on
Sustainable Development91 reviewed the relevant progress stemming from
Rio and produced a Plan of Implementation which recommended that States
“[a]cknowledge the consideration being given to the possible relationship
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between

environment

and

human

rights,

including

the

right

to

development.”92 This statement was the closest phrasing to a right to a
healthy environment to come out of Johannesburg and it is significantly
weaker than the Rio Declaration. It is surprising that, even in non-binding
rhetoric, there has been such a marked shift away from establishing a human
right to a healthy environment at the UN level.
The conflict between States with different environmental and development
interests certainly inhibited the development of a right to a healthy
environment at the international level; however, at the regional level some
progress has been made. During the 2002 Johannesburg negotiations, the
European Union once again proposed that any declaration stemming from
the negotiations should include a formal acknowledgement of the link
between

human

rights,

environmental

protection

and

sustainable

development. This did not become part of the Johannesburg Declaration,93
but it did indicate the willingness of regional groups to promote and pursue
strong environmental protection.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the African Charter was strengthened to
incorporate environmental protection into its human rights legislation. First,
in 1998, the Protocol establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights was opened for signature and the court was established in 2004.94 The
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court, unlike the African Commission, can make binding judgements on
human rights cases,95 but it is weakened by limitations placed on access.96
In 2003 the Maputo Protocol expanded the range of human rights protected
in Africa, specifically for women. The Maputo Protocol provides the right of
women to live in a healthy and sustainable environment and to participate in
environment and resource management.97 The rights described by the
Maputo Protocol are arguably some of the most strongly worded international
rights to a healthy environment; however, they have yet to be brought before
the African court.
In Europe, the 1990s and 2000s saw a return to a regional focus on
establishing a human right to a healthy environment. Europe first pushed for
recognition of this right in the 60s and 70s but progress stalled as efforts
moved toward establishing the right at the UN level. In 1990, prior to the Rio
Summit, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe proposed a
regional human right to a healthy environment and included it in a draft
“text of a European charter and a European convention on the environment
and sustainable development”.98 This effort stalled and although the
Parliamentary Assembly repeatedly advocated for the creation of a right to a
healthy environment,99 the Committee of Ministers stated in 2010 that it did
not consider it advisable to draw up an additional protocol at that time.100
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While on one level, the Europeans had explicitly rejected the right to a
healthy environment, some see the 1998 Aarhus Convention101 as at least
partially establishing such a right.102 The Aarhus Convention was negotiated
under the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and while it is
open to “States members of the Economic Commission of Europe as well as
States having consultative status with the Economic Commission for
Europe”,103 all parties to the Convention are either European or Central
Asian States.
The preamble of the Aarhus Convention it provides that “every person has
the right to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and wellbeing”. This is a strongly worded right, but as part of the preamble, is nonbinding. Article 1 is binding on parties, but is more narrowly worded:

In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of
present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to
his or her health and well-being, each Party shall guarantee the rights
of access to information, public participation in decision-making, and
access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with
provisions of this Convention.104

Article 1 references the right of every person to a healthy environment, but it
does not guarantee the right. It only provides the procedural rights to access
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information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in
environmental matters. The Aarhus Convention has been ratified by all EU
Member States and the EU itself. It comes close to establishing a human
right to a healthy environment in Europe but it falls short of creating a
broad, enforceable right.
Finally, the Middle East has also recently moved toward establishing a
human right to a healthy environment. The 2004 Arab Charter on Human
Rights105 provides that “[e]very person has the right to an adequate standard
of living for himself and his family, which ensures their well-being and a
decent life, including food, clothing, housing, services and the right to a
healthy environment. The States Parties shall take the necessary measures
commensurate with their resources to guarantee these rights.”106 The charter
has been ratified by 11 Arab nations,107 but it lacks a strong enforcement
mechanism.108
Overall, the global support for a human right to a healthy environment is
best described as “patchy”. While there was an initial push at the UN level to
formalize a right, success arguably peaked with Principle 1 of the Stockholm
Declaration and obviously declined at the Rio and Johannesburg Summits.
Non-binding declarations have progressively weakened a global recognition of
a connection between human rights and the environment. The dilution of this
international recognition is striking but it may be most clearly presented by
looking at the declarations in reverse order:
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1. [We should] acknowledge the consideration being given to the
possible relationship between environment and human rights
(Johannesburg).
2. Human beings are entitled to a healthy and productive life in
harmony with nature (Rio).
3. Man has the fundamental right to adequate conditions of life in an
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and wellbeing (Stockholm).

This progression, from acknowledging the consideration of a possible right to
declaring a fundamental right, is the order one would normally expect for the
recognition of a new right. The UN process has gone in the opposite direction.
Although the Johannesburg Summit took place in 2002 there has been
minimal progress made since then at the UN level. Regionally, Europe, the
Americas, Africa, and the Middle East have variously progressed toward
establishing a human right to a healthy environment. The San Salvador
Protocol, Maputo Protocol and Arab Charter on Human Rights all provide
strongly worded support for a specific human right to a healthy environment,
but none contains a strong compliance mechanism and all lack universal
regional support.109 In Europe, after a strong initial push to establish a
human right to a healthy environment, the effort peaked with the preamble
of the Aarhus Convention and since then, there has been a reluctance to
create a legally binding right.
It should be noted that significant progress has been made at the national
level to establish a human right to a healthy environment with the right
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having been incorporated into many national constitutions and legislation.

The Environmental Rights Revolution by Boyd provides an extremely
thorough review of national laws, constitutions and international agreements
and finds that almost all nations recognize that their citizens have a legal
right to live in a healthy environment.110 Only fifteen nations do not
recognize the right but among them are: Australia, Canada, China, Japan,
New Zealand and the United States. It should be noted that Boyd’s analysis
clearly argues that there is or at the very least should be a globally
recognized human right to a healthy environment and so while Boyd notes
that 178 out of 193 nations recognize a legal right to a healthy
environment,111 it is not to say that they all effectively enforce and protect
the right.
Given the challenge associated with establishing an enforceable global or
regional right to a healthy environment, the emphasis of this work now shifts
to the ability of regional human rights regimes to use existing human rights
to respond to environmental challenges. Ultimately, this work focuses on the
European and Inter-American human rights regimes, but as previously
mentioned they are not the only regimes working on environmental
protection. The following section outlines the other prominent human rights
regimes to provide some background and to distinguish them from the
European and Inter-American regimes.

1.4 Regional human rights regimes

To determine where regional human rights law has the greatest potential
efficacy, this research focuses on the two most developed regional human
110
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rights regimes and their abilities to respond to a broad array of
environmental challenges. While the European and Inter-American regimes
are the primary focus of this research, it is important to acknowledge the
other regimes and briefly explain why they were not chosen for detailed
analysis.

1.4.1 The Arab human rights regime

The Arab human rights regime is the most easily distinguished and
discounted for the purposes of this work. While the regime does provide one
of the few explicit human rights to a healthy environment,112 it lacks a court,
commission, or tribunal to facilitate contentious jurisprudence. In its current
form the Arab Human Rights Committee is only able to review and comment
on triennial human rights reports which are produced by the participant
nations themselves.113 To date, there have been only eight committee
responses to these national reports,114 none of which has touched upon
environmental issues. As the Arab Human Rights Committee has yet to
comment or utilize the right to a healthy environment, it is exceedingly
difficult to predict its ability to respond to environmental problems. One
option might be to review the regime’s ability to protect other human rights
and then to suppose that similar protection would be provided to the
environment if the issue were to arise, but the regime is so young and the
number of committee reports so few, that to do so would require an
unreasonable amount of speculation. The Arab regime is simply too new to be
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fairly judged on its ability to respond to environmental issues and is therefore
not part of this detailed analysis.

1.4.2 The African human rights regime

The African regime is more developed than the Arab regime: it has a court
capable of providing legally binding decisions on petitioners’ claims, but it is
also a relatively weak and underdeveloped regime.
One of the strengths of the African regime was that it was the first to
establish a formal right to a healthy environment. The 1981 Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Banjul Charter), provides that “[a]ll people
shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their
development.”115 The Banjul Charter also allows claims to be brought
between nations, and by individuals and NGOs.116 These claims are reviewed
by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African
Commission) which gives non-binding decisions.117 Obviously, non-binding
decisions are not as desirable for petitioners as legally binding decisions, but
this is certainly preferable to the absence of any such mechanism as in the
Arab regime.
Unfortunately, thorough analysis of the ability of the African regime to
respond to environmental issues is limited by a lack of relevant case law.
While the opportunity exists to bring environment related cases to the
African Commission, only one case has been brought to date. The Social and

Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social

Banjul Charter, supra note 68 Art 24.
Ibid Arts 55-56.
117 Ibid Art 45.
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Rights v Nigeria,118 concerned environmental damage from oil exploitation
that negatively impacted the applicants’ health.119 The environmental and
human health damage was clear and the decision in the case was not
controversial: there had been a violation of the applicants’ rights to life and
health. However, as the case was reviewed by the African Commission, the
judgment was non-binding and after finding a violation the decision was
limited to “appealing to” and “urging” the Nigerian government to change its
policies.120
The African regime does have a legally binding court. The African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights was established in 2004, but its utility is limited.
The court can make binding judgements on human rights cases,121 but claims
can only be brought between parties to the Protocol. There is an exception
which allows NGOs and individuals to bring claims,122 but these exceptions
require the prior consent of the nation against which the complaint is being
brought.123 As of August 2016, only 24 countries had ratified the Protocol
establishing the court and of those, only seven had consented to claims from
NGOs and individuals.124 The African regime is certainly more robust than
the Arab regime, but the lack of existing case law especially in relation to
environmental issues, means that any discussion on its present ability to
respond to environmental challenges would be too heavily based on
conjecture.

The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social
Rights v Nigeria, No 155/96 [2001] (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights).
119 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social
Rights v Nigeria, Paras 1-2.
120 Ibid Para 69.
121 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 94 Art 30.
122 Ibid Art 5(3).
123 Ibid Art 34(6).
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African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, “List of Countries which have Signed,
Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights”, online:
<http://www.achpr.org/instruments/court-establishment/ratification/>.
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1.4.3 The United Nations human rights regime

Finally, the human rights regime established by the United Nations differs
from all others due to its large membership and the organization’s role in
promoting international consciousness and development of human rights.
Unfortunately it shares the generally weak compliance mechanisms of the
Arab and African regimes and lacks a rich jurisprudence on environmental
issues.
The Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR provides the UN’s only avenue
for pursuing environmental protection through human rights. In E.H.P. v

Canada125 the Committee reviewed a claim against the proposed storage of
radioactive waste. The decision provided little guidance as to the actual
obligations of States with regard to protecting people at risk of environmental
hazards due to the case being dismissed without any substantive discussion
of the issue. Bordes and Temeharo v France also related to nuclear
radiation,126 but was not significantly more helpful as the committee
concluded that the authors were not “victims”, ostensibly because they did
not die or get sick from the nuclear tests and because they could not prove
that there was an imminent threat of death.
In Apirana Mahuika et al. v New Zealand,127 the ICCPR’s Human Rights
Committee reviewed a claim that fishing regulations contravened a native
group’s rights to self-determination, non-discrimination, and minority rights
as a culture.128 The New Zealand government claimed that the regulations
were intended to protect the health of the fishery and applied to both
EHP v Canada, No 67/1980 [1982] .
Bordes and Temeharo v France, No 645/1995 [1996] .
127 Apirana Mahuika et al v New Zealand, No 547/1993 [2000] .
128 Ibid Para 1.
125
126
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commercial and non-commercial fishers. The history of these regulations and
the challenges faced by the Maori people in accessing the fishery is
complex,129 but the Committee ultimately determined that restrictions could
be placed on the fishery, even though it was determined to be an essential
element of Maori culture.130 Restrictions were allowed because members of
the minority group had the opportunity to participate in the decision-making
process regarding said restrictions.131 The Committee’s decision ostensibly
determined that environmental protection, in this case conservation of fish
stocks, was in the interests of all members of Maori people by providing
sustainable stocks and overrode the cultural rights of the minority Maori
population.132
The UN’s human rights regime has touched upon environmental issues, but
has held back on making progressive judgements or establishing binding
human rights to water or a healthy environment. The Human Rights
Committee has also heard relatively few cases pertaining to these issues and
it is difficult to critique the ability of the Human Rights Committee to
respond to environmental challenges using this small sample set.
In contrast to these three regimes, the European and Inter-American regimes
have both been used on numerous occasions to provide strong environmental
protection using human rights. They both have established human rights
courts that are capable of providing legally binding judgments for cases
brought by individual petitioners. These courts enjoy comparatively broad
participation of the regimes’ member states and their jurisprudence (in
conjunction with decisions of their respective commissions) is developed
enough to allow for trends to become evident.

Ibid Paras 5.1-5.13.
Ibid Para 9.3.
131 Ibid Para 9.5.
132 Apirana Mahuika et al v New Zealand, No 547/1993 [2000] Para 9.9.
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The analysis of these two regimes is sub-divided by their abilities to respond
to three specific environmental challenges: point-source pollution, climate
change, and conservation. The following briefly introduces what is meant by
these terms before engaging in a detailed analysis of the respective regimes.

1.5 The three environmental problems under consideration

Together, point-source pollution, climate change and conservation provide a
broad representation of current environmental problems. These three issues
vary greatly in their geographic impact, temporal response, and legal
complexity. Point-source pollution is localized, but climate change is a global
problem. Point-source pollution is commonly responded to after the pollution
has occurred whereas ecosystem conservation is often pre-emptive; ideally
occurring before environmental damage is done. The following explores these
three types of environmental issues to illustrate their differences and outline
some of the recent development within international human rights law.

1.5.1 Point-source pollution

Point-source

pollution

is

the

most

common

and

familiar

form

of

environmental degradation. The term refers to any pollution which is emitted
from a singular identifiable source such as a factory, water treatment plant,
power plant, or refinery. The pollution can be in various forms, including
chemicals released to the air or water, excessive noise, light or heat. Incidents
of point-source pollution often have a clear geographic location, specific
timeframe and particular emission, so one can often find a clear path of
causation between the pollution and its impact on the environment. These
36

attributes have made point-source pollution cases the most common form of
environmental adjudication in human rights regimes. Cases have arisen
from, inter alia: long-term factory emissions,133 one-time releases of toxic
materials,134 and the storage of nuclear materials.135 Point-source pollution
cases have had a relatively successful track record in the human rights
courts, but their localized nature can limit their ability to be catalysts for
large-scale environmental protection. Certainly, the combined impact of
multiple

instances

of

point-source

pollution

can

create

large-scale

environmental problems such as poor air quality and contaminated aquifers,
but responding to these problems with numerous individual claims can be
inefficient and ineffectual. This is why some have sought means to respond to
large-scale problems by focusing on the outcome rather than its sources;
climate change is probably the best example of this.

1.5.2 Climate change

Climate change is a global problem with potentially greater impacts than
traditional point-source pollution.136 Unlike point-source pollution, climate
change is a global problem and from a legal perspective has complex issues
surrounding causation. Certainly, climate change is not the only global
environmental challenge: ozone depletion and plastic pollution in the oceans
are other obvious examples, but climate change is arguably the most complex
and potentially dangerous global environmental problem.

López Ostra v Spain, [1994] ECHR 16798/90 (European Court of Human Rights).
Tatar c Roumanie, No 67021/01 (27 janvier 2009) (European Court of Human Rights).
135 EHP v Canada, supra note 125.
136 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2013: The Physical
Science Basis: Working Group I Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2014).
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There are major challenges to the use of human rights to address climate
change impacts, but the perceived strengths of international human rights
law has created a strong push to find ways to overcome potential problems.
The greatest hurdle in using human rights to address climate change is a
difference in how the concept of causation is understood in law and in science.
Scientifically, the causal relationship between greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions and climate change is widely accepted and experts are continually
gaining confidence in their ability to connect particular climactic occurrences
with anthropogenic climate change.137 On the other hand, it is more difficult
to establish these same causal connections to a degree which satisfies the
standard of legal causation. Scientists may be confident that particular
weather events are direct impacts of anthropogenic climate change, and these
events may negatively impact aspects of an individual’s life normally
protected by human rights, but this does not necessarily mean that a
successful human rights claim exists.
Connecting a specific GHG emissions source with a specific negative climate
change impact is difficult scientifically and legally. While all GHG emissions
contribute to climate change, it is difficult if not impossible, to attribute a
particular emission to a particular negative impact. Human rights cases have
been brought to the IA Commission that have attempted to overcome the
challenge of establishing causation and they are discussed in Section 3.2 of
this work.

1.5.3 Ecosystem conservation

Core Writing Team, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, R.K. Pachauri & Reisinger,
A, eds. (Geneva: IPCC, 2007).
137
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Finally, ecosystem conservation, while an obvious environmental issue,
differs greatly from point-source pollution and climate change. It is
particularly suited to pre-emptive protection rather than after the fact
responses. Ecological restoration of land that has been damaged by human
activity is time and resource consuming and it is always easier to protect and
ecosystem from severe degradation than it is to restore it to its original state.
Ideally, conservation occurs before damage is done, protecting the
environment and the human rights of individuals present.
International human rights law does not have a strong history of using
injunctions to provide the necessary pre-emptive protection of rights and so
using human rights to establish ecosystem conservation is a challenging task.
While both regimes have dealt with ecosystem conservation, they have taken
very different approaches. The European regime has promoted conservation
not to protect human rights, but to protect the environment in spite of an
individual’s established human rights.138 In contrast, the Inter-American
regime has not dealt directly with conservation, but has decided that
indigenous populations have an ability to limit activities on their traditional
lands potentially facilitating conservation.139
The next two chapters of this work look closely at these two regimes: their
early histories, evolutions, and how they both respond to these three types of
environmental challenges. The first regime analyzed is the European human
rights regime: a regime which is in many ways a more complicated than its
Inter-American counterpart.

Hamer v Belgium, No 21861/03 (27 November 2007) (European Court of Human Rights).
See Saramaka People v Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Inter-Am Ct HR,
(Ser C) No 172 (2007) ; Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador, Judgment of June
27, 2012, Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 245 (2012) and more generally Section 13 of this work.
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Chapter 2: European Human Rights

The European human rights regime differs greatly from other regional
human rights regimes as it is composed of two distinct human rights bodies;
each with separate organizations, founding documents, and tribunals. This
chapter looks at the development of the two European regimes, their
relationship, conflict, and their abilities to respond to environmental
challenges. While there is significant overlap of the rights protected by each
body, the two have very different histories. On one hand, the Council of
Europe is the institution which oversees the application of one of the oldest
and most authoritative regional human rights documents: the European
Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR).140 On the other hand, the
European Union oversees the relatively recent Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (the CFREU).141 The presence of these two
human rights bodies provides exceptionally comprehensive human rights
protection in Europe, but there is a lack of clarity over the jurisdiction and
authority of the bodies’ courts and this has the potential for conflict and
unclear law.
Prior to analyzing the application of European human rights law to
environmental challenges, it is vital to understand the designs and
capabilities of the two European human rights bodies. To do this, Section 2.1
reviews the history of the institutions: the Council of Europe and the
European Union and Section 2.2 looks at the development of human rights
within these institutions. Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 analyze the abilities of the
comparatively robust rights under the ECHR to address point-source
pollution, climate change, and conservation. Finally, Section 2.6 looks at the
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November

1950, 213 UNTS 222 [ECHR].
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Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2000] OJ, C364/1 [CFREU].
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relatively new rights under the CFREU and their potential ability to respond
to these environmental challenges.

2.1 The development of European human rights institutions

Regional human rights in Europe are complicated. The main source of this
complication is the relationship between the Council of Europe and the
European Union and the jurisdictional overlap of their two main human
rights documents: the ECHR and the CFREU. While today, both the CoE and
EU have strong human rights documents with corresponding courts, the path
taken by these two institutions to protect human rights could not have been
more different. From its inception the CoE was focused on human rights
protection whereas the EU’s initial focus was on economic integration. The
CoE drafted the ECHR in 1950 and it came into effect in 1953. In contrast,
the CFREU was initially drafted in 2000 and it came into effect in 2009.
The following is a short introduction to European human rights development.
It explains why Europe has two distinct human rights documents and courts
and it aims to clarify the relevant differences between the Council of Europe
and the European Union.

2.1.1 European political action after World War II

At the end of the World War II European politicians and policymakers
pursued two different paths to unify Europe and prevent another conflict.
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Interestingly, rather than one approach gaining favour and the other being
discarded, both approaches were successfully implemented in parallel.142
In the early 1950s, the Council of Europe and the European Coal and Steel
Community (which would later become the European Union) were created to
provide solidarity and stability to Europe. Today, the two organizations can
be difficult to distinguish due to their similar names, geography,
membership, mandates, institutions, and their identical flags and anthems;
however, when they were created, the two organizations were absolutely and
fundamentally distinct.

2.1.1.1 Development of the Council of Europe

Sir Winston Churchill is frequently credited as pioneering the idea of the
Council of Europe.143 In his 1943 “Broadcast to the nation”144 and his 1946
“Zurich Speech”,145 Churchill called for a ‘Council of Europe’, which he
likened to a “United States of Europe”. Two years later, a conference was
held in The Hague to discuss the proposed council and it was concluded that
an economic and political union should be created in which European nations
would give up some of their sovereign rights to facilitate regional cohesion.146

Successful in terms of growth, participation and, so far, preventing another war in
Europe.
143 Birte Wassenberg, History of the Council of Europe (Council of Europe, 2013) at 13;
European Commission, “Winston Churchill: calling for a United States of Europe” Last
accessed April 1, 2016, available at <http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/foundingfathers/pdf/winston_churchill_en.pdf>.
144 Winston Churchill, Speech to the nation (London: BBC, 1943) An excerpt of the speech
can be found here
<https://www.coe.int/t/dgal/dit/ilcd/Archives/selection/Churchill/Default_en.asp>.
145 Winston Churchill, (University of Zurich, 1946).
146 “Political Resolution of the Hague Congress (7–10 May 1948)”, online: cvce.eu
<http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/political_resolution_of_the_hague_congress_7_10_may_1948-en15869906-97dd-4c54-ad85-a19f2115728b.html> Resolutions 1 and 3.
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The parties called for the immediate drafting of a Charter of Human Rights
and the establishment of a court to guarantee said rights.147
The Council of Europe was formally created by the Treaty of London in
1949.148 Its aim was to forge European unity by facilitating new regional
treaties that reflected the common ideas and morals of Europeans.149 Treaties
would pertain to economic, social, and cultural issues as well as science, law,
and human rights. They would be drafted by the CoE and nations would
commit to them in accordance with international treaty law. The role of the
CoE was not to govern its members, but to highlight commonality between its
members and to facilitate cooperation through established international
treaty law.
From its inception, the CoE had a broad mandate and it has successfully
established treaties on many topics including: human rights,150 education,151
intellectual property152, transportation,153 adoption,154 animal welfare,155 and
sports.156 All CoE treaties are independent documents and vary in
enforceability and membership. Some treaties, such as the ECHR, have been

Ibid Resolutions 9 - 13.
Statute of the Council of Europe, 5 May 1949, Eur TS 001 [Treaty of London].
149 Ibid Art 1.
150 ECHR, supra note 140.
151 European Convention on the Equivalence of Diplomas Leading to Admission to
Universities, 11 December 1953, Eur TS 15 [European Convention on the Equivalence of
Diplomas Leading to Admission to Universities].
152 European Convention on the International Classification of Patents for Inventions, 19
December 1954, Eur TS 17 [European Convention on the International Classification of
Patents for Inventions]; Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law
on Patents for Invention, 27 December 1963, Eur TS 47 [Convention on the Unification of
Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for Invention].
153 European Convention on the Punishment of Road Traffic Offences, 30 November 1964,
Eur TS 17 [European Convention on the Punishment of Road Traffic Offences].
154 European Convention on the Adoption of Children, 24 May 1967, Eur TS 58 [European
Convention on the Adoption of Children].
155 European Convention on the Protection of Animals for Slaughter, 10 May 1979, Eur TS
102 [European Convention on the Protection of Animals for Slaughter]; European
Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals, 13 November 1987, Eur TS 125 [European
Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals].
156 Anti-Doping Convention, 16 November 1989, Eur TS 135 [Anti-Doping Convention].
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ratified by all CoE member states,157 others, such as the European Social
Charter,158 have only been ratified by a subset of CoE members; others, such
as the Anti-Doping Convention, are open to ratification by countries which
are not CoE members.159
Organizationally, the CoE is divided into four main institutions: the
Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly,160 the Congress of the
Council of Europe, and the Secretariat. While each of these institutions has
its own functions, the roles of the Committee of Ministers from the
Parliamentary Assembly are most important for this work as they have the
greatest impact on human rights law and its development.
The Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly are the CoE’s
decision-making and deliberative bodies, respectively. The Committee of
Ministers determines all matters relating to the internal working of the
CoE161 and, importantly, decides when to open new conventions and Protocols
for signature.162 The Parliamentary Assembly’s role is to debate and make
formal recommendations to the Committee of Ministers on which conventions
and protocols to adopt.163 As this work reviews the development of European
human rights as proposed by both the Parliamentary Assembly and the
157

Membership in the CoE is actually contingent upon ratification of the ECHR see

Resolution 1031 on the honouring of commitments entered into by Member States when
joining the Council of Europe, Resolution 1031, Council of Europe (2009) [Parliamentary
Assembly Res 1031], para 9.
158 European Social Charter, 26 February 1965, 529 UNTS 89 [European Social Charter].
159 Anti-Doping Convention, supra note 156 Art 14.
Referred to as the Consultative Assembly in the Treaty of London, but currently known as
the Parliamentary Assembly.
161 The Committee of Ministers consists of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of each of the CoE’s
Member States and each has one vote.161 In contrast, the Parliamentary Assembly
(Parliamentary Assembly) is made up of national MPs from the CoE Member States,161 in
ratios roughly based on their population size. Article 16 except those relating to the
functioning of the Parliamentary Assembly
162 Treaty of London, supra note 148 Art 15.
163 Ibid Art 22. Recommendations contain proposals addressed to the Committee of Ministers,
which would need to be implemented by governments. The Parliamentary Assembly can also
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Committee of Ministers, it is important to understand that the authority of
these bodies is not equal.
Since 1949 the CoE has created over 200 regional agreements and
amendments to these agreements. It began with a 10 Party membership
which has since expanded to 47 European nations.164 It includes all 28
members of the European Union as well as various European principalities;
Eastern

European

nations;

Russia,

Turkey,

Iceland,

Norway,

and

Switzerland.165 The large membership of the CoE reflects its general
endorsement among European nations, but the design of the CoE has always
differed significantly from the “United States of Europe” originally proposed
by Churchill.
The CoE is not a supranational institution: it does not establish the economic
and political union proposed at the original conference in The Hague. It is
incapable of independently creating laws which bind its members. It can
draft treaties, but these still need to be signed and ratified independently by
it member states.
Churchill’s rhetoric in 1946 and 1948 resulted in greater European
cooperation, but it did not create a supranational union that could be likened
to a ‘United States of Europe’. However, the idea of European economic
integration remained popular and was taken up by Robert Schuman.
Schuman

also

sought

European

stability

through

economic

interdependence166 and his proposals eventually resulted in the modern
European Union.
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“Signatures and ratifications of the Statute of the Council of Europe”, online: Treaty
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165 Ibid.
166 Robert Schuman, Schuman Declaration (Paris, 1950).
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2.1.1.2 Development of the European Union

The modern EU began as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in
1951 with a relatively narrow mandate and membership.167 It was based on
the Schuman Declaration of 1950 which proposed a federation of Europe to
facilitate European stability.168 The declaration proposed bringing together
German and French coal and steel production, under the common regulation
of a “High Authority” which would regulate the industry and possess the
independent authority to bind national governments.169 The establishing
Treaty of Paris created “an economic community, the basis for a broader and
deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts”.170 Four
nations171 joined France and Germany in unifying their coal and steel
production under an independent, external executive body thereby creating
the world’s first supranational authority.172
The ECSC expanded in membership and mandate ultimately forming the
modern European Union. The mandate has gradual moved from a common
coal and steel market to a single common market for all European products
and services. It includes a common currency and unrestricted movement of
labour. Many modern EU rights have developed from a relatively small
number of labour rights provided in the original ECSC treaty.173 Initially, the
ECSC provided labour rights and European Human rights were provided for
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 18 April 1951, 261 UNTS
140 [Treaty of Paris].
168 Schuman, supra note 166.
169 Ibid.
170 Treaty of Paris, supra note 167 Preamble.
171 Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Italy
172 Iris Glockner & Berthold Rittberger, “The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
and the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaties” in Finn Laursen, ed, Designing the
European Union: From Paris to Lisbon (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 16 at 16.
173 Treaty of Paris, supra note 167 Article 3(e) provides that the institutions of the
Community shall “ promote the improvement of the living and working conditions of the
labor force in each of the industries under its jurisdiction so as to make possible the
equalization of such conditions in an upward direction”.
167
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by the CoE; however, as the EU’s mandate grew, so did a need for it to
properly address human rights.
The EU was forced to address human rights when it became apparent that
EU laws could be in conflict with fundamental human rights. The European
Court of Justice (herein the ECJ) had to resolve instances where EU law
conflicted with human rights – a particular challenge when all EU members
are equally bound to EU law and the ECHR. The EU has attempted to define
its interpretation of human rights and its relationship to the ECHR, but its
efforts have arguably only served to complicate the situation.174

2.2 Human rights in Europe

The foundations of the ECHR and the CFREU are very different: from its
inception, the CoE was intended to establish binding international human
rights in Europe. In contrast, the ECSC was an economic agreement and not
expressly concerned with human rights. It was only through the gradual
expansion of the ECSC to the modern EU that human rights began to be
incorporated into EU law: first through jurisprudence and then by legislation.
At the same time as the EU was gradually weaving human rights into its
law, the ECHR was expanding its membership and its concept of human
rights. Importantly for this work, much of the recent area of expansion has
revolved around the recognition of a human right to a healthy environment.

2.2.1 Development of human rights under the Council of Europe

174

See Section 2.2.3 of this work
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The ECHR was drafted in the shadow and influence of the UN’s Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.175 The texts are similar, but easily
distinguished by the ECHR’s creation of a court to review human rights
violations and provide binding decisions on the member states.176 The
European Court of Human Rights (herein the European Court) was
established in 1959.
The original text of the ECHR has been amended by 16 Protocols, 8 of which
are currently in effect. Protocols 2, 3, 5, 8, 9 and 10 were replaced in 1998 by
Protocol 11 which, along with Protocol 14, alter the procedure by which
claims are brought to the court.177 Protocols 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, and 13 are
substantive alterations to the ECHR that create new rights. Of the protocols,
the First Protocol has had the largest actual impact on protecting the
environment: entering into force 1954, it expanded the right to property to
establish that “[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions”.178 A new protocol has also been proposed on a
number of occasions, one which would establish a right to a healthy
environment, and it has a potential for even greater environmental
protection.179
In 1990, prior to the global Rio Summit, the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly
proposed the creation of a European convention on the environment and
sustainable development.180 The draft convention specified that “every person
has the fundamental right to an environment and living conditions
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217(III) UNGAOR, 3d Sess, Sup No 13,
UN Docc A/810, (1948) [UDHR].
176 ECHR, supra note 140 Art 19.
177 Protocols 15 and 16 also alter the way in which the ECHR functions, but neither has so
far entered into force.
178 Its application is explored in Section 8.1.1 of this work.
175

Future action to be taken by the Council of Europe in the field of environmental
protection, Recommendation 1431, Council of Europe (1999) [PA Rec 1431]; Environment and
human rights, Recommendation 1614, Council of Europe (2003) [PA Rec 1614]; PA Rec 1885,
supra note 99.
180 PA Rec 1130, supra note 98.
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conductive to his good health, well-being and full development of the human
personality.”181 Similarly, Article 2 provided that “[e]very European and
every Contracting European State has an equivalent duty to preserve and
protect the environment in the interests of the health and well-being of all
people inside and outside Europe, for the benefit of present and future
generations”.182
The draft convention was extensive with 18 Articles concerning, inter alia:
sustainable development, industrial development, energy production, landusage, and waste management.183 The Committee of Ministers reviewed the
Parliamentary Assembly’s draft convention, but decided to postpone
consideration until after the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.184
Unfortunately, it does not appear that the Committee of Ministers explicitly
returned to consider the draft convention after the summit in Rio.
The Parliamentary Assembly revisited an environmental right 1999 when it
first asked the Committee of Ministers to examine the feasibility of drafting a
protocol to the ECHR establishing the right of individuals to a healthy and
viable environment.185 It did so again in 2003, recommending that the CoE
establish safeguards against arbitrary environmental degradation.186 To
support this position the Parliamentary Assembly noted that many European
countries had already added the principle of environmental protection to
their constitutions.187 The Parliamentary Assembly also recommended that
governments of member states “recognize a human right to a healthy, viable

Ibid, para 6.
Ibid, para 7.
183 PA Rec 1130, supra note 98 see paras 7, 8, 9, 10, and 21 respectively.
184 On the formulation of a European charter and a European convention on environmental
protection and sustainable development - Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1130
(1990), CM/AS(91)Rec1130-final, Council of Europe (11 April 1991) [Council of Ministers on
Recommendation 1130], para 6.
185 PA Rec 1431, supra note 179 at 11(ii)(b).
186 PA Rec 1614, supra note 179, para 4.
187 Ibid, para 7.
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and decent environment which includes the objective obligation for states to
protect the environment”.188
In 2009 the Parliamentary Assembly once again recommended that the
Committee of Ministers draft an additional protocol to the ECHR concerning
the right to a healthy environment.189 The Recommendation reminds the
Committee of Ministers of the Stockholm Declaration’s Principle 1: “Man has
the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in
an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being”.190
It also argues that society and individuals have a responsibility to pass on a
healthy and viable environment to future generations, in accordance with the
principle of solidarity between generations.191
The Committee of Ministers did not formally reply to all of the Parliamentary
Assembly’s Recommendations to establish a right to a healthy environment,
however it did reply to the 2009 recommendation in 2010. It stated that it
recognized the importance of a healthy, viable and decent environment and
that it considers it relevant to the protection of human rights,192 but it
refused to draw up an additional protocol to that effect.193 In the Committee
of Ministers’ opinion, the ECHR already indirectly contributes to the
protection of the environment through existing rights and the interpretation
of the evolving case law of the European Court.194
The Committee of Ministers’ 2010 comments acknowledge that the
environment is an important human rights issue and deserving protection,
Ibid, para 9(ii).
PA Rec 1885, supra note 99.
190 Ibid at (5).
191 Ibid at at (9).
192 Committee of Ministers reply to “The challenges posed by climate change” Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1883 and “Drafting an additional protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights concerning the right to a healthy environment” Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1885 (2009), CM/AS(2010)Rec1883-1885 final,
Council of Europe (18 June 2010) [CM Reply to PA Recs 1883-1885], para 7.
193 Ibid, para 9.
194 Ibid.
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but there is no need to legislate in this area. The Committee of Ministers
believes that the judiciary has shown itself capable of creatively interpreting
the existing law in order to provide the necessary protection. In general, it is
uncommon for a legislative body to defer the creation of laws to the judiciary,
especially in an area where it believes protection is necessary. What may be
more likely, and this is speculation, is that the Committee of Ministers
publically wants to appear in support of environmental protection, but
privately

certain CoE member states

are resistant to

the formal

establishment of a right.
While legislative efforts to recognize a right to a healthy environment appear
to have stalled in the CoE, a 2009 decision by the European Court of Human
Rights may have established a partial right to a healthy environment as part
of the culmination of its evolving case law.195

2.2.2 Development of human rights and the EU

The EU has taken a long time to establish its own human rights document.
In some ways this is not surprising as (i) the ECSC was not concerned with
human rights; (ii) the ECSC’s gradual development into the modern EU
meant that human rights issues were initially infrequent and easily resolved;
and (iii) for legal and political reasons, the EU was unable to simply rely on
the ECHR as a basis for its human rights.
In the beginning, the ECSC was an organization almost singularly designed
to facilitate economic integration. While its treaty did include a section on the
protection of workers’ rights, the ECSC was established at the same time as
ECHR and, with all members of the ECSC also party to the ECHR, there was
195
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no need for the ECSC to duplicate the work of the ECHR. Initially, the ECSC
had a modest aim of improving working conditions and living standards of
steel workers,196 but as the ECSC expanded into the modern EU, these aims
also expanded to include protecting people’s rights197 and the environment.198
The first indication the human rights would necessarily become an issue for
EU law arose when an applicant forced the ECJ to consider the relationship
between EU law and other sources of law. In 1964, the ECJ ruled that EU
treaty law could not be overridden by domestic legal provisions.199 The case
did not comment on the relationship between EU treaty law and
international treaty law, but if EU law superseded national law, it was clear
that the ECJ would eventually have to address whether or not it similarly
superseded international human rights law.
In Handelsgesellschaft,200 an EU law was challenged against German Basic
Law,201 in particular, the “principles of freedom of action and disposition, of
economic liberty and of proportionality”.202 The case arose from an EU
mandated export license and the applicant’s claim that it violated their
fundamental right under the German Constitution. While this aspect of
German Basic Law might not be considered a fundamental human right,
German Basic Law protects other human rights, such as the rights to life,203
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equality before the law,204 and other freedoms found in the ECHR. The
decision of the ECJ was to distinguish human rights from other law and
acknowledge that “respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of
the general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice… and must be
ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the [EU]”.205

Handelsgesellschaft incorporated human rights into EU law while remaining
vague as to precisely what was meant by “fundamental rights”. In
subsequent cases, the ECJ referenced various rights, including the right to
property ownership;206 the inviolability of commercial premises;207 and the
ECHR in general,208 but the ECJ consistently stated that national human
rights documents and the ECHR only provided “guidelines” for EU law.209
Where national laws conflicted with EU law, the ECJ would, when necessary,
review the law based on both EU law and its compatibility with the ECHR,210
but the ECJ made it clear that the ECHR would not be used as a definitive
source of EU human rights.211
The result was that EU law protected human rights, but neither applicants
nor the ECJ knew precisely which human rights were afforded protection.
What rights would the ECJ consider “fundamental rights”? Faced with this
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lack of legal certainty, it was only a matter of time before EU legislators
acted to formally enshrine human rights into EU law.
In 1996, the ECJ considered the possibility of the EU becoming a party to the
ECHR,212 but the ECJ determined that without an express or implied power,
the EU did not have the competence to enter international agreements in the
field of human rights.213 With the ECJ’s decision, two streams of action
became available to the EU: pass legislation to provide the EU explicit legal
competence to accede to the ECHR or establish its own human rights
document. Unfortunately, the EU chose to do both simultaneously and this
has resulted in a very complex legal regime.
Efforts to establish an EU human rights document were nearly completed in
2000 with the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union in the European Constitution in 2000.214 However, the
European Constitution was never ratified and did not come into force. In
2009 the Lisbon Treaty came into effect and it made specific reference to the
CFREU giving it legal authority. At the same time, the EU pursued efforts to
accede to the ECHR.
The end result of this is an extremely complex system of human rights in
Europe. The CFREU and ECHR exist in parallel and both apply to all 28 EU
Member States. The EU itself is in the process of also joining the ECHR at
which point its institutions it will be bound by these two human rights
documents and potentially two human rights courts: the ECJ and the
European Court of Human Rights. This complex relationship is further
explored below.
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2.2.3 The relationship between the CFREU and the ECHR

Europe has two legally binding international human rights documents with
similar rights and overlapping membership. They have different courts and
each court has valid claim to legal supremacy. While this sounds like a
situation rife with legal conflicts, there was an opportunity for legislators to
design two human rights systems which functioned in tandem and did not
have overlapping mandates; unfortunately while they came very close to
achieving this, unresolved conflicts remain.
There are two aspects to consider when reviewing the jurisdictional overlap
of the ECHR and the CFREU. One is the current conflicts that exist because
the CFREU is designed with explicit authority over areas of law to which the
ECHR already has authority. The other is the potential conflict which will
arise when the EU accedes to the ECHR: specifically, how will authority be
split between the European Court and the ECJ? The following looks at both
of these conflicts in turn.

2.2.3.1 The current conflicts of authority between CFREU and the ECHR

Textually, the CFREU and the ECHR are similar, but are not identical: most
notably, the CFREU contains a right to environmental protection not present
in the ECHR.215 The jurisdiction of the courts overseeing the two documents
is also different: the European Court of Human Rights only settles disputes

215
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55

arising from the ECHR,216 whereas the ECJ’s considers cases arising from all
EU Treaties.217
These authoritative conflicts are most apparent in the application of each
document. The ECHR’s application is broad: it applies to any action taken by
its member states. The European Court cannot review EU law or the actions
of EU institutions, because the EU is not a party to the ECHR; however, EU
Member States are bound to the ECHR and are responsible for implementing
EU legislation in ways which conform to the ECHR.218 In contrast, the
CFREU only applies to EU law and EU institutions;219 it does not apply to
the national laws of EU Member States.
These jurisdictional distinctions almost create a perfect division of authority:
national actions of EU Member States must comply with the ECHR and the
EU as an institution must adhere to the CFREU. This clear division is
unfortunately undone by both courts having simultaneous authority over EU
Member States’ implementation of EU law.220
The ECJ has yet to review a case questioning if an EU Member State’s
implementation of an EU law conforms with the CFREU, but its authority to
do so is specified by Article 51(1): “The provisions of this Charter are
addressed… to the member states only when they are implementing Union
Law”.221
In 1999, the European Court made it clear that it would also review the
implementation of EU law.222 It determined that even though the EU itself
was not a signatory to the ECHR, EU Member States were responsible for
ECHR, supra note 140 Art. 19.
TEU, supra note 197 Article 267.
218 Matthews v The United Kingdom, No 24833/94 (18 February 1999) (European Court of
216
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implementing EU legislation in compliance with the ECHR. The European
Court of Human Rights stated that, even though EU Member States could
transfer competencies to the EU, they remained responsible for the way laws
made under those competencies were implemented.223
The relationship between the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights
was brought into focus by the Bosphorus cases in which the same issue was
brought to both the ECJ and the European Court. The case arose when Irish
authorities impounded a Turkish operated airplane, because of the plane’s
Yugoslavian ownership and an EU regulation224 that imposed UN sanctions
on Yugoslavia.225
The Turkish airline took their case first to the ECJ and claimed that the
actions of the Irish government were inconsistent with the purpose of the
sanctions.226 The airline was renting the plane from a Yugoslavian firm, but
money was paid into a frozen account and therefore, they applicants argued it
was not benefitting anyone in Yugoslavia.227 The ECJ disagreed and
determined that impounding the airplane was justified as a sanction against
Yugoslavia.228
The Bosphorus case was then brought to the European Court of Human
Rights where the applicants argued that impounding the plane violated the
operators’ Protocol 1 Article 1 right to property.229 The applicants claimed
that the Irish authorities had discretion over the application of the EU
Regulation, wrongly applied that discretion, and as a result, violated their
Ibid, para 32.
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 990/93 of 26 April 1993 concerning trade between the
European Economic Community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), 26 April 1993, OJ L 102, 2841993 [Council Regulation on Yugoslavia].
225 United Nations Security Council Resolution 820, 17 April 1993, S/RES/820 [United
Nations Security Council Resolution 820], para 21.
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property rights.230 First, the European Court of Human Rights held that
application of the EU Regulation did not allow for any discretion by the Irish
Authorities.231 Then it

considered if

impounding

the airplane was

nevertheless a violation of the applicants’ property rights.
In its decision, the European Court of Human Rights introduced a new
component to European human rights law, the doctrine of equivalent
protection: where an organization (in this case the EU) provides equivalent
protection to human rights to that of the ECHR, the presumption is that a
member of that organization (in this case Ireland), has not violated the
ECHR when it does no more than implement the legal obligations applied to
it by the organization.232 The court went on to say that this presumption
could be rebutted on a case-by-case basis if it is shown that protection of the
ECHR is manifestly deficient.233 It did not find the EU’s approach to be
“manifestly deficient” in the Bosphorus case234 and relied on equivalent
protection to reach the same conclusion as the ECJ.235
The doctrine of equivalent protection allows the European Court of Human
Rights to defer a significant amount to authority to the EU and the ECJ,
while retaining its claim on ultimate judicial authority. In Bosphorus, the
European Court of Human Rights also made reference to the need for
“international cooperation”, presumably a specific reference to cooperation
between itself and the ECJ. It also stated that the value of such cooperation
would be outweighed by any possible violation of the ECHR, at which point
its own authority would be supreme.236
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In Matthews and Bosphorus the European Court of Human Rights illustrated
its willingness to exert authority over both EU law and ECJ rulings, but the
European Court of Human Right’s jurisdiction over EU law is limited to EU
Member State’s implementation of EU laws. Until the EU becomes party to
the ECHR, human rights violations by EU institutions, such as the European
Parliament or the European Commission, can only be considered by the ECJ.
The ECJ currently considers human rights cases based on the CFREU, but as
early as 1969, the ECJ recognized that “fundamental human rights [are]
enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the
[ECJ]”.237 Unfortunately, prior to the entry into force of the CFREU, it was
unclear which rights would be protected by the ECJ.
In Nold,238 the ECJ stated that fundamental human rights “form an integral
part of the general principles of law” and in determining which rights to
protect, the ECJ would “draw inspiration” from the constitutional traditions
common to EU Member States, and from international human rights treaties
on which the member states have collaborated or to which they are
signatories.239 While the ECJ did not specifically mention the ECHR, it
clearly fit this description. It was not until 1989 that the ECJ made specific
reference to the ECHR stating that it was “of particular significance” when
reviewing human rights cases.240
Prior to the entry into force of the CFREU, European human rights
adjudication was not only split between two jurisdictions with two

Erich Stauder v City of Ulm, [1969] Case 29/69 ECLI:EU:C:1969:57 (Court of Justice of
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independent courts, but there was no clarity as to the rights protected by the
ECJ. The European Court based human rights explicitly on the ECHR, but
the ECJ could rely on the ECHR, other international agreements, and
national constitutions.
There were two obvious problems with the law at the time. One was that two
independent courts allowed the same right to be interpreted and protected
differently depending on whether the right was violated by an EU Member
State or an EU institution. The other was that while the ECJ had clearly
begun adjudicating human rights cases, neither the ECJ nor EU legislators
were willing to specify what constituted a human right within the European
Union.241 Both of these problems could have been overcome by either the EU
becoming a formal party to the ECHR or the drafting of a well-defined human
rights document for the European Union. EU accession to the ECHR could
have made the European Court of Human Rights superior to the ECJ and
provided the EU with a definitive list of well-established human rights. The
other option would be for the EU to create its own human rights document,
thereby providing a clear list of rights while retaining the ECJ’s
independence.242 However, rather than taking either of these options, the EU
has committed to simultaneously doing both and it has resulted in significant
legal conflicts.
The Lisbon Treaty established an EU specific human rights document, the
CFREU.243 It clarifies the human rights to be applied to EU institutions and
EU law (a competency already claimed by the ECHR as per Matthews and

Bosphorus). At the same time, the Lisbon Treaty also committed the EU to
accede to the ECHR.
Early attempts at specifying EU rights had been made (see Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe, supra note 214.) but they had failed to become binding.
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In response to the ECJ’s 1996 opinion that the EU did not have the mandate
to become party to the ECHR,244 the Lisbon Treaty explicitly gave the EU the
necessary authority.245 Parallel actions were also conducted at the CoE with
the passage of Protocol 14 of the ECHR,246 to allow the EU to accede to the
ECHR.247 The EU has made efforts to establish a path to accession to the
ECHR, but a recent decision of the ECJ has disrupted this process.248

2.2.3.2 Judicial authority and jurisdiction prior to accession

Currently, where EU Member States are accused of implementing EU law in
a way which violates both the ECHR and the CFREU, it is unclear if
applicants should bring their claim to either the European Court or the ECJ,
or both.
Technically, there is nothing preventing individuals from bringing a case to
both courts in hopes of eventually receiving a favourable decision.249 This is a
major problem for legal clarity and coherence: if both courts hear the same
issue, is either court bound by the other, and is one court superior to the
other?
With regard to the binding authority of the courts on each other, there are
generally two schools of thought: either the ECJ is bound by the European
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Court, or it is not.250 Lenaerts and Smijter rely on CFREU Article 52(3) as to
establish the superior status of the European Court; it states that:
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall
be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision
shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.251

Lenaerts and Smijter go on to say that, therefore, the decisions of the
European Court are binding upon the ECJ as it is the European Court which
interprets the meaning of the ECHR.252
Lock takes the opposite position. First, he points out that during the drafting
of the CFREU there were unsuccessful attempts to specifically reference the
European Court’s case law and this illustrates the drafters’ ultimate decision
not to bind the ECJ by the European Court.253 Second, Lock points out that
making the ECJ bound by the European Court would be “alien to European
Union law” since it would introduce the common law principle of stare decisis
to EU law.254 “Had such a shift been wanted,” he writes, “an express
provision would surely have been included in the EU Charter.”255
While the intentions of the EU’s drafters may be well documented,
international treaties are not interpreted based on the drafters’ intention, but
“in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty”.256 Furthermore, Lock’s position that the two courts
There is no support for the idea that the European Court would be bound by the ECJ.
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should be treated as equals257 creates an obvious lack of legal certainty: there
would be two distinct and equal courts, capable of reaching different, equally
valid, decisions on the same issue: an applicant could receive two conflicting
judgements and be unable to rely on either.
To clarify the relationship between the two courts, the EU and the CoE have
been working to establish the parameters by which the EU would formally
accede to the ECHR and define the roles of the two courts.
On April 5, 2013, the CoE published the Draft Revised Agreement on the
Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (herein Draft Accession
Agreement).258 If its conditions are implemented, it would serve to remove
the aforementioned problems of legal certainty. Unfortunately, a recent
review of the Draft Accession Agreement by the ECJ rejected it as
incompatible with EU law.259

2.2.3.3 The Particulars of the EU Accession to the ECHR

In a speech preceding negotiations of the Draft Accession Agreement, Jörg
Polakiewicz, the Director General of Human Rights and Rule of Law at the
CoE, reiterated the challenges and importance of finalizing the EU’s
accession to the ECHR.260 In it he cited “internal differences between the EU
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Member States”261 that delayed the EU´s accession and went on to say that
“[d]espite being an obligation under article 6(2) TEU, the merits and
rationale for EU accession are still being questioned [within the EU],
pointing to a lack of preparation, a ‘myriad of problems’ or, even worse,
unbridgeable incompatibilities between the EU legal system and the
Strasbourg protection mechanism”. In light of these challenges it is
unsurprising that the Draft Accession Agreement took five years to prepare.
Upon completion of the Draft Agreement, EU legislators chose to request the
ECJ to review the compatibility of the Draft Accession Agreement with EU
law.262
The Draft Accession Agreement was negotiated and facilitated by the ad hoc
group “47 + 1”. While its title refers to the 47 CoE member states plus the
European Union, it actually consisted of only 14 members: 7 from EU
Member States and 7 from non-EU members of the CoE.263
One task of the Draft Accession Agreement was to specify the necessary
minor technical changes of relevant treaties to accommodate the EU’s
accession, but its larger task was to detail how the EU would ultimately
interact with the European Court of Human Rights. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
the Draft Accession Agreement proposed that European Court of Human
Rights decisions would be binding on the EU’s institutions including the
ECJ.264 The ECJ would only retain a narrow ability to review human rights
cases pertaining to the ECHR.265
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As in all ECHR cases, applicants must exhaust all of their domestic remedies
before bringing a claim to the European Court.266 The Draft Accession
Agreement retains this principle and would allow applicants to bring
potential rights violations to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the validity
of EU law. The ECJ would not consider the specific act or omission, but would
have the opportunity to determine if the EU law was invalid because it
violated the ECHR, or for any other reason.267 Where the ECJ found the law
to be valid, applicants could then bring their case to the European Court
which would not be bound by the ECJ preliminary decision.268
The Draft Accession Agreement clarified the would-be relationship between
the European Court and the ECJ: the ECJ would determine if EU laws are
valid and compliant with the ECHR. Where the ECJ finds laws valid, the
European Court would then have the opportunity to review the ECJ and
provide its own decision which would bind the ECJ. This would give the
European Court ultimate authority over the majority of the human rights
cases in Europe,269 over EU law, and the ECJ. This makes sense, as noted by
Jörg Polakiewicz, “it is the EU which seeks accession to the ECHR and not
the other way around”.270 Under the Draft Accession Agreement the EU
would be treated as a sovereign nation joining the ECHR so it is unsurprising
that European Court would have authority over the EU’s court.271
Finally, it should be noted that under the Draft Accession Agreement, EU
accession would not give the European Court decisions the authority to quash
ECJ decisions or render EU law invalid. European Court decisions would
simply place the EU under an obligation to find a way be compliant with the
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ECHR.272 The EU, as with all parties to the ECHR, will have a “measure of
discretion” in how they choose to apply European Court of Human Right’s
decisions.273
Unfortunately, the state of EU accession is currently unclear. In Opinion
2/13,274 the ECJ set out to see if EU accession to the ECHR, as described by
the Draft Accession Agreement, was compatible with EU law.275 Much of the
opinion is devoted to describing the ECHR and the Draft Accession
Agreement and because of this it has been criticized for failing to provide a
detailed analysis of the law.276 Ultimately though, the ECJ was explicit about
the Draft Accession Agreement’s incompatibility with EU law.277
The Treaty of Lisbon established that the EU law regulating the EU’s
accession to the ECHR would be set out by Article 6(2) and Protocol No. 8 of
the Consolidated Treaty of the European Union. Protocol No. 8 specifies that
accession “shall make provision for preserving the specific characteristics of
the Union and Union law”278 and this clause serves as the basis for the ECJ’s
decision in Opinion 2/13. The ECJ stated EU law prohibits the EU from
entering any international agreement which adversely affects the autonomy
of the EU legal order.279 It went on to say that ECHR decision-making bodies
must not have the effect of binding the EU and its institutions.280 Under
these conditions not only is the Draft Accession Agreement incompatible with
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EU law (as the European Court would bind the EU and its institutions), but
it becomes difficult to imagine any path for EU accession.281
With Opinion 2/13, the ECJ clearly intends to retain final authority over
human rights issues and EU law. On one hand, it is understandable that the
ECJ judges do not want their work second-guessed by judges who come from
non-EU nations, but at the same time, the purpose of the ECHR and its court
is to review the decisions of its member states’ courts. The laws and acts of all
parties to the ECHR are scrutinized by the European Court in a way which
second-guesses national courts – this is exactly what makes human rights
under the ECHR so robust.
The ECJ’s reaction to the EU’s decision to accede to the ECHR is not
surprising, but it is disappointing. In one of the few peer-reviewed papers on
Opinion 2/13, Lazowski and Ramses estimate that the court’s opinion has
effectively blocked EU accession for years.282 In reviewing the ECJ’s decision,
it is clear that it relied on three conflicting points: (i) Protocol No. 8 that
requires accession to preserve the specific characteristics of Union law; (ii)
the EU law which prohibits the EU from entering an international agreement
which adversely affects the autonomy of the EU legal order; and (iii) the
aspects of the Draft Accession Agreement that would make the ECJ bound by
European Court decisions. What needs to be recognized is that the ECJ was
not bound to interpret these three points as necessarily factual and
conflicting: the EU law which “prohibits the EU from entering an
international agreement which adversely affects the autonomy of the EU
legal order” is not based in treaty, but is a law created by the ECJ.283
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The ECJ’s relied on its own law to determine that the parameters of the
Draft Accession Agreement were incompatible with EU law. In theory, this
means that the court could reverse itself at any time by reinterpreting its
own law to allow limitations to be placed on the autonomy of the EU legal
order. There is a strong argument for the court to do this as the Treaty of
Lisbon and the Draft Accession Agreement clearly illustrate of the explicit
intention of EU Member States – their legislators and negotiators knowingly
committed to accede to the ECHR and therefore be bound by its court. This
does raise the question as to why EU legislators opted to seek the ECJ’s
opinion on accession since they must have known that the ECJ could derail
the accession process. Without an internal knowledge of the accession process
it is difficult to speculate as to why the opinion of the ECJ was sought in this
case, but it has led to the ECJ’s disregarding the intention of the EU Member
States by relying on its own law to safeguard its own authority.
Frustratingly, it also leaves European human rights law lacking clarity and
certainty.
EU accession to the ECHR is now in an awkward and unclear place. The
Draft Accession Agreement created a workable blueprint for accession, but it
was rejected by the ECJ and there is no clear path forward. This leaves
Europe with two courts, both claiming final authority over human rights law
and the division between the two courts appears to be increasing.
When the CFREU gained binding legal status, the ECJ clearly shifted away
from its previous tendency to consider the ECHR and European Court of
Human Rights decisions when reviewing human rights cases.284 According to
an analysis by Gráinne de Búrca, there were 122 ECJ cases heard between
December 2009 and September 2012 which mentioned the CFREU, but only
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10 of those mentioned the ECHR and/or European Court case law.285 While it
may seem obvious that the ECJ would base its human rights decisions on the
EU’s human rights document, failure to interpret the CFREU in a way that
is consistent with the European Court’s interpretation of the ECHR
ultimately risks weakening human rights in Europe as the law becomes more
fragmented and less clear: “the mere existence of two different texts to be
interpreted by two different courts operating in very different contexts is not
conductive to legal certainty”.286
The current state of European human rights law means that any analysis of
the European human rights regime must consider both the rights under the
ECHR and those under the CFREU independently, however due to the much
higher volume of case law arising from the ECHR, it is useful to consider the
ECHR first and then review the CFREU.

2.3 The ECHR and point-source pollution

Of the three environmental challenges considered in this work, point-source
pollution has the largest volume of existing case law. While the ECHR
provides no specific environmental rights, applicants have successfully used
other rights to bring cases arising from polluting activities to both the
European Commission of Human Rights287 and the European Court of
Human Rights. It should be noted that in many of the early cases, the
applicants’ focus was not aimed at reducing pollution, but in every case
G De Búrca, “After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a
Human Rights Adjudicator?” (2013) 20:2 MJ 168 at 174–5.
286 Polakiewicz, supra note 260 at 4.
287 Prior to ECHR Protocol 11 entering into force, individuals had to bring potential human
rights violations to the European Commission on Human Rights and, if the Commission
determined that the claim was valid, the Commission would then bring the case to the
European Court of Human Rights on the individual’s behalf. Protocol 11 allows individuals to
directly petition the European Court.
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discussed herein, there was a potential for a reduction in point-source if
claims were successful.
A variety of ECHR rights have been used in attempts to resolve
environmental issues. Early claims were based on noise and nuisance. In
these cases, air traffic disturbed local residents who argued that it
constituted a violation of their privacy and property rights. Although many of
these initial cases were unsuccessful, they broadened the idea of what could
constitute a violation of the right to privacy and allowed future claims to rely
on the right to directly and indirectly reduce pollution. The progression of
these cases is discussed in detail in the following section of this work.
The ECHR right to life has also been frequently cited in cases relating to
environmental quality and pollution. The right has been narrowly applied
under the ECHR, but it has been useful in cases where people have died or
there is a significant risk of death due to poor environmental conditions. The
cases discussed in Section 2.3.2 are instances where applicants had a strong
claim that their right to life has been violated and adequate remedy would
likely depend on improving the environment by reducing or eliminating
pollution.

2.3.1 Point-source pollution and the rights to privacy and property under the
ECHR

ECHR property rights are found in Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol 1:
Article 8 provides the right to respect for private and family life and Article 1
of Protocol 1 to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions.288 Although they do not
make specific reference to the environment, they have been interpreted by
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the European Court to provide some protection to both human health and the
environment.
The first property rights cases argued that noise, specifically noise emanating
from government regulated activities such as airports, violated individuals’
right to peaceful enjoyment of their home and property. While these early
applicants were more interested in reducing air traffic in order to eliminate
noise, rather than to eliminate pollution from airplane emissions, these cases
established a basis for future pollution cases.

Arrondelle v The United Kingdom289 and Baggs v The United Kingdom,290
were two of the first noise cases, but both were resolved by way of “friendly
settlements” allowing the UK government to maintain that no violation
occurred, and avoiding the case being reviewed by the European Court of
Human Rights. Rayner v the UK was the first claim of a noise violation to
progress to the European Commission of Human Rights. The applicant’s
arguments were rebuked by the European Commission of Human Rights
which determined that the applicant’s Article 8 right had been violated, but
that it was justified as being in the economic interest of the country.291 In
regard to Article 1 of the First Protocol, the IA Commission stated that it too
had not been violated and that it did “not, in principle, guarantee the right to
the peaceful enjoyment of possessions in a pleasant environment.”292 The case
eventually proceeded to the European Court of Human Rights because of a
potential violation of their right to effective remedy.293
The European Commission of Human Rights’ decision in Rayner was an
obvious setback to environmental protection efforts, since “environment”
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could be interpreted widely to include both noise pollution and chemical
pollution. However, this position was altered four years later when the case
came before the European Court of Human Rights in Powell and Rayner v

UK.294 The court’s decision opened the door for all cases which link pollution
and the right to privacy as it concluded that noise from the aircraft did
adversely affect the applicants’ enjoyment of their nearby homes and was
potentially a violation of their Article 8 right.295
The claim of the applicants in Powell and Rayner ultimately failed as the
court also determined that the potential violation could be justified. The noise
did adversely affect the enjoyment of their property, but it only constituted a
potential violation of the ECHR and the court said that the State enjoys a
“margin of appreciation” with regard to its application of Article 8. This
meant that the law requires a “fair balance” between an individual’s rights
and society’s interest.296 The applicants’ claim was rejected on the basis that
their privacy interests were outweighed by the airport’s importance to the
nation’s economic well-being.297 Although the applicants were unsuccessful,
the court’s reasoning in Powell and Rayner became the basis for many
applicants in subsequent cases.
The applicants in López-Ostra v Spain298 and Guerra and Others v Italy,299
successfully used their ECHR privacy right to protect their health, and
consequently the local environment.
In López-Ostra, a waste treatment plant produced fumes which caused
health problems for many of the town’s residents. Efforts to reduce the
impact of the plant were unsuccessful and it continued to endanger the
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applicant’s health,300 so the applicant claimed that the operation of the plant
violated her Article 8 right.301 The court agreed, stating that “severe
environmental pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them
from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and family
life adversely, without, however, seriously endangering their health.”302 The
court reiterated the concepts of a “fair balance” and a “margin of
appreciation,”303 but, due to the severity of the damage caused by the plant,
and the government’s inaction,304 it determined that the government had
failed to properly balance society’s interests against those of the applicant.305
In Guerra and Others v Italy, the court confirmed that “severe environmental
pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying
their homes in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely”.
The court’s decision in Guerra melded the right to privacy with a right to
health and a right to the peaceful enjoyment of their property. The case was
based on pollution which emanated from a local chemical plant and, because
of its proximity to the applicants’ community, was considered “high risk”
under Italian law. The factory had several accidental chemical releases,
including a major explosion which hospitalized 150 people.

The court

determined that the Italian authorities had not taken adequate steps to
protect the applicants’ Article 8 right which, according to the court, required
states to ensure that the right is not violated by government actions. It also
creates a positive obligation on States to protect individuals from third party
violations.306
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Recently the European Court of Human Rights has expanded the right to
privacy to include protection of health, particularly where the applicants’
health is negatively impacted by environmental pollution. In Fadeyeva v

Russia,307 Giacomelli v Italy,308 and Dubetska v Ukraine,309 applicants
successfully argued that emissions from neighbouring industrial facilities
damaged their health in a way that violated their Article 8 right. An
important component of each of the cases was that, even though the facility
in question was a private operation, the governments were aware of the
health problems caused by pollution and failed to take adequate action.
It is also important to note that none of these applicants voluntarily moved to
the pollution in question. In Dubetska and Giacomelli the applicants’
residences predated the presence of the polluting facilities. In Fadeyeva the
applicant moved to her home after the plant was in operation, but her home
was provided by the government and located within a zone known to be
dangerous to human health.310
In each of the cases, the court’s decisions relied on a determination that the
severity of the health and environment risks posed by the facilities
outweighed their legitimate economic benefits. Furthermore, the long-term
failure of authorities to properly respond to the known health impacts
illustrated a failure to achieve a fair balance between individuals and society.
These cases illustrated how polluting industries can be challenged under
ECHR property rights as well as the willingness of the European Court of
Human Rights to broadly interpret the ECHR. These cases effectively
established a “right to health” even though that right is not explicitly
contained in the ECHR.
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Most recently, Tatar v Romania,311 illustrated a further progression of the
European Court of Human Right’s interpretation of rights. It was the first
time the court applied the “Precautionary Principle” to an environmental
judgement and aspects of the decision may be used in the future to
significantly expand environmental protection in Europe using the ECHR’s
right to privacy.
In Tatar, the applicants argued that the release of cyanide-contaminated
tailings from a nearby gold mine violated their right to life (Article 2) and
their Article 8 right. It is important to note that the court acknowledged that
the applicants could not conclusively link the environmental concentrations
of sodium cyanide to the applicants’ health problems.312 Crucially, after
recognizing the lack of a causal link, the court went on to say:
that despite the absence of a causal likelihood in this case, the
existence of a serious and substantial risk to the health and welfare of
the applicants posed to the State a positive obligation to take
reasonable and appropriate measures able to protect the rights of
respect for their private life and their home, and more generally, to
the enjoyment of a healthy and protected environment.313

The court not only made it clear that the State failed to meet its duties, but
in its decision it expanded ECHR law by using the Precautionary Principle to
establish a duty in the absence of “a sufficiently established causal link”. The
court defined the Precautionary Principle, but without an official English
translation of the case it can only be paraphrased as “the lack of current
scientific certainty cannot justify the State in delaying the adoption of
effective and proportionate measures to prevent a risk of serious and
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irreversible damage to the environment.”314 The use of the Precautionary
Principle by the European Court of Human Rights certainly lowers the
threshold for future pollution cases as it allows applicants to have a
successful case without having to prove an incontrovertible or even
statistically probable315 link between a pollutant and damage to their health.
The other potentially major development in Tatar stems from the emphasis
the court placed the pollution’s negative impact on the environment as
something additional to its impact on human health. The court made
references to “a healthy and protected environment”, “the risk of serious and
irreversible damage to the environment”, and “the health and environmental
consequences of the ecological accident”.316 This separation of “health” and
“the environment” may be indicative of the court’s increasing willingness to
recognize a value in protecting the environment, potentially with the creation
of a right to a healthy environment. The court has not considered an Article
8/point-source pollution case since Tatar so it has not had the opportunity to
elaborate on its decision or clarify the value it places on protecting the
environment from pollutants. That said, Section 4.4.2 of this work provides
further analysis of Tatar and considers how the European Court of Human
Rights could develop its reasoning in Tatar to expand and strengthen
European human rights law.

2.3.2 Point-source pollution and the right to life under the ECHR

ECHR Article 2, the right to life, has had far fewer environmental
applications than the right to privacy, but the relative lack of case law has
Ibid, para II(B)(h) based on Google Translate and edited for grammar.
See ibid, paras 105–6 where the court notes that it would have considered statistical
evidence had it been available.
316 Ibid, para 107, 109, 112, and 122.
314
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not prevented the European Court of Human Rights from placing serious
obligations on States to ensure individuals’ safety in many cases with the
side effect of potentially reducing point-source pollution.
Only one case has come before the European Court that has linked manmade pollution with the right to life: Onerildiz v Turkey.317 In the case, the
court determined that the State could be accountable for deaths caused by an
explosion at a garbage dump in part because the dump had not complied with
national safety regulations.318 The court held that the right to life imposes a
positive obligation on States to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives
of those within their jurisdiction.319 It also emphasized that this obligation is
particularly relevant when it pertains to industrial activities which are
dangerous by nature.320

Murillo Saldias v Spain,321 and Budayeva v Russia,322 also link the right to
life with the environment, but these cases arise from natural disasters rather
than man-made pollution.

Murillo Saldías was the first case where an individual argued that a State
had failed to meet its obligations under the right to life because of a failure to
protect the applicants from a natural disaster. The facts of the case
illustrated how the Spanish Government had failed to prevent numerous
deaths resulting from floods caused by rain. Ultimately the applicants’ claims
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were found inadmissible,

323

but the court did not question the ability of

applicants to claim that their Article 2 right had been violated by a
government’s failure to protect them from a natural disaster. The Spanish
government had argued that the claim was inadmissible because (i) the
victims had already received compensation, (ii) they had failed to exhaust
national remedies, and (iii) the flood was the result of an unpredictable
natural disaster.324 In its decision, the court did not comment on the
application of Article 2 to natural disasters so it was unclear whether or not
the State had been under any obligation.

Budayeva built on Murillo Saldías and clarified the obligation of States to
protect human life from natural disasters. The case was based in the town of
Tyrnauz, a town affected by mudslides which occurred roughly every year
and were caused by natural fluctuations in the flow of nearby rivers.325 To
protect the town’s residents, the Russian government built a mud retention
collector in 1965 and a dam in 1999.326 Soon after its completion, the dam
was severely damaged and in 2000 a series of mudslides resulted in the death
of eight people.327 Between the 1999 damage and the 2000 mudslides, the
Russian authorities were warned about the potential risks to the
townspeople, but adequate steps were not taken.
The court determined that the Russian government failed to provide
adequate protection against the risk of mudslides. It stated that Article 2
places a positive obligation on States “to take regulatory measures and to
adequately inform the public about any life-threatening emergency”.328
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Budayeva established that, given an adequately recognized risk to human
life, national governments are required to protect their citizens from natural
disasters.
The European Court of Human Rights has established an obligation on
States to undertake practical measures to ensure the effective protection of
individuals whose lives might be endangered by the inherent risks of
dangerous activities.329 Under certain circumstances these obligations could
be used to respond to point-source pollution problems, but few point-source
pollution problems pose a real threat of loss of life.
It is important to recognize the potential utility of the ECHR right to life as
part of this work in order to provide a comprehensive look at the ECHR’s
ability to respond to point-source pollution. That said, the ECHR right to
privacy and the associated right to a healthy home environment likely
provide a more accessible means for protecting the environment. López-Ostra
established that severe pollution can create an obligation even in the absence
of serious endangerment of health330 and under Tatar an obligation existed
because of a serious and substantial risk to health.331 In practice is seems
likely that in circumstances where applicants could claim “a life threatening
emergency” they could have pre-emptively established a State obligation
using their ECHR right to privacy.
It is not unreasonable to expect that most situations which pose a risk to an
applicant’s life also pose a risk to their health and in many cases that risk to
heath existed prior to the risk to his or her life. In general, the ECHR right to
privacy is a better tool for responding to point-source pollution, but right to
life does provide an additional avenue for environmental protection and it
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may provide an avenue for addressing climate change through the ECHR as
discussed in the following Section of this work.

2.4 The ECHR and climate change

To date, neither of the European Court of Human Rights nor the ECJ has
considered a case arising from the intersection of climate change and human
rights. This is not to say that climate change has been ignored by their
related parent institutions: the CoE and EU have both documented the
impacts of climate change on human rights and both courts have emphasized
the importance of general environmental protection in their decisions.
The European Court of Human Rights has not specifically mentioned climate
change, but it has made multiple references to the general role of the
environment in protecting human rights. Furthermore, the CoE has
published a number of documents linking climate change and human rights.
These documents, along with the accessibility and authority of the European
Court make it a particularly attractive place to bring a claim related to
climate change.

2.4.1 The Council of Europe, defining human rights, and climate change

Both the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly and Committee of Ministers have
explicitly connected climate change to potential human rights violations.
Unfortunately, many of the connections they draw are between climate
change and a human rights that are not recognized by the ECHR and have no
legal authority. These documents have not only complicated what is meant by
80

the term “human right,” but also exaggerate the potential for ECHR human
rights law to be able to effectively respond to climate change.
The Parliamentary Assembly’s Resolution, Challenges posed by climate

change,332 asserts that climate change will “consign the poorest 40%... to a
grim future, further jeopardising their right to life, and their access to water,
to food, to good health, to gainful livelihood, and to decent housing and
security.”333 This was echoed by the Committee of Ministers’ comment that
“[c]limate change will have a direct impact on basic rights such as life, food,
property, adequate housing, health and water, but it will also indirectly raise
questions of equality, non-discrimination, access to information, access to
justice, etc.”334 While both bodies connect substantive human rights protected
under the ECHR to climate change, they confuse the issue by also connecting
rights with no legal protection, such as the rights to water, food and housing.
It is important to make the distinction here between protected rights and
“aspirational rights.” Advocates for using human rights law to respond to
environmental challenges, in particular climate change, often conflate the
human rights that have actual legal protection and “human rights” which do
not have the same protection. For the purpose of this work the term
“aspirational rights” is used to refer to rights that are not yet universally
recognized and protected; they include the right to a healthy environment,
the right to clean water, the right to health, and others.
Certainly, in the absence of legal duties, non-binding human rights rhetoric
can draw attention to climate change and provide an impetus for authorities
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to take action,335 but the focus of this work is on the ability of human rights
law to address environmental issues, not the influence of human rights
rhetoric. Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of
Ministers have not indicated that any of the aspirational rights they connect
to climate change are likely to be added to the ECHR and given explicit
protection in the future. Ultimately there is no reason for this work to
consider the ability of these aspirational rights to respond to climate change;
the focus here is on hard ECHR law and on this basis the most relevant
ECHR rights are the rights to life and privacy.

2.4.2 The ECHR right to privacy and climate change

Section 2.3.1 of this work established how the European Court of Human
Rights has recently interpreted the ECHR right to privacy in ways which
create a right to health, adopt the Precautionary Principle, and connect
environmental health to human health.336
Combined, these factors might appear to perfectly position the court to use
the Precautionary Principle to link climate change to human rights through
the right to privacy, health, environmental health and the predicted impacts
of climate change.
For example, one might argue that the science on climate change, specifically
its potential impact on human health,337 is sufficient to invoke the
Precautionary Principle using the right to privacy; i.e. “the science predicts
John H Knox, “Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations” (2009)
33:2 Harvard Environmental Law Review 477 at 166.
336 Tatar c Roumanie, supra note 134; Fadeyeva v Russia, supra note 310; Moreno Goméz v
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Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch 8.
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that climate change will have a negative effect on people’s health338 and
therefore, following the Precautionary Principle,339 national governments are
obligated to protect their populations by mitigating climate change”.
However, linking these legal concepts is difficult in practice and bringing any
sort of climate change related case to the European Court of Human Rights is
rife with challenges. An applicant interested in using the ECHR to respond to
climate change would also have to consider the remedies offered by the court
since a climate change related victory would not necessarily result in a
meaningful response to the causes or impacts of climate change.
The challenges of using ECHR privacy and property rights to respond to
climate change are significant. Even under ideal circumstances, it would be
difficult to use these rights to bring a strong case.
In Öneryildiz v Turkey and Budayeva v Russia two sets of applicants in
similar circumstances received very different outcomes regarding their right
to property under Article 1 of the First Protocol. In both cases the State failed
to protect the lives and property of people for whom the State had an
obligation to protect. In Öneryildiz the State operated a garbage dump where
a landslide occurred that killed the applicant’s relatives and engulfing the
applicant’s dwelling.340 In Budayeva the State’s failure to maintain a dam
allowed a series of mudslides to severely damage the town of Tyrnauz and
kill eight people.341 In its review of the applicant’s Article 1 of the First
Protocol claim in Budayeva, the European Court of Human Rights
distinguished itself from its previous decision in Öneryildiz. In Öneryildiz the
State was found to be under an obligation to do everything in its power to
protect the applicant’s property interest and the State’s failure to do so
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resulted in a violation of the applicant’s right.342 In contrast, the court
determined in Budayeva that the Russia was not under the same obligation,
specifically because the hazard was not “of a man-made nature”.343 The court
drew a distinction between the positive obligations placed on States in
relation to the right to life and the right to property:
While the fundamental importance of the right to life requires that
the scope of the positive obligations under Article 2 includes a duty to
do everything within the authorities’ power in the sphere of disaster
relief for the protection of that right, the obligation to protect the right
to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, which is not absolute, cannot
extend further than what is reasonable in the circumstances.
Accordingly, the authorities enjoy a wider margin of appreciation in
deciding what measures to take in order to protect individuals’
possessions from weather hazards than in deciding on the measures
needed to protect lives.344

The basis for the court’s distinction was the difference between events
occurring “under the responsibility of public authorities” and “natural
disasters”.
While the impacts of anthropogenic climate change can be seen as resulting
from greenhouse gas emissions that are under the responsibility of public
authorities, it seems more likely that the European Court of Human Rights
will perceive them as natural disasters as they relate to the right to property.
The court referred to the situation in Öneryildiz as a dangerous activity of a
man-made nature345 and it is easy to see how an obligation can be established
in the vicinity of a waste treatment facility. In contrast, many of the activities
which contribute to climate change are not inherently dangerous and the
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court may be more likely to treat its impacts as natural disasters rather than
liken them to the situation in Öneryildiz. In both Budayeva and Öneryildiz
the State was aware of the risks posed to the applicants.
Russia was aware of the risk posed by mudslides yet the court distinguished
the impacts of a natural disaster from a man-made hazard. On this basis it
seems unlikely that the predictability of climate change’s impacts will have
an effect on an applicant’s claim under Article 1 of the First Protocol. States
may be aware of the potential risks of climate change, but the activities that
cause climate change, even if hazardous, are difficult to connect to specific
climate change impacts. Section 2.3.4 of this work discusses how an applicant
may be able to use Budayeva to invoke a right to life claim relating to climate
change, but pursuing a property right claim seems unlikely.
Under certain circumstances an applicant may be able to bring a climate
change related claim based on their right to privacy, specifically if an impact
of climate change poses a serious and substantial risk to their health. Under

Tatar the existence of a serious and substantial risk to the health establishes
a positive obligation on the State to take reasonable and appropriate
measures to protect their private life and health.346 While impacts of
anthropogenic climate change are certainly capable of posing serious risks to
peoples’ health, it seems unlikely that the European Court of Human Rights
will apply the right to privacy to the impacts of climate change.
Claims based on the ECHR rights to privacy and property face a number of
obstacles. Primary among them are the caveats added to these rights which
allow them to be limited if it is in the public interest,347 or for the economic
well-being of the country.348 While there is strong evidence that, in the longterm, unmitigated climate change is not in the best economic or social
Tatar c Roumanie, supra note 134, para 107.
ECHR, supra note 140 Article 1 of the First Protocol.
348 Ibid Article 8(2).
346
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interest,349 nations can make short-term gains by exploiting the low-cost,
high carbon fuels, which cause climate change, but can facilitate economic
growth.
There are limits on how heavily a nation can rely on an economic argument
as a basis for infringing upon an individual’s rights. In Fadeyeva, Russia
argued that the steel plant was necessary to the region’s economy and
therefore justified a violation of the resident’s right to privacy.350 The court
agreed that the steel plant was important for the regional economy, but on
the facts of the case, determined that the government had failed to strike a
fair balance between the applicant’s interests and society’s.351 The plant in
question was the largest iron smelter in Russia and employed 60,000 people.
The smelter caused the air quality around the applicant’s home to be
particularly poor with the levels of dust, carbon disulphide, and formaldehyde
being many time higher than the official “maximum permissible level”
established by the Russian government.352 The applicant could not establish
a causal link between the environmental pollution and her personal health,353
but it was established that the environmental situation in the area caused a
general increase in the morbidity rate of the city’s residents.354 The court
concluded that, even if it were the case that the pollution did not cause any
quantifiable harm to the applicant’s health, it inevitably made the applicant
more vulnerable to various illnesses and it adversely affected her quality of
life at home.355
The court chose to balance the rights of the applicant against the economic
interests of a national industry and a regional economy in such a way as to
349
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prioritize the right of the individual. In a theoretical climate change case, the
court may similarly need to balance the national economy against individual
property or privacy right, but there is reason to believe that there is a
significant difference between the situation in Fadeyeva and a potential
climate change case. In Fadeyeva, the applicant could be appeased by simply
relocating her from the pollution zone.356 Depending on the scope of the
damage caused by climate change it may be more difficult/costly to relocate a
large affected population.
There are two other challenges facing a climate change claim: causation and
preventability. The UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
acknowledges that it is nearly impossible to connect historical GHG
emissions to any specific climate change impact.357 On this basis, it becomes
very difficult to prove in court that the damage suffered by an applicant was
the result of climate change. Ultimately, this shortcoming could be overcome
either by developments in the science which persuasively link emissions to
specific events or a change in the way the law recognizes causation. While
science and law are constantly developing, establishing legal causation
remains a real challenge for any current climate change case before the
European Court of Human Rights.
Global climate change is caused by the cumulative greenhouse gas emissions
from every nation: no country is uniquely responsible and no county has zero
emissions. The role of multiple actors in causing climate change makes it
very difficult to link a single State’s emissions to climate change and then to
a specific impact that damages an applicant’s property or violates their right
to privacy. The European Court of Human Rights has considered cases with

Ibid, para 57 The applicant sought relocation in the case she prevously brought before the
Russian Supreme Court .
356

Report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship
Between Climate Change and Human Rights, A/HRC/10/61 UN Human Rights Council, 15
January 2009 [Report on Climate Change and Human Rights], para 70.
357

87

multiple actors and cumulative effect and it has tended to divide
responsibility between actors, rather than absolve all actors of responsibility.
The court has considered numerous cases arising from damage attributable
to multiple actors, but it has not established a clear mechanism for
attributing liability.358 Rather than define a clear policy, the court has
preferred a flexible approach stating:
It is not the Court’s role to function akin to a domestic tort mechanism
court in apportioning fault and compensatory damages between civil
parties. Its guiding principle is equity, which above all involves
flexibility and an objective consideration of what is just, fair and
reasonable in all circumstances of the case, including not only the
position of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach
occurred.359

This gives the court considerable discretion in the way it resolves such cases,
but it does little to provide legal certainty.
Some indication of how the European Court of Human Rights might deal
with the combined contributions to climate change may come from the
existing case law involving multiple actors, but the details of these cases
differ greatly from any potential climate change case. None of the existing
case law deals with environmental issues and the court has yet to consider a
situation where one or more of the multiple actors are nations not party to
the ECHR.
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In the leading case Ilascu,360 Russia and Moldova were both found to have
violated the applicant’s rights to torture361 and liberty.362 The court awarded
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages and divided financial responsibility
between the two nations based on its determination of the severity of each
nation’s breach.363
In “multiple actors” cases the European Court of Human Rights tends to
isolate the distinct acts which contribute to an injury and, even where injury
is indivisible, divide responsibility based on the magnitude of each nation’s
violation.364 While it has yet to consider a multiple actor case arising from
property rights, if the court were to employ such a strategy in the case of
climate change it is unlikely to have the desired outcome for an applicant.
If the European Court of Human Rights was to follow its general decisionmaking trend and apply it to a climate change case there is a good chance
that respondent nation(s) would only be held accountable for the portion of
the damage corresponding to that nation’s contribution to global GHG
emissions.
The division of climate change liability based on GHG emissions would
certainly produce an unsatisfactory judgment for an applicant as he or she
could only hope to recover a small fraction of their losses. Individually, each
party to the ECHR is responsible for a very small contribution to global
greenhouse gas emissions. In 2010 Russia had the highest individual
contribution of only 5.2% of global emissions.365 As such, a successful claim
against Russia might only result in compensation for 5.2% of the applicant’s
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damages. Even if a successful claim was brought simultaneously against all
parties to the ECHR this would still only amount to a small fraction of the
damages since, in 2010 the ECHR nations combined accounted for less than
20% of global GHG emissions.366
This is not to say that the European Court of Human Rights would
necessarily divide compensation by proportional contribution. The court
established in Ilascu that it would not commit itself to dividing responsibility
based on proportion of damages; rather it has committed itself to the
principle of “equity”. In response to a climate change related rights violation,
the court could determine that an equitable outcome places full financial
responsibility on a single nation thereby allowing an applicant to receive full
compensation for his or her damages. In this best case scenario, an applicant
might overcome the challenges of causation and establish damage which
cannot be justified for economic or social reasons, and having established a
rights violation, might receive financial compensation. However, even then,
there still remains a lingering question: what is the goal of an applicant
bringing a climate change case to the European Court of Human Rights?
If an applicant were to bring a case for their own personal satisfaction,
simply aiming to attain financial compensation for his or her loss, then under
the right circumstances, it might be possible to do so using the ECHR. A
successful ECHR case could also signal to States that there is a potential
liability associated with a failure to address climate change and it may
influence increased national action. However, applicants who seek a means of
legally compelling States to prevent or adapt to climate change may be
disappointed.
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2.4.3 Limitations on using the European Court of Human Rights to mitigate
climate change

Section 2.4.2 of this work showed how, under ideal circumstances, an
applicant may be able to bring a successful claim under the ECHR arising
from the impacts of climate change. Unfortunately, the ECHR is incapable of
providing applicants with a means to force States to engage in efforts to
mitigate or prevent of climate change. At best, the ECHR may be able to help
provide a level of relief to some of those impacted by its effects.
As a regional document, the ECHR is incapable of adequately responding to a
global problem such as climate change. Even if all parties to the ECHR were
obligated to eliminate their greenhouse gas emissions, it would account for
less than 20% of the global total. The UN’s Special Rapporteur on human
rights and the environment has argued that human rights can encourage
States to engage in broader international efforts and establish a global
agreement to reduce global emissions,367 but (a) the EU has already taken a
lead role in international climate change negotiations, and (b) State
sovereignty allows nations to determine their own balance of issues such as
public health, climate change, greenhouse gas emissions, pollution, and
economics – irrespective of European pressures. In the end, the ECHR and its
member states are incapable of forcing non-members to take action to
prevent climate change. ECHR member states can try to promote climate
change mitigation, but there is no guarantee of success.
Furthermore, even if the European Court of Human Rights were to
determine that a party to the ECHR violated an applicant’s human rights by
failing to limit emissions, the court is unable to compel the State to
subsequently reduce those emissions. The authority of the court is limited to
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determining if a State’s actions comply with the ECHR; the court can award
damages to successful applicants,368 but “it is for the State to choose the
means to be used in its domestic legal system in order to comply with the
provisions of the Convention or to redress the situation that has given rise to
the violation of the Convention.”369 This means that a rights violation arising
from climate change could be resolved to the satisfaction of the court simply
by payment of financial compensation.
A State held responsible for damage, or potential damage, due to climate
change would almost certainly look for the lowest cost means of absolving
themselves from existing and future responsibility. In situations where there
are limited applicants, this will almost certainly be in the form of paying
damages or facilitating relocation; having to pay damages to a few applicants
would almost certainly be less expensive than implementing efforts to
prevent climate change. Similarly, in a situation with the potential for a large
number of applicants and massive damages, a government may still find it
economically preferable to pay extensive damages, adaptation, or relocation
costs rather than choosing to alter its economy by reducing GHGs. Even if a
State were to prefer resolving the source of the problem, rather than just
paying compensation, no European State accounts for an adequate
percentage of global emissions to unilaterally prevent the progression of
climate change.
The ECHR cannot force a State to reduce its emissions and even if it could,
the cumulative emissions reduction of all ECHR member states is unable to
halt climate change. The ECHR has little to no ability to shape international
climate change policy. At best it might be useful for providing those impacted
by climate change some level of compensation: Section 2.4.2 outlined how
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that might be possible based on the rights to privacy and property; Section
2.4.4 looks at the potential application of the right to life.

2.4.4 The ECHR and the right to life

In Budayeva v Russia the European Court of Human Rights established that
member states have an obligation to undertake practical measures to ensure
the effective protection of citizens whose lives might be endangered by the
inherent risks of dangerous activities.370 This ruling may be uniquely
applicable to the risks associated with climate change because of the unusual
source of the risk in that case.
In its judgement, the court determined Article 2, the right to life, places a
positive obligation on States “to take regulatory measures and to adequately
inform the public about any life-threatening emergency”.371 Given an
adequately established risk to human life, States are required to protect their
citizens from natural disasters. This may have opened a door for climate
change litigation.
Using Budayeva, an applicant may be able to use the right to life to bring a
climate change related case to the European Court that would avoid one of
the main challenges associated with many climate change cases: establishing
causation. When evoking the rights to privacy and property, an applicant
must show that the State was responsible for the damage in question. If
climate change is the cause of a property violation, then the applicant
traditionally needs to show that the State caused the climate change which in
turn caused the damage. The practical challenge of establishing causation in
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regard to climate change is generally considered the biggest challenge facing
a successful climate change case.372

Budayeva shows that a State can be responsible for an Article 2 violation
caused by predictable natural phenomena. There is no need to show that the
event that caused the damage was caused by a State’s action. Instead, an
applicant need only show that there was a known risk and that the State did
not take adequate measures to mitigate it. In this way, States could be
obligated to protect individuals from the impacts of climate change even if the
State has not contributed to climate change itself.
Unfortunately, in conjunction with this broad obligation to protect human life
from potential risks, the court granted States a wide margin of appreciation
in how they meet this obligation.373 States have especially broad discretion
when risks arise from meteorological events beyond human control.374 The
European Court of Human Rights has made it clear that it will not place
authorities under an impossible or disproportionate burden that fails to take
into account operational choices and priorities of resources.375 The strength of
this obligation is also dependent on the imminence of the natural hazard, its
identifiability, its frequency, and if it affects an area developed for human
habitation or use.376 Therefore, while an obligation exists, the lengths to
which a State must go to meet it vary greatly depending on the nature of the
particular risk.
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In Budayeva, the risk was that mudslides would potentially kill residents of
the town of Tyrnauz. The risk was known and the Russian authorities
attempted to mitigate the risk by building a dam. In 2000 the dam was in
disrepair and it failed to protect the townspeople. In its decision, the court
considered a variety of protection options open to the Russian government
and found that the authorities took almost no steps to protect citizens: the
authorities ignored recommendations to implement a warning system for
impending mudslides;377 they failed to adequately inform the population once
an evacuation order was put into effect;378 and they failed to maintain the
dam, the only risk reducing measure they had put into effect.379 The court
concluded: “in exercising their discretion as to the choice of measures
required to comply with their positive obligation, the authorities ended up by
[sic] taking no measures at all up to the day of the disaster”.380
In Budayeva the Russian authorities were incapable of preventing mudslides
and it was not reasonable to reasonably relocate the town. While a functional
dam might have been the best way to provide protection to Tyrnauz’s
residents, it appears that the court would have considered the State’s
obligation fulfilled if it had undertaken one or more of the less ambitious
actions such as providing an early warning system. On this basis, the
European Court of Human Rights is likely to similarly grant a State a wide
range of options to comply with any obligation to protect lives at risks from
the impacts of climate change.
While climate change is projected to have a wide array of environmental
impacts, few pose an obvious and immediate risk to human life. Increased
temperatures leading to heat waves and crop failures could cause loss of life,
but it would be difficult to associate a death during a heat wave to a State’s
Ibid, para 154.
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377
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failure to meet its Article 2 obligation. Even if heat waves were predictable,
severe and recurring – so as to make them a serious and predictable risk to
life – a State would likely fulfill its obligation under Budayeva by
implementing relatively simple measures to protect human life.
The European Human Rights Court will not impose an impossible or
disproportionate burden on States. During a heat wave capable of
significantly endangering human life, an obligation to guarantee the
protection of all human life is disproportionate, if not impossible. A national
authority would likely meet its Article 2 obligation under Budayeva through
campaigns informing the public of the best ways to protect themselves from
the heat.381
In the case of a crop failure due to climate change or, taken to its most
extreme, a famine, it would only be a very irresponsible government that fails
to meet an Article 2 obligation. A widespread famine would be a major
challenge for any government, immediately placing them under a heavy
burden. If a governing authority rejected aide, grossly or intentionally
mismanaged relief, ignored the problem, or in some other way failed to act in
the best interests of its citizens, the court might find a violation of Article 2.
However, such circumstances are difficult to imagine. During a famine,
where citizens’ lives were at risk, any reasonable government would be
expected to take some action to protect its citizens. As long as the
government in question took action in good faith, even if people were to die in
the famine, the court is likely to determine that the State complied with its
obligation to take positive action.
While Budayeva establishes that a national authority is required to protect
its citizens from the risk of death from natural disasters, Budayeva was itself
an extreme case of government inaction in face of a clear risk. Mudslides
In ibid, paras 155–6 the court appears to say that a functional early warning system could
have been sufficient for meeting their obligation.
381
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were known to be common and very dangerous, so much so that the
authorities built a dam. The dam was not maintained and no other
protections were in place. While the ruling might allow a climate change case
to be brought without an applicant having to prove that the authorities
caused climate change, a successful case would still have to illustrate that
the risk was significant, known, and importantly, not addressed by local
authorities. One hopes that in situations where the impacts of climate change
risk human life and are known in advance, States will act in the best
interests of their citizens and an applicant would not have to invoke the
Article 2 obligation under Budayeva.
Ultimately, the preceding analysis has shown that the ECHR has a limited
capacity to respond to climate change. It will be difficult to bring any climate
change related case to the European Court of Human Rights. Cases based on
the rights to privacy and property will have to overcome the challenge of
proving causation and the complexity of multiple actors. Cases based on the
right to life will have to overcome establishing that risks to life were
foreseeable yet ignored. Under either set of circumstances, an applicant will
be unable to compel States to actually address the causes of climate change
and have little to no hope of slowing the progress of climate change using the
ECHR. The best case scenario is that an applicant receives compensation for
losses due to climate change, certainly this would not be an insignificant
victory for an applicant who has suffered damage, but it means that the
ECHR is not the right avenue for those wishing to actually slow or reverse
the progress of global climate change.

2.5 The ECHR and ecosystem conservation
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Ecosystem conservation has a decidedly different relationship to human
rights than point-source pollution and climate change. The ECHR does not
provide a general protection of the environment and conservation is
frequently based on protecting nature for its own sake. For conservation to be
most effective it cannot only occur in situations where a failure to conserve an
ecosystem would place human lives or health at risk: there is value in
conserving ecosystems in areas where people do not live.
While the ECHR does not formally provide a right to a protected environment
or any rights particularly aimed at conservation, it is clear that the European
Court of Human Rights takes conservation very seriously and there is a path
to protect ecosystems under the ECHR.
In 1991, a new type of property law case was brought to the European Court
of Human Rights. In Fredin v Sweden,382 the applicants were landowners
who argued that the Swedish government’s order to halt their gravel pit
operations violated their rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol. They
argued that the State violated their property rights by removing their right
to use their property as they intended. The applicants owned a gravel pit
which had a complicated history of land amalgamations and property and
permit transfers, the details of which are unnecessarily complex for this
work. To understand the court’s decision it is important to know that the
applicants were initially granted their license in 1963, but they did not begin
gravel extraction until 1980.383 Under a Swedish law passed in 1973, the
government granted itself the authority to revoke existing permits: this
authority would not enter into effect until 1983, but would apply to permits
granted prior to 1973.384 The applicants challenged the Swedish government’s
decision to revoke their permit in accordance with the 1973 law. The
European Court of Human Rights determined that the State’s decision fell
Fredin v Sweden (No 1), No 12033/86 [1991] .
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within the margin of appreciation or “fair balance” established in Powell and

Rayner385 and it concluded that the State’s choice to favour of conservation by
closing the gravel pit was a justifiable violation of the owner’s property
rights.386
Environmental protection was again prioritized over an individual’s property
rights in Pine Valley Developments Ltd and others v Ireland.387 In the case,
the applicants purchased property which had been granted outline planning
permission, but required subsequent approvals for ultimate development of
the site.388 Comprehensive planning permission was refused by the County
Council, granted on appeal to the High Court but then nullified by the
Supreme Court. The applicants then sold the land for less than 10% of their
original purchase price and brought an action against the Irish Government
claiming that the Supreme Court’s decision violated Article 1 of the First
Protocol.389 The European Court of Human Rights concluded that the
Supreme Court’s decision did constitute an interference with the applicants’
rights since the initial planning permission gave the applicants a legitimate
expectation of being able to carry out the proposed development.390 However,
the court went on to say that the interference could be allowed in accordance
with the second paragraph of Article 1 of the First Protocol which permits
such interference if it is clearly a legitimate aim “in accordance with the
general interest”.391 The court noted that the nullification of the planning
permission was for the purpose of protecting the environment which, in the
court’s view, was one such legitimate aim.392
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The line distinguishing acceptable government actions to protect the
environment and actions which fail to properly balance individual and social
goals was illustrated again by Matos e Silva v Portugal.393 Here, the
applicants complained that government measures to establish a nature
reserve, part of which encompassed the applicants’ land, violated, inter alia,
the applicants’ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 rights.394 The European Court of
Human Rights held that the measures did amount to an interference
restricting the applicants’ ability to farm, fish farm, produce salt, build on the
land, or sell the land.395 However, the court again conceded that the
government’s measures, which intended to protect the environment, pursued
the public interest and so could have been considered a fair balance between
individual and social interests.396 However, when the court closely considered
the time the Portuguese government took to implement the nature reserve, it
determined that almost no progress had been made in the 13 years since the
limitations were placed on the applicants’ land. On this basis the court
determined that the government had failed to reach a fair balance and held
the Portuguese government in violation of the applicants’ rights.397
In Krytatos v Greece,398 the applicants argued that urban development near
their house negatively affected their life to the point where it constituted a
violation of their Article 8 right to property. The majority of the case hinged
on the illegality of the development, the Greek authority’s failure to act on
the illegality and the resulting violation of the applicants’ Article 6(1) right to
trial within a reasonable time. The European Court of Human Rights also
considered the applicants’ claim with respect to Article 8. The court held that,
while the urban development did do significant damage to the environment,
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including reducing the scenic beauty of the area, it did not have a harmful
effect on the applicants’ private or family life.

It was simply a general

deterioration of the environment and therefore was not covered by Article
8.399 Krytatos v Greece appeared to shut the door on cases dealing with pure
environmental damage, a reversal of cases such as Fredin and Pine Valley
which placed value on pure environmental protection. At the time, it could
have been said that a government’s action to protect the environment, such
as that in Fredin and Pine Valley could override an individual’s property
rights but an individual could not argue environmental protection as part of
their property right. However, the recent case of Hamer v Belgium400 has
blurred this distinction.
In Hamer v Belgium, the European Court of Human Rights referred to the

Krytatos decision and conceded that the ECHR is not specifically designed to
provide general protection to the environment, but the court went on to make
a strong statement about the value the ECHR places on the environment:
“[f]inancial imperatives and even certain fundamental rights, such as
ownership, should not be afforded priority over environmental protection
considerations, in particular when the State has legislated in this regard.”401
In its judgment, the court determined that the Belgian authorities had struck
a fair balance when they interfered with the applicant’s Article 8 right to
“possession” in favour of a purely environmental aim of preserving a forest.402
This rationale follows Fredin and Pine Valley, prioritizing government
initiatives to protect the environment over an individual’s rights and in this
way was not revolutionary.
The decision in Hamer does have a major impact on ECHR law and the
relationship between environmental protection considerations and ECHR
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rights: environmental protection is not necessarily overridden by the right to
ownership, financial imperatives, and other fundamental rights. The use of
the phrase “financial imperative” is important as it denotes something more
than a “financial interest” thereby giving the environment a theoretically
higher level of protection. Although the court has yet to elaborate on which
other fundamental rights can also be overridden by environmental protection,
it has made it obvious that environmental protection can be prioritized over
the right to property as well as other human rights.
In Hamer, the court also noted that the prioritization of environmental
protection over human rights was not dependent on domestic legislation. It
said that environmental protection can be given priority “in particular when
the State has legislated in this regard,” but it did not say that legislation was
necessary. The implication is that even in the absence of State legislation,
environmental protection considerations can take precedence over both
fundamental rights and economic imperatives. This should open the door to
individuals such as the applicants in Krytatos, to argue that, even in the
absence of legislation, environmental protection should take priority over
development.
Although the ECHR does not provide an explicit right to environmental
protection, the European Court of Human Rights has made it clear through
its jurisprudence that it will prioritize conservation over established human
rights. Hamer implies that the court is willing to do this even in situations
where the State lacks conservation legislation. The court will have to expand
on its decision on Hamer in order to provide applicants with a better
understanding of which rights can be overridden by environmental
protection, but even without elaboration Hamer adds strength to the idea
that the European Court of Human Rights is on the verge of significantly
expanding environmental protection though the ECHR. This potential
expansion is discussed in detail in Section 4.4.2 of this work.
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2.6 The CFREU and the environment

The comparatively recent entry into force of the CFREU means that it does
not have the volume and depth of established case law of the ECHR and the
ECJ has yet to considered any cases dealing with point-source pollution,
climate change, or conservation. This somewhat restricts an analysis of the
CFREU’s ability to resolve environmental challenges and therefore any
discussion of the potential ability of the CFREU to provide environmental
protection will necessarily be more speculative and less grounded in
established case law.
Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 of this work discussed the development of human
rights under the ECJ and that court’s relationship with the ECHR and the
CFREU. Prior to the entry into effect of the CFREU, the ECJ had shown a
reasonable willingness to consider the ECRH and decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights when adjudicating on human rights issues, but with
its own human rights document the ECJ has since shifted away from the
ECHR.403 Some have speculated that the ECJ’s rejection of the Draft
Accession Agreement was done in part to allow the ECJ to distinguish its
human rights jurisprudence from that of the European Court of Human
Rights404 and therefore (i) it may be unwise to expect that the ECJ will
interpret the CFREU in the same way as the European Court of Human
Rights has interpreted the ECHR and (ii) the ECJ may offer new and unique
opportunities for progressive environmental litigation.
There are two means by which the CFREU might be used to respond to pointsource pollution. The first might be through the CFREU’s specific right to
403
404

De Búrca, supra note 285 at 174–5.
Lazowski & Wessel, supra note 276 at 190.
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environmental protection405 – a right not contained in the ECHR. The other
could be through the same sorts of protections provided by the ECHR:
specifically under the rights to life, privacy and health.
The CFREU is textually very similar to the ECHR, but whereas the ECHR
does not mention “the environment” and efforts to include a reference have so
far failed,406 the CFREU does provide a right to environmental protection in
Article 37.

2.6.1 Point-source pollution and CFREU Article 37

CFREU Article 37, the right to environmental protection, states that:
A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the
quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the
Union and ensured in accordance with the principles of sustainable
development.

While this right is arguably preferable to no right to environmental
protection, the loose language of the right illustrates the “significant
challenges” the drafters encountered when defining the right during the
CFREU’s negotiations.407 The result is that Article 37 is a principle, rather
than a subjective right and it cannot be invoked directly by individuals.408
Article 37 only applies when authorities fail to meet its principles when

CFREU, supra note 141 Article 37.
See Section 7.1 of this work.
407 Richard Bellamy & Justus Schönlau, “The Normality of Constitutional Politics: An
Analysis of the Drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights” in Claudio Corradetti,
ed, Philosophical Dimensions of Human Rights (Springer Netherlands, 2012) 231 at 231–252.
405
406

Commission Communication on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, Commission of the European Communities, 13 September 2000, COM(2000) 559 final
[Communication on the CFREU], para 25.
408
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exercising their legislative or executive functions.409 A stronger right could
not attain the necessary consensus during the drafting.410
While the CFREU initially seems progressive for its inclusion of an
environmental right, the right is essentially empty as it does not give
applicants the ability to bring a claim based on environmental degradation.
In order invoke Article 37, it would have to be shown that EU legislators
failed to integrate a high level of environmental protection into their
policies.411 There may be some room for debate as to what constitutes a “high”
level of environmental protection, and there may be specific policy areas
where environmental protection is not prioritized above political or economic
interests. However, finding enforceable instances of a failure to meet
obligations under Article 37 would be difficult since it is a policy of the ECJ to
give the legislative bodies of the EU a wide margin of discretion in situations
involving complex political and economic choices.412
This is not to say that the ECJ has shown an unwillingness to support
environmental protection. The ECJ previously prioritized environmental
protection over protection of the common market even before the CFREU
came into effect.
In 2001 the ECJ referenced Article 130r(2) of the Maastricht Treaty as
partial justification for finding a potentially discriminatory and restrictive

Ibid.
Ibid, para 23.
411 Ibid, para 25 During the drafting of the CFREU, the Commission of the European
409
410

Communities (now the European Commission) stated that the right cannot be invoked by
individuals directly, but its principles could be enforced against the EU or national
authorities in their performance of their legislative or executive functions.
412 Francis Jacobs, “The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of the
Environment” (2006) 18:2 J Environmental Law 185 at 195; French Republic and Société

commerciale des potasses et de l’azote (SCPA) and Entreprise minière et chimique (EMC) v
Commission of the European Communities, [1998] Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95
ECLI:EU:C:1998:148 (Court of Justice of the European Union), paras 223 & 224; Tetra Laval
BV v Commission of the European Communities, [2002] Case T-5/02 ECLI:EU:T:2002:264
(Court of Justice of the European Union).
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national environmental initiative413 compatible with EU law.414 Article
130r(2) stated, inter alia, that “Community policy on the environment shall
aim at a high level of protection...” and that “[e]nvironmental protection
requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of
other Community policies”.415
Article 130r(2) is no longer part of the Consolidated Treaty of the European
Union, but its language is echoed and arguably strengthened by Article 37 of
the CFREU. The ECJ will have opportunity to use Article 37 to justify
environmental initiatives, but it will be much more difficult to use the right
to obligate States to take action where environmental protection is lacking.
The European Commission

has made it

clear that Article

37 is

“enforceable”,416 but as it cannot be invoked by individuals. It appears that it
is the responsibility of the European Commission to bring claims under
Article 37 against States or EU bodies. Unfortunately, Article 37 is worded in
such a way that violations worthy of the European Commission’s intervention
seem unlikely: in general the EU does a reasonable job of integrating
environmental protection into its policies.
The utility of Article 37 will more likely be useful as a means of justifying
environmental legislation which would otherwise be in conflict with other EU
laws or principles – just as Article 130r(2) was used in 2001. Ultimately,
Article 37 was not designed to provide individuals with a strong
environmental right and it is unlikely to be invoked in the ECJ as a means of
obligating a State or body of the EU to reduce point-source pollution.

413

Jacobs, supra note 412 at 190–3.

PreussenElektra AG v Schhleswag AG, [2001] Case C-379/98 ECLI:EU:C:2001:160 (Court
of Justice of the European Union), para 76.
415 Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, 1 December 1992, Official Journal of the
European Union (C 191) [Maastricht Treaty] Article 130r.
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2.6.2 Point-source pollution and the rights to life, privacy, property, and
health

If the CFREU is to be used to reduce point-source pollution the best
opportunities are likely to come from its rights to life, privacy, and property –
which are nearly identical to those of the ECHR – and its unique right to
health.
The CFREU rights to life, privacy, and property are similar to, but
distinguishable from, those found in the ECHR. In the CFREU, Article 1
establishes the right to life which is differs from the ECHR right only in that
it prohibits the death penalty.417 CFREU Article 7 provides a right to private
and family life and is worded almost identically to Article 8(1) of the ECHR.
Article 17 provides a very similar right to property as Article 1 of the First
Protocol, but whereas the ECHR places limits on property rights within the
rights themselves,418 the CFREU uses Article 52 to define how all rights of
the CFREU can be limited “if they are necessary and genuinely meet
objectives of general interest”.419
Unlike the ECHR, the CFREU has a specific right to health. Article 35
provides that “[a] high level of human health protection shall be ensured in
the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities.” This
right is akin to Article 37 so right to health only establishes guarantees
pertaining to EU policies and activities and individuals are unable to invoke

The death penalty was abolished under the ECHR by Protocol No. 6 to the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 28 April 1983, ETS No 114 [ECHR Protocol No. 6].
418 ECHR, supra note 140 Article 8(2) and the second paragraph of Article 1 of the First
417

Protocol.
419
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it directly.420 It does not provide any protection, per se, to a person’s health
and even if a person’s health deteriorates due to an EU policy they would be
unable to invoke Article 35. As with the right to environmental protection,
the CFREU’s right to health is unlikely to provide a mechanism for
responding to any type of environmental degradation or pollution.
In contrast to the CFREU’s environment and health rights, the rights to life,
privacy, and property are objective rights which applicants could invoke,
potentially

in

situations

of

environmental

damage

from

pollution.

Unfortunately, there is insufficient ECJ case law dealing with either right to
provide a real indication of the court’s interpretation of either right.
Only three ECJ cases reference the right to life, but none of them
substantively review the right itself.421 Similarly, the few ECJ cases that
reference the right to property provide little indication of how the court might
interpret property rights as they relate to environmental damage or
pollution. The ECJ has only considered the right to property and
environmental protection in two cases: Križan and Others422 and Arcelor v

Parliament and Council,423 but they only provide limited insight into how the
CFREU right to property could be applied to point-source pollution.

Communication on the CFREU, supra note 408, para 25 the Commission did not actually
reference the Right to health, but as its language is identical to that of Article 37 the same
principle applies. It should also be noted that Article 35 actually has two components, the
first is a right to healthcare and that aspect of the right probably could be invoked by
individuals.
421 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Y and Z, [2012] Case C-71/11 and C-99/11
ECLI:EU:C:2012:518 (Court of Justice of the European Union) is an asylum case; Baris
Akyüz, [2012] Case C-467/10 ECLI:EU:C:2012:112 (Court of Justice of the European Union);
Wolfgang Hofmann v Freistaat Bayern, [2012] Case C-419/10 ECLI:EU:C:2012:240 (Court of
Justice of the European Union) are both transport cases, each case makes a very tangential
reference to the right to life.
422 Jozef Križan and Others v Slovenská inšpekcia životného prostredia, [2013] Case C416/10 ECLI:EU:C:2013:8 (Court of Justice of the European Union).
423 Arcelor SA v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, [2010] Case T16/04 ECLI:EU:T:2010:54 (Court of Justice of the European Union).
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In Križan, the applicants argued, inter alia, that their fundamental property
rights had been violated by a national court decision to revoke their permit to
build a landfill.424 The Slovenian court had come to its decision because the
initial permit was granted in a way which failed to follow the laws governing
public participation and environmental impact assessment.425 The applicants
argued that their fundamental right to property superseded requirements for
public participation and environmental assessments established by EU
law.426 The ECJ disagreed, stating that the CFREU property right is not
absolute and can be restricted if it is in the general interest and to do so
would not impair the very substance the right guaranteed.427 The ECJ
specifically acknowledged that protection of the environment is an objective
capable of justifying the restriction of property rights.428
In Arcelor v Parliament and Council the ECJ simply repeated its point in

Križan.429
The ECJ has yet to consider a case where pollution has potentially violated
an applicant’s rights and until it does so it is difficult to predict how the court
will act. Certainly there will be expectations that the ECJ would follow the
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, but the ECJ is not
obligated to do so and has recently shown a willingness to distinguish itself
from the other court.
One area of ECJ jurisprudence could help illustrate how the court might
interpret human rights as they pertain to point-source pollution: the ECJ
cases dealing with environmental protection and the EU’s open market. The
European Union is founded on the creation of a common market and

Križan, supra note 422, para 41.
Ibid.
426 Ibid, para 111.
427 Ibid, para 113.
428 Ibid, para 114.
429 Arcelor SA, supra note 423, para 153.
424
425
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therefore any instances where the ECJ is willing to prioritize environmental
protection over protecting the market may be indicative of the ECJ’s overall
support of environmental protection. Walloon Waste,430 Dusseldorp,431 and

Aher-Waggon,432 are three cases where the ECJ illustrated its willingness to
prioritize environmental protection over the free movement of goods within
the EU.
Francis Jacobs, the Advocate General in Dusseldorp and Aher-Waggon, has
written about the controversy surrounding the ECJ’s decisions in these
cases.433 The court’s analysis in these cases was not always detailed, but the
decisions themselves do seem reasonable, and more importantly, they
illustrate the importance the ECJ places on environmental protection.
In Walloon Waste a Belgian law banned the importation of waste into the
Belgian region of Wallonia. The concern was that the ban violated Article 30
of the EEC,434 which prohibited restrictions on importation of goods between
member states.435 The ECJ first had to establish that non-recyclable waste
was a “good”, which it did,436 and then, having determined that an Article 30
violation had occurred,437 it looked to see if it could be justified by then
Article 36 of the EEC treaty.
Article 36 of the EEC treaty, allowed quantitative restrictions on trade if they
were for, inter alia, the protection of human or animal life or health, as well
as the preservation of plant life. The ECJ agreed with the Belgian
430

Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium, [1992] Case C-2/90

ECLI:EU:C:1992:310 (Court of Justice of the European Union).
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Aher-Waggon GmbH v Bundesrpublik Deutschland, [1998] Case C-389/96
ECLI:EU:C:1998:357 (Court of Justice of the European Union).
433 Jacobs, supra note 412.
434 The Article can now be found as Article 34 of TEU, supra note 197.
435 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 298 UNTS 11
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government that the free movement of waste constituted a threat to the
environment and, as such, its restriction could be justified under Article 36
on grounds of protection of health and the environment.438

Dusseldorp also dealt with the transfer of waste. Here, Dutch authorities
restricted the export of waste for recovery: dangerous waste could only be
exported to nations with a disposal technique superior to Netherlands’ or, if
the Netherlands lacked necessary capacity, to nations with comparable
techniques.439 Part of the Netherlands’ rationale for the restriction was a
need to provide their waste recovery industry with an adequate quantity of
waste so it would have an adequate economy of scale to afford to recycle the
waste in the most environmentally friendly manner.440 The ECJ seized on
this aspect of the Dutch argument and determined that the object and effect
of this legislation was to restrict exports and provide an economic advantage
to national industry;441 this made it incompatible with EU law. However, in
its decision the court alluded to the fact that such a restriction could be
justified on environmental grounds if it was not specifically designed to
provide an economic advantage.442
Finally, in Aher-Waggon, German authorities enacted legislation which
restricted the new registration of airplanes with noise levels above 69dB(A).
This was a more stringent noise limit than set by the EU standard of 72dB(A)
and it meant that planes which had been registered in other EU Member
States could not necessarily be registered in Germany.443 Furthermore,
because it only pertained to new registrations, many German planes
registered before the legislation took effect exceeded the 69dB(A) standard,

Ibid, paras 50 & 51; EEC Treaty, supra note 435 Article 36; TEU, supra note 197 Article
36, allowing restrictions for protection of health and life of humans, animals and/or plants.
439 Dusseldorp, supra note 431, para 12.
440 Ibid, para 43.
441 Ibid, para 44 in violation of ; Maastricht Treaty, supra note 415 Article 34.
442 Dusseldorp, supra note 431, para 44.
443 Aher-Waggon, supra note 432, para 8.
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but identical planes could not be imported into Germany from other member
states.444 The ECJ noted (a) that the EU legislation only set a minimum noise
standard which could be surpassed by member states,445 (b) that the German
law did restrict inter-community trade,446 and (c) the restriction could be
justified on the basis of protecting public health and environmental
protection.447
Jacobs is critical of these three decisions and argues that, in an effort to
support environmental initiatives, the ECJ avoided important analysis of the
cases and oversimplified EU law. His argument begins from the Danish

Bottles448 case, in which the ECJ established that protection of the
environment was an essential objective of the EU and that it could be used to
justify restrictions on the free movement of goods.449 Jacobs notes that

Danish Bottles established “environmental protection” as distinct from the
Article 36 language of “protection of human or animal life or health [and] the
preservation of plant life”.450 Danish Bottles allowed “environmental
protection” to justify trade restrictions as a “mandatory requirement”451 and
as such, it could only be used where restrictions are (a) applied to domestic
and imported products without distinction (non-discriminatory); (b) necessary
in order to satisfy one of the “mandatory requirements”; and (c) proportionate
to the aim in view.452
In his criticism of Walloon Waste, Jacobs relies on the language of the last
paragraph of the ECJ’s decision:
Ibid, para 10.
Ibid, para 15.
446 Ibid, para 18.
447 Ibid, para 19.
448 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark, [1988] Case 302/86
444
445

ECLI:EU:C:1988:421 (Court of Justice of the European Union).
449 Ibid, para 8.
450 Jacobs, supra note 412 at 188.
451 See Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] Case C-120/78
ECLI:EU:C:1979:42 (Court of Justice of the European Union).
452 Danish Bottles, supra note 448, para 6.
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Thus, where free movement of waste constitutes a threat to the
environment, the adoption of temporary measures, such as those at
issue in the present case, is not prohibited by the directives in
question nor is it contrary to the rules of the Treaty.453

He argues that the language used by the court means that the ECJ must
have employed the “mandatory requirement” justification to allow the trade
restriction. But, he argues, the trade restriction created in Walloon Waste
was discriminatory and that the court’s methods of finding it nondiscriminatory were unconvincing.454 As such, the mandatory requirement
justification should not apply, (the first requirement set out in Danish Bottles
is that it only applies to non-discriminatory restrictions) so Jacobs concludes
that the ECJ improperly applied the law in order to favour an environmental
initiative.455
With regard to Dusseldorp, Jacobs points out that the court again considers
the potential use of mandatory requirements to justify a discriminatory
restriction of exports.456 While the court ultimately determined that the
export restriction was too connected to economic principles, it did state that
the measure might be justified by a mandatory requirement.457 However, the
court does not appear to even consider if the measure is discriminatory or not
– Jacobs argues that it is discriminatory – and therefore the court has
implicitly stated that “in the case of the mandatory requirement of
environmental protection, the discriminatory nature of the measures is of no
relevance.”458

Walloon Waste, supra note 430, paras 50 & 51.
Jacobs, supra note 412 at 189.
455 Ibid.
456 Ibid at 190.
457 Dusseldorp, supra note 431, para 43 the court uses the term “imperative requirement”
rather than “mandatory requirement”, but it is clear that they give it the same meaning.
458 Jacobs, supra note 412 at 190.
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Finally, on Aher-Waggon, Jacobs again argues that the ECJ justified a
discriminatory

measure

by

environmental

protection.459

using
The

the

mandatory

measure,

in

his

requirement
opinion,

for

directly

discriminates between domestic aircraft and imported aircraft,460 but in their
decision the ECJ determined that the measure could be justified without
considering whether or not it was discriminatory. The ECJ simply states that
the legislation at issue restricts intra-Community trade,461 but that it can be
justified by considerations of public health and environmental protection.462
The only other thing the ECJ takes into account when assessing the measure
is whether or not it is proportionate to the objectives pursued and that those
objectives are not attainable by measures less restrictive to trade.463
Jacobs’ analysis of these three cases is logical. In all three cases the ECJ
appears to bend its own rules pertaining to “mandatory requirements” in
order to find trade-restrictive, yet environment beneficial, measures
compliant with EU rules. Jacobs summarizes his position on these cases with
mixed opinions: while he supports the environmental initiatives, he criticises
the courts for failing to provide adequate legal certainty.464
Jacob’s observations on these cases may be simply overlooking a tacit shift in
how the ECJ deals with mandatory requirements and environmental
protection. Perhaps the ECJ has decided that “environmental protection” is
itself a justification for a discriminatory trade restriction. On the other hand
and to Jacob’s point, it would also be helpful if the court would make its
rationale explicit, but at the moment and for the purpose of this work this
lack of legal certainty may actually be of benefit. While it is clear that the
ECJ is willing to prioritize environmental protection over trade, it is not clear
Ibid at 191.
Ibid at 190.
461 Aher-Waggon, supra note 432, para 18.
462 Ibid, para 19.
463 Ibid, para 20.
464 Jacobs, supra note 412 at 192.
459
460
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exactly when and how it is prepared to do so. Walloon Waste, Dusseldorp,
and Aher-Waggon show the ECJ bending its own rules, but not being explicit
in how it goes about this. New litigation should be able to exploit this lack of
clarity and expand the law, and environmental protection, until the court
provides clearer parameters of the extent of the law’s applicability. More
importantly, the ECJ’s willingness to expand the law here may be indicative
of a willingness to progressively interpret human rights law where it deals
with the environment.
There are many uncertainties as to how the ECJ will deal with interactions
between the CFREU and point-source pollution. It could follow the European
Court of Human Rights and expand the rights to privacy, property, and the
right to life to provide some response to point-source pollution. It could also
go further than the European Court of Human Rights and follow its tendency
to give a very high priority to environmental protection. On the other hand,
the ECJ could go in an entirely opposite direction and interpret the CFREU
narrowly on the basis that the drafters’ inclusion of the relatively weak right
to environmental protection indicates their lack of intention to incorporate
environmental protection into other human rights areas. Ultimately, we will
only know the court’s position on these issues as cases come forward.
One certain aspect of the CFREU’s potential for responding to point-source
pollution is its overall limited utility due to the document’s limited
application. The CFREU only applies to the activities of European Union
institutions, and implementation of EU law by Member States.465 These
limitations will limit the opportunities for the CFREU to apply to
interactions of human rights and point-source pollution. While there are
certainly conditions under which pollution could be attributed to an activity
of an EU institution, this will likely account for a very small number of
instances.
465
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Under the CFREU, the ECJ also has authority over human rights violations
which arise from the implementation of EU law,466 but the European Court of
Human Rights has also claimed competency here.467 From the perspective of
a potential applicant the legal landscape in Europe is currently very
interesting. Confronted with a potential human rights violation brought on
by the national implementation of an EU law an applicant would first
attempt to resolve the issue nationally, then at the ECJ, then at the
European Court of Human Rights. Depending on the given facts, the
applicant could begin this process with a reasonable expectation of how the
European Court of Human Rights might rule, but due to the lack of case law
they may have little idea of how the ECJ might rule. The applicant could
hope for a favourable decision from the ECJ and it could provide greater
environmental protection than the European Court of Human Rights. If the
applicant does not receive the desired outcome in the ECJ they elevate the
case to the European Court of Human Rights,468 but if the State disagreed
with the ECJ’s reasoning they could not similarly elevate the case. A State
cannot challenge the ECJ’s interpretation of human rights as long as the EU
is not a party to the ECHR.
Today, the CFREU does not provide clear tools for addressing point-source
pollution. The CFREU rights to health and a healthy environment are
subjective rights and cannot be invoked by individuals. The rights to life,
privacy, and property have the potential for being interpreted by the ECJ in
the same way as they have been by the European Court of Human Rights,
but the ECJ has yet to interpret or elaborate on these rights. The ECJ has
illustrated a willingness to prioritize environmental protection above aspects
of the European common market and this may support the notion that it will
progressively interpret human right to provide environmental protection.
Ibid Article 51(1).
Matthews v The United Kingdom, supra note 218.
468 As the applicants did in the Bosphorus cases
466
467
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However, the wider jurisdiction and arguably more authoritative status of
the European Court of Human Rights generally makes the ECHR a more
useful mechanism for addressing point-source pollution.

2.6.3 Climate change and the CFREU

Unfortunately, the CFREU provides no clear mechanism for responding to
climate change. As discussed in Section 11.2, there are four rights under the
CFREU which might apply to environmental issues, but the rights to health
and environment cannot be invoked by individuals and are therefore difficult
to apply in practice. The ECJ has illustrated a willingness to support
environmental protection, but it has given no indication as to how it will
interpret the rights to life, privacy, and property – specifically if they will be
applied to the environment as they are under the ECHR.
Climate change certainly poses major risks for the European Union and its
citizens, but it is unlikely that the European Commission would invoke either
Article 35 (health) or Article 37 (environment) for an EU institution or
Member State’s failure to address climate change. Both articles mandate that
high levels of protection be provided to both human health and
environmental protection, but it will be difficult to find an EU law which
relates to the causes of climate change and fails to provide protection to
health or the environment. Even if such a situation were to be found, the
likelihood of a successful case is small as the ECJ traditionally gives
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legislators a wide discretion in situations involving complex political and
economic choices.469
Furthermore, it should also be noted that the protection of the environment
under Article 37 is to be “in accordance with the principles of sustainable
development”. The EU’s defined sustainable development in the Consolidated
Version of the Treaty of the European Union, such that “[t]he Union shall
establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of
Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly
competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social
progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the
environment”.470 The need to balance economic, social, and environmental
interests further weakens the potential application of Article 37 – any claim
that an EU institution or Member State failed to provide a high level of
environmental protection could be countered with a claim that the decisionmakers were balancing the environment against the economy or social
interests.
It will be difficult if not impossible to apply Article 37 to climate change. This
leaves the CFREU rights to life, privacy, and property as the only potential
means of using the CFREU to respond to climate change. Unfortunately,
without a clear indication as to how the ECJ will interpret these specific
rights, the best basis for predicting its approach to a human rights case
pertaining to climate change is to look at its case law dealing with climate
change even though it does not relate to human rights.

Jacobs, supra note 412 at 195; Also see SCPA and EMC v Commission, supra note 412 at
223 & 224; Tetra Laval, supra note 412, para 20; Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v
European Commission, [2010] Case T-21/05 ECLI:EU:T:2010:205 (Court of Justice of the
European Union).
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In PreussenElektra471 the ECJ showed its willingness to prioritize an
initiative aimed a mitigating climate change over a general principle of the
common market. The case stemmed from a German law requiring electricity
supply companies to purchase locally produced, renewably sourced, electricity
at an artificially inflated rate.472 The ECJ acknowledged that the German
law conferred certain economic advantages to specific producers473 and the
case hinged on whether or not the law’s potential for harming intraCommunity trade could be justified under Article 30 of the EC Treaty.474
Article 30 of the EC Treaty (now Article 36 TFEU) allows restrictions to be
placed on the import and export of goods if it is justified. Justification can be
based on a variety of reasons including “the protection of health and life of
humans, animals or plants”.475 In its decision, the ECJ noted that “the use of
renewable energy sources… is useful for protecting the environment in so far
as it contributes to the reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases which are
amongst the main causes of climate change which the European Community
and its Member States have pledged to combat”.476 The court added that
Article 130r(2) of the EC Treaty (now reflected in Article 37 of the CFREU)
required

that

environmental

protection

be

integrated

into

the

implementation of all Community policies.477 Based on these factors, the ECJ
concluded that the law in question could be justified under Article 30 of the
EC Treaty.

PreussenElektra, supra note 414.
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473 Ibid, para 54.
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The ECJ built on its decision in PreussenElektra in the recent case of Ålands

vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten.478 Here the court again had to consider a
national law which limited access to an EU Member State’s electricity
market with the intent of promoting renewable energy and combatting
climate change. Swedish law established that electricity suppliers and
certain consumers were required to purchase a specific quantity of certified
renewable energy. The certification was done by the Swedish government and
only electricity installations located in Sweden could be certified.479 The court
acknowledged that the Swedish law had the effect of restricting imports,480
but its usefulness for protecting the environment and the life of humans,
animals and plants481 allowed it to be justified as protecting the
environment.482
In PreussenElektra and Ålands vindkraft, the ECJ closely connected efforts
to combat climate change with environmental protection in general and,
importantly, allowed these efforts to qualify under Article 36 TFEU as a
justification for restricting imports and exports between EU Member States.
Unrestricted imports and exports are a fundamental principle of the
European Union so anything capable of their restriction must also be of
significant importance. Article 36 TFEU does not mention environmental
protection as a specific justification, only “public morality, public policy or
public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or
plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or
archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial
property”. While climate change is certainly capable of impacting one or more

Ålands vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten, [2014] Case C-573/12 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2037
(Court of Justice of the European Union).
479 Ibid, paras 11–15.
480 Ibid, paras 65–70.
481 Ibid, paras 79 & 80.
482 Ibid, para 119 in its decision the court also verified that the law was proportional - that it
was “appropriate and necessary” for environmental protection, but a detailed analysis of this
is unnecessary for the purpose of this work.
478
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of these issues, the ECJ has yet to clarify the precise relationship between
the “environmental protection” and the justification of discriminatory
measures.483
Advocate General Bot gave opinions in both Ålands vindkraft and the
subsequent similar case of Essent.484 In his Essent Opinion, he advocated for
the ECJ to clarify the ability for environmental protection to act as a
justification for measures that impede the free movement of goods.485 He
noted that the “environmental protection” is not explicitly provided as a
justification under Article 36 TFEU and recommended that the court provide
a clear formal recognition of an applicant’s ability to potentially rely on
environmental protection as a justification for discriminatory measures.486
The court did not provide clarity in Essent and has yet to do so in any other
case.487 While this reduces legal certainty, it allows EU Member States to
legislate with a focus on combating climate change, confident that the ECJ
appears to be broadly sympathetic to the idea that reducing greenhouse gas
emissions can be a justification for otherwise discriminatory measures.
There is no clear path for an applicant to use the ECJ to oblige a State to
either engage in point-source pollution reduction or climate change
prevention, but the ECJ has made it clear that both environmental protection
and emissions reductions are priorities of the EU. National actions which
prioritize environmental protection or climate change mitigation over the free
movement of goods have a reasonable chance of being justified by the ECJ

Dörte Fouquet & Angela Guarrata, “Judgment of 1st July 2014 in Alands Vindkraft AB v.
Energimyndigheten” Renewable Energy L & Pol at 58.
484 Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt,
[2014] Cases C-204/13 and C-208/12 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2192 (Court of Justice of the European
Union).
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Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt
(Opinion of AG), [2014] Cases C-204/13 and C-208/12 ECLI:EU:C:2013:294 (Court of Justice
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of the European Union), para 92.
486 Ibid.
487 Fouquet & Guarrata, supra note 483 at 58.
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and the ECJ has left itself space to further interpret the role of
environmental protection. The ECJ has shown a tendency to focus on
environmental protection in spite of EU law, just as the European Court of
Human Rights has facilitated conservation in spite of explicit human rights.
With respect to conservation, the ECJ has yet to consider a case where
conservation intersects with human rights, but there is reason to believe that
the ECJ could also prioritize environmental protection over explicit CFREU
rights.

2.6.4 The EU and ecosystem conservation

While conservation is not explicitly provided for by the CFREU, it is possible
that conservation could be prioritized above explicit human rights
protections, similar to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights.
In Hamer it became clear that conservation could be prioritized over certain
fundamental ECHR rights, including the right to property.488 Article 52 of the
CFREU allows limitations to be placed on any right “if they are necessary
and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union”.489
At the same time, the European Commission and ECJ have made it clear
that conservation is a high priority for the EU.
Two EU Directives provide “the cornerstone for Europe’s nature conservation
policy”,490 the Birds Directive491 and the Habitats Directive.492 The ECJ has

Hamer v Belgium, supra note 400 Para 79.
CFREU, supra note 141 Article 52(1).
490 European Commission, Natura 2000 Conservation in Partnership, updated 2009 ed
488
489

(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009) at 3.
491

Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the conservation of wild birds,

30 November 2009, 2009/147/EC [Birds Directive].
492

Council Directive on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, 21

May 1992, 92/43/EEC [Habitats Directive].
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considered the application of these two directives on multiple occasions and
routinely prioritized conservation principles over other interests.
Article 52 of the CFREU allows limitations to be placed on all rights. The
emphasis the European Commission and ECJ have placed on the
conservation directives establish a strong argument for their being part of the
objectives and general interests of the EU and this will likely allow the ECJ
to, within reason,493 limit CFREU rights in favour of ecosystem conservation.
In Lappel Bank the ECJ held that the designation of conservation areas
under the Birds Directive could not be based on economic considerations.494
The court later extended this to the Habitats Directive stating clearly that “a
Member State may not take account of economic, social and cultural
requirements or regional and local characteristics… when selecting and
defining the boundaries of the sites”.495 The ECJ has also established a high
threshold for projects which may impact sites established under the Habitats
Directive such that impact assessments must be conducted “if it cannot be
excluded, on the basis of objective information, that it will have a significant
effect on that site”.496 This standard has been likened to the Precautionary
Principle and makes it very difficult to pursue projects in the proximity of
conservation areas.497

Limitations on rights allowed by Article 52(1) are also subject to the principle of
proportionality.
494 Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment, [1996] Case C-44/95
ECLI:EU:C:1996:297 (Court of Justice of the European Union), paras 40 & 41.
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The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, [2000]
Case C-371/99 ECLI:EU:C:2000:600 (Court of Justice of the European Union), para 25.
496 Waddenvereniging and Vogelsbeschermingvereniging, [2004] Case C-127/02
ECLI:EU:C:2004:482 (Court of Justice of the European Union), para 25.
497 Andrew L R Jackson, “Renewable energy vs. biodiversity: Policy conflicts and the future of
nature conservation” (2011) 21:4 Global Environmental Change 1195 at 1198; the ECJ has
said that project can only proceed if “where no reasonable scientific doubt remains as to the
absence of [adverse] effects” Waddenzee, supra note 496, para 59 or if it meets the conditions
of Habitats Directive Article 6(4): absence of alternative solutions and imperative reasons of
overriding public interest.
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The ECJ has not yet considered the balance of conservation and CFREU
rights, but there is an opportunity for the court to apply Article 52 to any
given right in order to prioritize conservation. Certainly this likelihood is
higher in conservation areas which fall under the Birds or Habitats
Directives as they are particularly important components of EU law and
would certainly fall under “general interests recognized by the Union”. It is
also likely that the ECJ would extend such protection to areas which are not
formally protected under the Directives, but the court sees as worthy of
formal classification.498
What remains unclear is how the court will respond to small-scale
conservation actions which do not meet the standards for protected areas
under the Birds and Habitats Directives. The focus of both Directives is on
the protection of particularly vulnerable and threatened species and
habitats,499 so how would the ECJ treat conservation efforts which protect a
“common” ecosystem? In Hamer, the European Court of Human Rights did
not emphasize the uniqueness of the conservation area in question and there
is no reason why the ECJ would need to either. The European Commission
has made it clear that conservation is a priority of the Union and the ECJ
has emphasized conservation and environmental protection in multiple cases.
Together these factors establish a general interest recognized by the Union
and should allow conservation efforts to outweigh CFREU rights.
In conclusion, European human rights can clearly be divided between actual
protection and potential protection. Rights under the ECHR are relatively
well defined and, while possessing potential for development, can be clearly
The court has found states in violation of their obligations for failing to classify and
protect areas which should be protected by the Directives, see Commission of the European
Communities v French Republic, [2000] Case C-374/98 ECLI:EU:C:2000:670 (Court of
Justice of the European Union); Bund Naturschutz in Bayern eV, Johann Märkl and Others,
498

Angelika Graubner-Riedelsheimer and Others, Friederike Nischwitz and Others v Freistaad
Bayern, [2006] Case C-244/05 ECLI:EU:C:2006:579 (Court of Justice of the European Union),
para 37.
499 European Commission, supra note 490 at 4.
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applied to certain environmental challenges. The ECHR rights to privacy and
life provide established mechanisms to respond to point-source pollution, in
particular in situations where the pollution places the applicant’s health at
risk. These rights, in particular the right to life, may be applicable to climate
change, but using the ECHR to force States to respond to climate change will
be challenging. Finally, the European Court of Human Rights has also made
it clear that it places a high priority on ecosystem conservation, so much so as
to prioritize it over fundamental ECHR rights. In contrast, the rights under
the CFREU are hypothetical when it comes to their application to
environmental problems. The ECJ has illustrated the value it places on
environmental protection, but it has also illustrated a willingness to distance
itself from the ECHR and the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights. The ECJ has the potential to interpret the CFREU rights to life,
privacy, and property in line with the ECHR rights and there are indications
that it may provide even greater environmental protection than the ECHR.
The ECJ and the EU similarly place a lot of emphasis on the importance of
climate change mitigation and ecosystem conservation and the ECJ could
interpret the CFREU in line with these principles. At the same time, there
are still many questions surrounding the actual utility of the CFREU as a
means of responding to environmental challenges; these questions will only
be answered as cases proceed before the ECJ.
The next chapter echoes this chapter and looks at the Inter-American human
rights regime, its history, development and its ability to respond to the same
environmental challenges.
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Chapter 3: Inter-American Human Rights

Inter-American human rights are founded upon the world’s oldest
international human rights document. It provides citizens from Canada to
Argentina with varying levels of human rights protection. These rights
contrast greatly with European human rights in terms of their founding
principles, historical application, and functional mechanisms, but these
differences notwithstanding, the Inter-American human rights regime offers
significant opportunities to respond to environmental challenges. This
analysis will review the history of the Inter-American human rights regime,
its primary documents, and its present and potential ability to respond to
environmental challenges.
This work begins by outlining the development of the Organization of
American States, the body responsible for creating and overseeing the InterAmerican Human Rights Regime. Then it looks at two attempts within the
regime to use Inter-American human rights to respond to climate change.
Finally, as there is significant overlap between point-source pollution and
conservation within the regime, these two topics will be considered together.

3.1 The Organization of American States

The OAS is the body which currently oversees the Inter-American Human
Rights regime. Although its role is relatively easily defined today, it has a
complex history rooted in conflict filled regional relations.
There are a variety of points in time which experts have cited as laying the
foundation of the OAS and the Inter-American human rights regime,
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including: the Congress of Panama, organized by Simon Bolivar in 1826;500
the First International Conference of American States, held in Washington
DC in 1889;501 the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace
in 1945;502 and the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of the American Republics in 1959.503 However, while the creation of
the Intern-American human rights regime can be traced back to multiple
sources, a review of the regime’s history reveals the tremendous impact the
United States of America has had on all aspects of the regimes creation and
function.504 Therefore any review of the modern regime must first
acknowledge the role of the United States in the Americas.
On December 2nd, 1823, President James Monroe presented what would
become one of the most long-standing principles of United States foreign
policy: the Monroe Doctrine.505 At the heart of the doctrine was the principle
that the United States would treat any European attempts at expanding or
reclaiming colonies in the Western-hemisphere as an act of aggression toward

David A Rikard, “End to Unilateral U.S. Action in Latin America: A Call for Expanding
the Role of the O.A.S., An” (1987) 14 Syracuse J Int’l L & Com 273 at 277 Rikard attributes
the genesis for the Inter-American system to the principles set out by Simon Bolivar and the
1926 Congress of Panama.
501 Ibid at 278“The Inter-American system, as it is today, began to take shape in 1889”; The
OAS traces its own history to this meeting, see: OAS, “OAS - Organization of American
States: Democracy for peace, security, and development”, (1 August 2009), online:
<http://www.oas.org/en/about/our_history.asp>.
502 Robert K Goldman, “History and Action: The Inter-American Human Rights System and
the Role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights” (2009) 31:4 Human Rights
Quarterly 856 at 858 Goldman cites this meeting as the one which began to shape a regional
human rights regime in the wake of World War II.
503 Jose A Cabranes, “The Protection of Human Rights by the Organization of American
States” (1968) 62:4 The American Journal of International Law 889 at 893 Cabranes argues
that it was not until 1959 that the OAS truly began to create a regional human rights
regime.
504 Jack Donnelly, “International human rights: regime analysis” (1986) 40:3 International
Organization 599 at 625 Donnelly states that the Inter-American human rights system is
“probably best understood” in terms of the influential authority of the United States over the
regime.
500

Message of President James Monroe at the commencement of the first session of the 18th
Congress (The Monroe Doctrine), 12/02/1823, Presidential Messages of the 18th Congress,
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ca 12/02/1823 - ca 03/03/1825 (U, 1823).
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the United States itself.506 Although the doctrine did not make any reference
to the United States’ intention to influence the national practices of other
states in the Western-hemisphere,507 the declaration has been used on many
occasions as a justification for regional intervention.
The Monroe Doctrine was presented at a time when Latin America was in a
particular state of flux. Spain had recently lost control over many of its
former territories including Argentina,508 Gran Colombia,509 Peru,510 and
Mexico.511 In the wake of this, the United States moved to create diplomatic
relations with these new governments with the intention of establishing
trade. The United States was partly concerned that if it did not act Britain or
France might move to seize parts of newly independent Latin America.512
There was a perceived value associated with trade opportunities presented by
the newly independent Latin nations and so the Monroe Doctrine, while
potentially appearing altruistic, was primarily based on economics: by
preventing European intrusion in the Americas, the United States would be
able to maximize its trade opportunities, and influence, in the region.513
From the introduction of the Monroe Doctrine to the creation of the OAS, the
United States frequently intervened in the affairs of its regional neighbours

Ibid. “With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not
interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their
independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and
on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of
oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in
any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United
States.”
507 Elihu Root, “The Real Monroe Doctrine” (1914) 8:3 The American Journal of International
Law 427 at 434.
508 Argentina became independent in 1816
509 Gran Colombia became independent in 1819 and included modern-day Colombia,
Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama, Northern Peru, Western Guyana and Northwest Brazil
510 Peru became independent in 1821
511 Mexico achieved independence in 1821
512 Mark T Gilderhus, “The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications” (2006) 36:1
Presidential Studies Quarterly 5 at 7.
513 Ibid.
506
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and its interventions became major concerns for Latin American States.514
The USA helped Cuba gain independence from Spain,515 but also forced
independent Cuba to allow the US to unilaterally intervene in Cuban
affairs.516 The United States used this authority in 1906 to invade Cuba,
create a provisional government, and retain control over the nation until
1909. In 1903, the US entered Colombian affairs when it explicitly supported
Panamanian independence (Panama was previously a department of
Colombia) in order to gain control over the proposed Panama canal. The
United States helped Panama separate from Colombia and Panama gave the
United States complete control over the Panama Canal Zone. From 1912 to
1933, United States Marines occupied Nicaragua, in part to protect US
citizens during a time of political instability, but also to protect its interests
in a proposed Nicaraguan canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
The United States also occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934 and the Dominican
Republic from 1916 to 1924.
The United States would substantially change its foreign policy in 1933 with
the “Good Neighbor Policy” which reversed previous international policy in
favour of non-intervention, specifically: “[t]he definite policy of the United
States… is one opposed to armed intervention”.517 It was under the Good
Neighbor Policy that the US would end its occupations in Nicaragua and
Haiti and renounce its authority over Cuban affairs.

Henry Wells, “Institutional Framework of Inter-American Relations, The” (1983) 13 Cal
W Int’l LJ 223.
515 Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, 10
December 1898, General Records of the United States Government 1778-2006, RG 11 [Treaty
of Paris 1898] which ended the Spanish-American War. In the treaty, Spain surrendered
control of Cuba and ceded Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines to the United States.
514

Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Cuba Embodying the Provisions
Defining Their Future Relations as Contained in the Act of Congress Approved March 2,
1901, 22 May 1903, General Records of the United States Government 1778-2006, RG 11
[Platt Amendment].
517 Alan McPherson, Encyclopedia of U.S. Military Interventions in Latin America [2
volumes] (ABC-CLIO, 2013) at 236.
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At the time of proposing the Good Neighbor Policy, the United States also
began to increase its emphasis on increased cooperation among all Westernhemisphere nations. President Franklin Roosevelt, who established the Good
Neighbor Policy, is credited with organizing the Seventh International
Conference of American States in 1933.518 It was here that the participants
ratified the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,519 which specifies
in Article 8 that “[n]o state has the right to intervene in internal or external
affairs of another”. Article 8 would become known as “the principle of nonintervention” and it was repeated three years later with a protocol stating
that the parties “declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them,
directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external
affairs of any other of the parties”.520
The principle of non-intervention had been favoured by Latin American
nations prior to 1933 as principle primarily directed against the acts of the
United States;521 however it was not until the US adopted the Good Neighbor
Policy that the principle could be integrated into Inter-American relations.
The principle of non-intervention was adopted into Inter-American relations
before the creation of the modern OAS and it would permeate the OAS and
its human rights.

See Charles G Fenwick, “The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace”
(1937) 31:2 The American Journal of International Law 201 at 201; Special to THE NEW
YORK TIMES, “LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN AMERICAS URGED BY 3 LATIN
STATES: This Is One of Suggestions in the 17 Favorable Replies to Roosevelt’s Parley
Project. NO NEGATIVES RECEIVED Proposal Is Also Made That All the American States
Become Parties to Monroe Doctrine. LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN AMERICAS URGED”, New
York Times (13 April 1936), online:
<http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/docview/101608923/abstract/95D93AB28D
D64E34PQ/1?accountid=10406>.
519 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Seventh International
Conference of the American States (Signed 26 December 1933) [Montevideo Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States] Article 8.
520 “Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention” (1937) 31:2 The American Journal of
International Law 57 Article 1.
521 Wells, supra note 514 at 230.
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The Ninth International Conference of American States fundamentally
changed the cooperative dynamic that had existed in the Americas since the
first Conference of American States. Held in 1948, it established a treaty to
strengthen cooperation and solidify a cooperative organization. Prior to the
Ninth Conference, all activities of the “International Union of American
Republics”, (the modern OAS), were based on individual resolutions.522
Multiple narrow resolutions had been preferred over a singular broad treaty
and

cooperation

consisted

only

of

an

assortment

of

non-binding

recommendations, which were easy to alter and append.523 This piecemeal
strategy suffered from complexity, uncertainty, confusion, a vague definition
of

competencies,

and

inadequate

financial

support.524

The

Ninth

International Conference of the American States set out to solve these
problems through reorganization.525
The Ninth Conference overhauled the interaction of American States by
creating a singular Charter of the Organization of American States.526 The
charter has subsequently been amended by four protocols; each requiring
ratification by two-thirds of OAS members and appling only to those
members which have ratified the protocols.527 In broad terms, the Charter is
designed to (i) outline the principles by which its members will interact;528 (ii)
establish the various organs and financing mechanisms which facilitate the
principles outlined in (i);529 and (iii) outline various matters of the practical
operation and implementation of the OAS.530 Many of the functional aspects
of the OAS are not of major importance to this work, save one important
Josef L Kunz, “The Bogota Charter of the Organization of American States” (1948) 42:3
The American Journal of International Law 568 at 568.
523 Ibid.
524 Ibid at 569.
525 Ibid at 570.
526 Charter of the Organization of American States, 13 December 1951, 119 UNTS 3 [Bogota
Charter].
527 Ibid Article 140.
528 Ibid Articles 1-3, 10-52.
529 Ibid Articles 53 - 130.
530 Ibid Articles 131 to 146.
522
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exception: as with previous Inter-American documents, the Charter places
heavy emphasis on the principle of non-intervention:
Article 19
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs
of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed
force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic,
and cultural elements.
Article 20
No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an
economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of
another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.
Article 21
The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even
temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken
by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No
territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force
or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.

It is important to recognize the importance the Inter-American nations place
on non-intervention because it has a major impact on the design and function
of Inter-American human rights. The OAS initially created a regional human
rights regime which lacked a clear ability to interfere with national activities,
including human rights violations. The Inter-American human rights regime
has since developed a relatively effectual mechanism for protecting human
rights, but to do so it has had to overcome numerous challenges.
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3.1.1 Human rights under the OAS

At the Ninth International Conference of American States, along with
signing OAS Charter, participants also signed the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man:531 the world’s first international human rights
document.532 Framing the document as a declaration, the participant nations
were able to outwardly support regional human rights using a non-binding
document that was technically incapable of holding the parties accountable.
It would not be until 1960, with the creation of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (the IA Commission), that the OAS would
establish a mechanism to provide a means of ensuring any party
accountability for protecting Inter-American human rights.
The IA Commission on Human Rights was initially created as an
independent institution of the OAS with a relatively limited mandate and
authority.533 The purpose of the IA Commission was to promote respect, and
raise awareness, of human rights within the region.534 To accomplish this,
the IA Commission had the authority to “make recommendations to
Governments of the member states in general”; “to prepare such studies and
reports as it considers advisable”; and “to urge the Governments of member
states to supply it with information on the measures adopted by them in
matters of human rights”.535
The IA Commission was quick to make the most of its limited powers. At its
seventh meeting, the IA Commission determined that its authority to “make
recommendations to Governments of the member states in general” allowed it
531

American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, April 1948, 43 AJIL Supp 133

[American Declaration].
532 Goldman, supra note 502 at 859.

Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 26 Sept 1960,
OEA/SerL/V/II [Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights].
534 Ibid Article 9.
535 Ibid Article 9.
533
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to make both general statements about the status of human rights in the
Americas as well as general recommendations to individual each member
states.536 Although the IA Commission was initially designed as a “study and
reporting body”, a human rights crisis in the Dominican Republic in 1965 saw
the IA Commission actively operating an in situ humanitarian operation –
monitoring the rights of prisoners, investigating reported human rights
abuses, and facilitating mediation between conflicting groups.537 This marked
a shift for the IA Commission from a studying and reporting body to “one
with [a] far broader action range than ever anticipated by its creators”.538 The
OAS clearly approved of the IA Commission’s expanded actions in the
Dominican Republic539 and its authority was formally expanded in 1965,540
1967,541 and 1979.542
The modern role of the IA Commission represents one tier of a multi-tiered
human rights regime. While the foundation of the Inter-American human

See Report on the work accomplished during the first session, Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights 14 March 1961, OEA/SerL/V/II1 Doc 32 [Report on the work
accomplished during the first session]“Competence of the Commission”.
537 Cabranes, supra note 503 at 895.
538 Ibid at 896; The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Dominican
536

Republic, June 1965 to 1966, prepared for the Hammarskjold Forum on the Dominican
Crisis, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2 May 1966, OEA/SerL/V/II14 Doc 13
[The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Dominican Republic, June 1965 to
1966, prepared for the Hammarskjold Forum on the Dominican Crisis].
See “Second Special Inter-American Conference” (1966) 60:2 The American Journal of
International Law 445 at 458 The OAS does not mention the Dominican Republic specifically
but does praise the IACommHR’s work and it broadens the IACommHR’s responsibilities in
an effort to promote greater respect for human rights.
540 note 539 The OAS was given the authority to examine individual petitions and the OAS
requested annual reports on the current state of human rights in the Americas.
541 “Organization of American States: Protocol of Amendment of Charter” (1967) 6 ILM 310
Articl 51 elevates the IACommHR to on of “the Organs” which accomplish the purposes of the
OAS and Article 112 states that the IACommHR is a consultative organ of the OAS whose
structure and competence shall be determined by the (at the time unwritten) inter-American
convention on human rights.
542 Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1 October 1979, OAS Off
Rec OEA/SerP/IX02/80, Vol 1 at 88 [Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights].
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rights regime is the American Declaration, the American Convention,543 and
its protocols provide increasing levels of regional human rights protection
with decreasing participation.
The American Convention, which opened for signature in 1969 and came into
force in 1978, established binding human rights with an independent court:
the IA Court. It also split human rights protection in the Americas between a
relatively low level of protection applied to all OAS nations by the American
Declaration and a higher level of protection provided to a subset of OAS
States party to the American Convention.
The American Convention represented a major step forward in InterAmerican human rights protection. The document elaborated on many of the
rights present in the American Declaration, it also established new rights
and a court capable of determining: if rights had been violated; if
compensation was owed; and, in cases where irreparable damage had not yet
occurred, if preventative measures were necessary.544 The American
Convention provided individuals with a stronger mechanism for protecting
their human rights as compared to the American Declaration, but this
greater protection has come with a significant decrease in State participation.
The OAS has 35 member states and the IA Commission is capable of
reviewing their compliance with the human rights found in the American
Declaration. These reviews have no legal authority. The American
Convention establishes legally binding regional human rights in the
Americas, but only 25 OAS member states have ratified the Convention and
of those, two have subsequently denounced it.545 Of the 23 States currently

American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 [American
Convention].
544 Ibid Article 63.
545 Signatories and Ratifications to B-32: American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of
San Jose, Costa Rica”, Accessed 17 May, 2016 [Parties to the American Convention] Trinidad
543
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committed to the American Convention, only 20 recognize the authority of the
IA Court.546 This tiered protection continues with the Protocol of San
Salvador. The protocol is the most recent and significant addition to the
American Convention and it establishes various economic, social, cultural
and environmental rights, but has only been ratified by 16 States.547 The
design of Inter-American human rights is markedly distinct from the ECHR
regime, when ECHR protocols enter into force they apply to all parties to the
agreement, this is not the case in the Inter-American regime and the result is
a regime where progressively fewer nations are willing to commit themselves
to increasingly strong human rights protections.
At the broadest tier of the Inter-American regime the IA Commission has
numerous powers. It can make recommendations on individual petitions that
allege violations by any of the 35 OAS member states of the rights under the
American Declaration.548 It can request reports from OAS member states on
the measures they have taken regarding human rights;549 with national
consent they can conduct in situ observations of human rights compliance;550
and in serious and urgent situations, the IA Commission can request that a
OAS Member State adopt precautionary measures to prevent irreparable
harm to individuals or the subject matter of a pending case.551

Ibid Dominica, Grenada and Jamaica have all ratified the convention but have not
recognized the court. Article 62 of the American Convention requires State parties to
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the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
rights “Protocol of San Salvador”].
548 Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 542 Article
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Using these authorities, the IA Commission has received roughly 20,000
individual petitions552 including many petitions pertaining to environmental
issues. While the IA Commission’s recommendations are not legally binding,
it is clear that most OAS member states do take the IA Commission’s
complaints review process seriously. OAS member states (a) consistently
mount strong defenses against claims that they have violated an applicant’s
human rights and (b) member states recently campaigned to reform the IA
Commission to restrain its ability to issue its non-binding precautionary
measures.553
At the second tier of the Inter-American Regime, 23 nations are currently
parties to the American Convention. The American Convention commits a
nation to human rights not provided by the American Declaration,554 but
parties must explicitly recognize the authority of the IA Court if they are
willing to be formally bound.555 This extra step recalls the principle of nonintervention and its role in Inter-American relations.
Where parties to the American Convention have not recognized the IA Court,
individuals, groups, and registered non-governmental agencies can petition
the IA Commission to review potential right violations,556 but the IA

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Annual Report 2012, 5 March 2013, OAS
Off Rec OEA/SerL/V/II147 Doc 1 [Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Annual
Report 2012], ch 2(A)(5) In their 2012 report the IACHR stated that it had received almost
20,000 petitions. This number includes petitions claiming violations of both the American
Declaration and the ACHR.
553 See Clarinha Glock, “Inter-American Human Rights Reform Faces Deadline” (2013) Inter
Press Service News Agency, online: <http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/03/inter-american-humanrights-system-reform-faces-deadline/>; Reform of the Rules of Procedure, Policies and
Practices, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1/2013 [Reform of the
Rules of Procedure, Policies and Practices] The changes do not eliminate the authority of the
Commission, but it refines its ability to use Precautionary Measures see Page 4.
554 Such as a right to humane treatment American Convention, supra note 543 Article 5.
555 Ibid Article 62.
556 Ibid Article 44.
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Commission will not accept inter-party petitions without the explicit
permission of the State.557
The design of the American Convention illustrates OAS member states’
historic willingness to accept some intervention by allowing the Commission
to review cases brought by their own citizens, but at the same time a
wariness of allowing neighbouring nations to interfere in national activities.
The scale of this apparent distrust between parties is illustrated by some
nations having refused to grant authority to the Commission to hear interstate cases while at the same time, recognizing the Court’s authority to give
binding judgments on cases brought by their own citizens.558
The 20 OAS nations which have recognized the IA Court have committed
themselves to a human rights standard beyond other OAS member states as
they are the only States willing to be bound by decisions of an external court.
Recognizing the authority of the IA Court is arguably the most significant
concession to the principle of non-intervention to be found in the InterAmerican human rights regime. Unfortunately, for those groups and
individuals whose rights are violated, the procedure for petitioning the court
is complex and lengthy and such issues can minimize its ability to
meaningfully affect national policies and practice.
Applicants cannot directly petition the IA Court, instead a petitioner brings
his or her case to the IA Commission, which then reports on the facts and
draws its own conclusions regarding the potential rights violations. These
conclusions are given to the petitioners and defending state, but are not
published.559 Then, if the matter cannot be settled privately between the

Ibid Article 45(1).
The Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Guatemala fall in this category. See Signatories
to the American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica”, Accessed 26
January 2015 [http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm].
559 American Convention, supra note 543 Article 50(1).
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parties, either the State or the IA Commission (on behalf of the petitioner)
submits the issue to the IA Court.560 If the IA Court subsequently determines
that a right has been violated, the IA Court will rule that the aggrieved party
is guaranteed the enjoyment of the right in question and, if appropriate, that
compensation is paid to the injured party.561
The IA Court has a second important role which is the power to order
“provisional measures” which are akin to the IA Commission’s “precautionary
measures”. Here, the IA Court may order that a State take particular actions
to avoid irreparable damage to an individual.562 If the case is already before
the IA Court, provisional measures can be requested by a party or be based
on the court’s own motivation.563 If the case has not yet reached the IA Court,
provisional measures can be made at the request of the IA Commission.564
Finally, at the highest tier of the Inter-American human rights regime, 16
nations have ratified the Protocol of San Salvador.565 The protocol is
particularly relevant to this work as it contains one of the most strongly
worded environmental rights found in international law:
Article 11
Right to a Healthy Environment

Ibid Article 51.
Ibid Article 63.
562 Ibid Article 63(2); Also see Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, published in Dinah Shelton, Paolo Wright-Carozza & Paolo G Carozza, Regional
Protection of Human Rights: Documentary Supplement (Oxford University Press, 2013) at
560
561

344 Article 26.
563 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in Shelton, WrightCarozza & Carozza, supra note 562 at 344 Article 26(1).
564 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in ibid Article 26(2).

Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of.
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “Protocol of San Salvador”, 17 November 1988, 28 ILM
161 [San Salvador Protocol]; The other protocol is the Protocol to the American Convention
on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, 8 June 1990, OAS Off Rec OEA/SerL/V/II82
Doc 6 Rev1 at 80 (1992) [Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish
the Death Penalty], but it has nothing to do with the environment.
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1. Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and
to have access to basic public services.
2. The States Parties shall promote the protection, preservation and

improvement of the environment.566

Unfortunately, although it appears that Article 11 gives the individual an
enforceable right, individuals are incapable of bringing a claim to either the
IA Commission or the IA Court because of an explicit restriction placed on
Article 11.567 The IA Commission maintains the ability to publish
observations and recommendations regarding the status of Article 11 in any
of the 16 ratifying nations.568 In its Country Reports, the IA Commission has
criticised various nations for failure to protect the environment,569 but it has
not referenced Article 11 of the San Salvador protocol. It is not clear that
these references are based on Article 11 and as most pertain to the
environment and property of indigenous populations, they could easily be
based on the right to property under the American Convention – the IA
Commission is not specific.
The San Salvador Protocol also provides a right to health.570 The right
expands on Article 11 of American Declaration which guarantees the
preservation of an individual’s health and well-being.571 Unfortunately, like
the right to a healthy environment, the right to health in the San Salvador
Protocol cannot be invoked by individual petitioners. In contrast to the right
to a healthy environment, the right to health under the San Salvador

566
567

San Salvador Protocol, supra note 565 Article 11.
Ibid Article 19(6) states that only violations of Articles 8(a) and 13 can giver rise to

individual petitions.
568 Ibid Article 19(7).
569 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Guatemala: Diversity, Inequality, and Exclusion (2015), para 13; Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Honduras
(2015), para 421; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Colombia: Truth, Justice and Reparation (2013), paras 652–55.
570 San Salvador Protocol, supra note 565 Article 10.
571 American Declaration, supra note 531 Article XI.
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Protocol has been referenced specifically by the IA Commission.572 IA
Commission recommendations based on the right to health are still nonbinding, but they illustrate the seriousness with which the IA Commission
treats the San Salvador Protocol and indicate a potential willingness of the
IA Commission to directly reference the right to a healthy environment in the
future. Interestingly, the right to health under the American Declaration has
been used successfully to argue for greater environmental protection573 and
although the American Convention does not provide an explicit right to
health, the IA Commission declared a case admissible on the basis that
pollution, which led to a public health crisis, could be characterized as
violating numerous American Convention rights.574 The role of the right to
health is discussed in further detail in Section 3.3.2 of this work.
The complex tiered nature of rights provided by the Inter-American human
rights regime are at least in part a result of the regimes storied relationship
with the principle of non-intervention.
The transition of the Inter-American regime from one founded on the
principle of non-intervention to one which allows a supranational court to
intervene in national activities has been lengthy and complicated. Article 19
of the OAS Charter, established that “[n]o State or group of States has the
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State”.575 If this principle had been
followed, it would have been impossible for a supranational human rights
regime to be effective. If a State were to violate the human rights of its
citizens, Article 19 would prevent other nations from taking any action.

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in Paraguay (2001), ch 5 para 44.
573 See Yanomami v Brasil, (1985), Inter-Am Comm HR, No 7615, Annual Report of the
572

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 1984-85 OEA/SERL/V/II66 .
574 See Community of San Mateo de Huanchor and its members v Peru, Case 504/03, Report
No 69/04, Inter-Am CHR, OEA/SerL/V/II122 Doc 5 rev 1 at 487 (2004) , para 66.
575 Bogota Charter, supra note 526 Article 19.
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Fortunately, the OAS member states did agree to the terms of the nonbinding American Declaration and then allowed the IA Commission to
monitor State’s human rights. This ultimately developed toward modern
Inter-American regime complete with its legally binding court.
Throughout its history, the Inter-American human rights regime has been
used by numerous individuals to pursue environmental initiatives. Given the
tiered nature of the regime, one way to divide analysis of these
environmental initiatives would be to separate cases into those which fall
under American Declaration from those arising under American Convention
and the Protocol of San Salvador. However, the IA Commission has shown a
tendency to blur the lines between the American Declaration and the
American Convention when interpreting these two documents so this is not
an ideal means of structuring analysis.
Ultimately, even though tiers exist, many of the OAS member states treat
the IA Commission and the IA Court as similar entities. Although decisions
of the IA Commission are non-binding, OAS members clearly take their
reports and recommendations very seriously.576 Member states aggressively
defend their human rights records before both the IA Commission and IA
Court and while a favourable recommendation from the IA Commission does
not guarantee a resolution for an aggrieved party, there is evidence that
decisions of the IA Court also may not always result in satisfactory
resolutions in practice.577

This is evidenced by (a) the defenses mounted by OAS states where violations are accused;
(b) how many cases are resolved by friendly settlements between private opinions being
made and potential publications? – if some, evidence of value of Commission reports; and (c)
efforts of OAS Member States to limit Commission’s authority to grant precautionary
measures
577 Fernando Basch et al, “Effectiveness of the Inter-American System of Human Rights
Protection: A Quantitative Approach to Its Functioning and Compliance with Its Decisions,
The” (2010) 12 SUR - Int’l J on Hum Rts 9 at 20 According to the report only 29% of the
remedies ordered by the Court are totally satisfied.
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Overall, even though there are significant differences between the IA Court
and the IA Commission, dividing analysis along these lines is not as helpful
as division by environmental issue. There is value in analysing similar cases
as they are heard by both the IA Commission and the IA Court as it
illustrates the overall approach of the Inter-American human rights regime
on specific environmental challenges. This analysis begins by looking at
climate change, the most complex environmental challenge we face today and
one which potentially impacts a variety of rights in both the American
Declaration and American Convention. Then it looks simultaneously at pointsource pollution and conservation, two frequently overlapping issues within
the Americas that have been found in the past to conflict with applicants’
rights to property, life and health.

3.2 Inter-American human rights and climate change

Climate change is a pressing global concern, but for those living in Polar
Regions temperature increases are predicted to be especially extreme and
climate change impacts are expected to include elevated precipitation and the
loss of Arctic sea ice578 and permafrost.579 In response to the threats posed by
climate change and the inaction of specific Inter-American States, two
Northern

indigenous

groups

have

independently

petitioned

the

IA

Commission claiming that government inaction has resulted in violations of
their human rights. In 2005 the Sheila Watt-Cloutier petitioned the IA
Commission on behalf of the Inuit people of the Arctic regions of the United
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States and Canada.580 The Inuit Petition claimed that the United States’
failure to effectively limit carbon dioxide emissions caused climate change
and the impacts of climate change violated a number of the Inuit’s human
rights. The Inuit Petition was ultimately rejected by the IA Commission, but
in 2013 a second petition was filed, this time on behalf of the Arctic
Athabaskan Peoples.581 The pending Athabaskan Petition shares many
characteristics with the Inuit Petition; however, some key distinctions may
give it a better chance of success before the IA Commission.
It would be difficult to describe the outcome of the 2005 Inuit Petition as
anything but a disappointment.582 The petitioners submitted a 175 page
document outlining how climate change and the United States had violated
their human rights, but the IA Commission responded with a two paragraph
letter which stated that “the information provided [did] not enable us to
determine whether the alleged facts would tend to characterize a violation of
the rights protected by the American Declaration.”583 Following the IA
Commission’s letter, the petitioners requested that the IA Commission hold a
hearing on the linkages between climate change and human rights,584 but

Sheila Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, “Petition to the Inter American
Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global
Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States” (2005), online:
<http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/files/uploads/icc-files/FINALPetitionICC.pdf>.
581 The Arctic Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, “Petition to the
Inter American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations of the Rights of
the Arctic Athabaskan Peoples Resulting from Rapid Arctic Warming and Melting Caused by
Emissions of Black Carbon by Canada” (2013), online: <http://ablawg.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/Blog_VRJ_Petition_Inter_American_Commission_on_HR_Arctic_At
habaskan_July2013.pdf>.
582 Some authors have praised the petition for initiating dialogue and raising awareness of
climate change’s impact on Inuit (see Osofsky in Randall Abate & Elizabeth Ann Kronk,
Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples: The Search for Legal Remedies (Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2013) at 335.), but ten years after its rejection there is little indication that that
Inuit Petition had any impact on United States’ climate change policy or the impact of
climate change on the Inuit people.
583 Ariel Dulitzky, “Ref.: Sheila Watt-Cloutier, et al. Petition No. P-1413-05, United States”
(2006), online: <http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/science/16commissionletter.pdf>.
584 Hari M Osofsky, “The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change
and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights” (2006) 31:2 American Indian Law Review 675 at 676.
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while multiple groups provided testimony,585 the IA Commission never
commented on the substance of the hearing.
The mystery surrounding the Inuit Petition is in large part what makes the
Athabaskan Petition so compelling: it is similar yet distinct from the Inuit
Petition and it will be interesting to see if it results in it receiving a more
positive outcome.
Prior to delving into the substance of the two petitions it is important to
recognize that if the Athabaskan Petition succeeds where the Inuit Petition
failed, it can likely be attributed to: (a) the petitioners more persuasively
establishing that the State violated their human rights, (b) there having been
a substantive change in the way the IA Commission interprets the law since
the Inuit Petition, or (c) a combination of both.
This analysis seeks to determine if either (a) or (b) is true thereby providing
the Athabaskan Petition a theoretically better chance at not being rejected by
the IA Commission and potentially establishing a human right violation. To
do this it first compares the strengths of each petitions’ claim that climate
change violates their human rights to culture, property, health, and
subsistence: the right violations claimed by the Athabaskan Petition.586
Second it considers how the petitions connect the actions of the respondent
States to climate change highlighting the Athabaskan Petition’s potentially
pivotal focus on the regional impact of black carbon. Finally it concludes by
summarizing the strengths and weaknesses of the Athabaskan Petition,
emphasizing some of the practical challenges associated with using InterAmerican human rights in this way and points to other efforts to respond to
the concerns of the Athabaskan Petition.

Katherine King, “Climate Change and the Inuit: A Melting of Actions into a Cloudy Mess”
(2008) 17 Se Envtl LJ 481 at 493.
586 The Arctic Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581
at 61.
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3.2.1 The Inuit Petition and the Athabaskan Petition

At first glance, the Inuit and Athabaskan Petitions are very similar. In both
petitions the respondent nation is a member of the OAS, party to the
American Declaration, but not party to the American Convention. The
petitions both begin by outlining the history and culture of the affected
populations. Then they discuss the causes of climate change, its impacts on
the environment and how these impacts violate the petitioners’ human
rights. Finally, the petitioners provide justification as to why the respondent
State is particularly responsible for causing climate change and therefore the
violation of their human rights.
It is important to note that this analysis does not question the factual
accuracy of the petitioners’ claims. The Inuit Petition was rejected during the
“Initial Processing” stage of the Inter-American human rights review
process.587 At this stage the IA Commission only considers if (a) remedies
under domestic law have been exhausted; (b) if the petition is manifestly
inadmissible based on its facts; and (c) if grounds of the petition exists.588
Although the IA Commission did not provide a clear indication as to why the
Inuit Petition failed, there is no reason to believe that the IA Commission
would reject a petition at the initial processing stage on the basis that it did
not believe the petitioners claims or on the basis that it independently
checked the petitioner’s science and found it lacking.

Rules of Procedure, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, published in Shelton,
Wright-Carozza & Carozza, supra note 562 at 309 Article 29.
588 Regulation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 8 June 1990, OAS Off
Rec OEA/SerL/V/II82 Doc 6 Rev1 at 103 (1992) [Regulation of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights] Article 34. Note that these regulations were updated in 2013
and inadmissibility is now determined by Articles 30-34.
587
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The minimal justification provided by the IA Commission in its rejection of
the Inuit Petition does not imply that it failed for failure to exhaust domestic
remedies or because it was manifestly inadmissible and de la Rosa Jaimes’
work persuasively establishes why the Athabaskan Petition is unlikely to be
rejected on these bases.589 Then, assuming the Inuit Petition failed in initial
processing because it failed to establish a potential rights violation, it needs
to be determined if the content of the Athabaskan Petition more persuasively
establishes such a violation.

3.2.3 Climate change’s impact on the Inuit and Athabaskan peoples

The Inuit and Athabaskan people are two distinct indigenous groups, but
their two petitions highlight their many similarities. Both groups have
historically lived in Northern Canada and Alaska and trace their heritage
back thousands of years.590 They are both indigenous peoples and therefore
claim special guarantees for the full exercise of their rights.591 Both are
highly reliant on subsistence hunting and foraging – much of which depends
on cold and consistent Arctic weather592 and both believe that their culture is
intrinsically tied to their traditional hunting methods, diet, territory, and the
presence of Arctic snow and ice.593
Due to their close relationship with nature, Arctic warming causes significant
challenges for both the Inuit and Athabaskan people. These challenges
Veronica de la Rosa Jaimes, “Arctic Athabaskan Petition: Where Accelerated Arctic
Warming Meets Human Rights, The” (2014) 45 Cal W Int’l LJ 213 at 239–41.
590 Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580 at 13–14; The Arctic
Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581 at 24.
591 See The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, (2001) Inter-Am Ct HR
(Ser C) No 79 , paras 148–149 and Section XYZ of this work.
592 Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580 at 15; The Arctic Peoples
of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581 at 26–7.
593 Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580 at 17–8; The Arctic
Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581 at 27.
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manifest themselves in a variety of ways which both petitions associate with
specific human rights violations, specifically the rights to life, health,
property, culture and subsistence. The following looks at each of these rights
to independently determine if the Athabaskan Petition establishes any of
these violations in a more persuasive way than the Inuit Petition.

3.2.3.1 Climate change and the right to culture

The right to culture under the American Declaration, Article XIII, provides a
very narrow right:
Every person has the right to take part in the cultural life of the
community, to enjoy the arts, and to participate in the benefits that
result from intellectual progress, especially scientific discoveries.

Although it is not immediately apparent that such a right would naturally
protect the cultural practices of indigenous groups from environmental
changes, both the Inuit and Athabaskan petitions place a lot of emphasis on
the fact that climate change violates their right to culture.
The petitioners state that climate change has caused traditional food sources
to become less reliable due to changes in animal distribution and health.594
Traditional hunting methods are losing their reliability as climate change:
reduces the sea ice relied upon by Inuit hunters;595 alters the game and travel
routes relied upon by the Athabaskans; and increases the severity and
frequency of storms making hunting more dangerous.596

Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580 at 45; The Arctic Peoples
of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581 at 39.
595 Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580 at 36–7.
596 The Arctic Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581
at 46–7.
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The inability to practice traditional hunting prevents the Inuit and
Athabaskan people from passing their traditional knowledge to future
generations: the Inuit are unable to teach the next generation how to make
igloos when there is no suitable snow597 and Athabaskans cannot teach
traditional weather prediction methods as climate change alters weather
patterns.598 For both groups of petitioners, the concept of culture goes beyond
their beliefs, language, and arts and includes the way they interact with the
land around them:
As climate change has reduced the capacity to travel, access to game,
and safety, the Inuit have been forced to modify their traditional
travel and harvest methods, damaging the Inuit culture.599
Arctic Athabaskan peoples’ cultural identity and spiritual beliefs are
founded upon their relationship with the land and are tied to their
traditional means of subsistence. Arctic Athabaskan peoples thus rely
on the natural environment for their physical and cultural survival.
[Climate change] directly degrades the land, snow, ice, waters and
biodiversity on which the Arctic Athabaskan peoples rely for culture,
property, health and subsistence.600

The petitions make numerous references to decisions of the IA Court and IA
Commission which link indigenous peoples, their land, and their culture. The
Inuit Petition heavily relies on the IA Commission’s decisions in Yanomami v

Brazil601 and Belize Maya;602 the Commission’s 1997 Report on Ecuador;603
and the IA Court’s decision in Awas Tingni v Nicaragua.604

Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580 at 43.
The Arctic Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581
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Yanomami v Brazil is the earliest case cited in the Inuit Petition. The case
centered on a highway constructed to facilitate the transportation of
resources extracted on one side of the territory of the Yanomami Indians to
the other side. Regrettably, construction of the highway displaced Yanomami
people;605 the highway facilitated the discovery of resources within
Yanomami territory, leading to violence between prospectors and Indians;606
and it brought non-indigenous people and their diseases to the indigenous
population. Many of Yanomami died from influenza, tuberculosis, and
various sexually transmitted infections.607 The government made some effort
to protect the Yanomami people, but was not effective.608
The Inuit Petition extracted major points from the IA Commission’s decision
in Yanomami,: (i) international law recognizes the right of ethnic groups to
special protection of the preservation of their culture609 and (ii) it is a priority
of the OAS to preserve and strengthen the cultural heritage of ethnic groups
and prevent the discrimination of these groups from activities which destroy
their cultural identity.610 The Inuit Petition did not address the fact that the
IA Commission did not actually find that their cultural rights had been
violated. The IA Commission determined that the Brazilian government’s
failure to take timely and effective measures on behalf of the Yanomami
Indians violated their Article I right to life, liberty, and personal security;
their Article VIII right to residence and movement; and their Article XI right

603
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to the preservation of health and to well-being, but not their Article XIII right
to culture.611
The IA Commission did not deny that the Yanomami culture had been
impacted by the highway construction and its implications. It stated that the
physical incursion, introduction of disease, forced displacement, and
unauthorized exploitation of their territorial resources had “negative
consequences for their culture, traditions, and costumes”,612 but this did not
constitute a violation of their right to culture.
Twelve years after Yanomami, the IA Commission again commented on the
interaction between the culture of indigenous populations and the
environment the 1997 Report on Ecuador. From the report, the Inuit Petition
noted that the IA Commission recognized that indigenous populations
deserve special protection of their rights.613 The petition quoted the 1997
report as saying “indigenous peoples maintain ties with their traditional
lands, and a close dependence upon the natural resources provided therein –
respect for which is essential to their physical and cultural survival.”614 The
Inuit Petition also noted that Ecuadorian indigenous groups had focused on
protecting their traditional territories because displacement or damage to
those lands, “invariably leads to serious loss of life and the health and
damage to cultural identity”.615
The Inuit petitioners used these comments in support of their own cultural
rights, but a closer review of the IA Commission’s statements in the Report
on Ecuador reveals that they do not actually relate to the right to culture.
Instead, the IA Commission looked at the rights of indigenous Ecuadorians:
Yanomami, supra note 573, para 1.
Yanomami, supra note 573 Considerations Para 2.
613 Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580 at 71; Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador:
Chapter 9 (1997).
614 Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580 at 73.
615 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 613.
611
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to equal protection; to freedom from discrimination; to land, resources and
property; and to freedom of expression, religion, association and assembly.
Certainly, cultural issues are intertwined with these rights, but the IA
Commission’s only recommendation explicitly related to culture was limited
to the provision of multilingual education that adequately reflects the culture
of the tribe.616 While the Report on Ecuador did mention indigenous
populations, their traditional land, and their culture, the IA Commission’s
limited recommendations regarding cultural protection are likely indicative
of a narrow interpretation of the right to culture.
Continuing chronologically, the Inuit Petition made significant reference to
the 2001 IA Court case: Awas Tingni v Nicaragua. Here, the Nicaraguan
government granted timber concessions in the tropical forest claimed by the
Awas Tingni Community. The applicants’ primary argument focused on the
importance of the land in question to the indigenous population:
The territory… is vital for their culture, religious and family
development, and for their very subsistence, as they carry out hunting
activities and they fish, and they also cultivate the land. It is a right of
all members of the Community to farm the land, hunt, fish, and
gather medicinal plants; however, sale and privatization of those
resources are forbidden.617
[B]y violating the rights of a community to continue to subsist as such
and to its reproduction as a unit and identity, a number of basic
human rights are violated: the right to culture, to participation, to
identity, to survival618

The Inuit Petitioners took the arguments used in Awas Tingni and attempted
to similarly argue that “[b]ecause of their close ties to the land and the
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environment, protection of the Inuit's human rights necessarily requires
protection of the Arctic environment”.619 The Inuit Petitioners quoted Awas

Tingni and argued that the case established that a failure to prevent
environmental damage to indigenous lands, “caused catastrophic damage” to
indigenous peoples because “the possibility of maintaining social unity, of
cultural preservation and reproduction, and surviving physically and
culturally, depends on the collective, communitarian existences and
maintenance of the land.”620 However, these quotes did not come from the
conclusions of the IA Court in Awas Tingni, but rather from the IA Court’s
summary of expert witness testimony.621 Furthermore, while the applicants
in Awas Tingni were successful in arguing that their rights had been
violated, the IA Court held that it was the applicants’ rights to judicial
protection and property which were violated,622 not their right to culture. The
IA Court may have acknowledged a link between the culture and property of
indigenous peoples, but it did not establish a basis for a violation of the right
to culture.
Selective excerpts from these cases would appear to support the Inuit’s right
to culture and its potential violation. The IA Commission has established: (i)
that international law recognizes the right of ethnic groups to special
protection of the preservation of their culture623 and (ii) it is a priority to
preserve and strengthen the cultural heritage of ethnic groups and prevent
the discrimination of these groups from activities which destroy their cultural
identity.624 It also recognized that indigenous populations deserve special
protection of their rights and that damage to traditional land “invariably

Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580 at 72.
Ibid.
621 Awas Tingni, supra note 591 at 39.
622 Ibid at 82.
623 Yanomami, supra note 573 Considerations Para 7.
624 Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580 at 71 and 75; Yanomami,
supra note 573 Considerations Para 9.
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leads to serious loss of life and the health and damage to cultural identity”.625
In Awas Tingni v Nicaragua the IA Court acknowledged the link between
cultural integrity and indigenous communities’ lands as “the fundamental
basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic
survival.”626 Finally, in Belize Maya the IA Commission stated “that
interference with indigenous lands necessarily implicates the right to
culture.”627
The purpose of the Inuit Petition was to persuade the IA Commission of a
rights violation and it is therefore unsurprising that it took persuasive
excerpts of these cases, sometimes without complete context;628however, a
close look reveals that none of these cases actually consider a violation of the
American Declaration’s right to culture. In these cases the IA Court and the
IA Commission acknowledged links among indigenous populations, their
property, and their culture, but these links do not mean the applicants’ right
to culture has been violated. In fact, neither the Court nor Commission has
ever determined that a group’s right to culture has been violated because of
environmental damages.
The Athabaskan Petition links the petitioners’ culture to their environment
in a very similar way to the Inuit Petition and it fails to establish that
climate change impacts Athabaskan culture in any way that is substantively

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 613.
Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580 at 75; Awas Tingni, supra
note 591, para 149.
627 Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580 at 75.
628 A simple example of this is a reference made by the Inuit Petition to the 1997 report on
Ecuador. The petition states that in the 1997 report, “the Commission found that ‘indigenous
peoples maintain ties with their traditional lands, and a close dependence upon the natural
resources provided therein – respect for which is essential to their physical and cultural
survival.’” However, the complete text of the report reads “Certain indigenous peoples
maintain ties with their traditional lands…” (emphasis added). While the difference between
these two quotes is subtle, and it may be true that the Inuit people are one of one of the
indigenous peoples who “maintain ties with their traditional lands” in such a way, the
absolutist nature of the quote as phrased by the Inuit Petition does change its tone in such a
way as to make the Inuit’s argument appear stronger than it may actually be.
625
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different from the way it impacts Inuit culture. Because of this, if the
Athabaskan Petition is to more persuasively establish a violation of their
right to culture it will be due to developments in the law since 2005. The
Athabaskan Petition cites four cases to tacitly illustrate how the law has
developed since the Inuit Petition: Moiwana v Suriname,629 Yakye Axa v

Paraguay,630 Sawhoyamaxa v Paraguay,631 Saramaka v Suriname.632
Unfortunately, while all of these cases reference the impact of environmental
damage on the indigenous populations’ culture, once again these impacts
never culminate in violations of the applicants’ right to culture.
Certainly, the IA Court did not find violations of the right to culture because
the American Convention does not provide a right to culture.633 This
notwithstanding, the Athabaskan Petition relies on the IA Court’s repeated
recognition of a relationship between the petitioners’ land and their culture.
In Moiwana v Suriname it acknowledged that “in order for the culture to
preserve its very identity and integrity, the Moiwana community members
must maintain a fluid and multidimensional relationship with their ancestral
lands”.634 Similarly, in Yakye Axa the IA Court stated that “land is closely
linked to [the indigenous populations’] oral expressions and traditions, their
customs and languages, their arts and rituals, their knowledge and practices
in connections with nature, culinary art, customary law, dress, philosophy
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Moiwana Village v Suriname, Judgement of June 15, 2005, Inter-Am Ct HR, (Ser C) No

145 (2005) .
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Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, Judgement of June 17, 2005, Inter-Am Ct

HR (Ser C) No 125 (2005) .

Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, Judgement of March 29, 2006, InterAm Ct HR, (Ser C) No 146 (2006) .
632 Saramaka People v Suriname, supra note 139.
633 The American Convention does not provide a clear right to culture; the closest it comes to
establishing cultural rights are provided by Article 16: “Everyone has the right to associate
freely for ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, social, cultural, sports or other
purposes.” This could be used to support an individual or group’s cultural right, if they were
prevented from joining together with others who share their culture, but a right to associate
with a particular culture is not the same as a right to participate and maintain traditional
cultural practices.
634 Moiwana Village v Suriname, supra note 629, para 101.
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and values”.635 In Sawhoyamaxa the IA Court recognized that indigenous
people have a special relationship with their traditional lands which can be
expressed by “traditional spiritual or ceremonial use or presence; settlements
or sporadic cultivation; seasonal cultivation; seasonal or nomadic hunting,
fishing or gathering; the use of natural resources connected to their customs;
and any other factor characteristic of their culture”.636 Finally, in Saramaka v

Suriname the IA Court references the idea that indigenous and tribal
populations have a special relationship with their territory which “require[s]
special measures under international human rights law in order to guarantee
their physical and cultural survival”.637
The emphasis the IA Court places on the need to protect indigenous culture
and property should not be misconstrued as implying that their right to
culture is violated by damage to their land. In all of these cases the IA Court
recognized the impacts on the petitioners’ culture as part of the foundation
for finding that their property rights had been violated. Ultimately, none of
these cases help establish a clear violation of the Athabaskans’ right to
culture and the narrow text of Article XIII provides little indication that a
right to practice a particular culture exists in the Inter-American regime. It is
therefore unlikely that either the Inuit or Athabaskan Petitions establish a
violation of the petitioners’ right to culture, but as previously alluded to, the
Athabaskan Petition may have a reasonable claim that climate change
violates their right to property.

The Arctic Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581
at 62; Yakye Axa, supra note 630, para 154.
636 The Arctic Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581
at 62; Sawhoyamaxa, supra note 631, para 131.
637 The Arctic Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581
at 62; Saramaka People v Suriname, supra note 139, para 86.
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3.2.3.2 Property rights

Arctic warming has two clear impacts which directly affect the property of
both the Inuit and Athabaskan people: it reduces permafrost and it increases
rainfall. Permafrost provides the physical foundation for many Inuit and
Athabaskan communities as well as important public infrastructure; as it
melts, land can shift damaging buildings, roads, railways, pipelines, and
runways.638 Melting permafrost also releases the previously frozen water,
which can cause flooding and cause buildings to sink into the softened
ground.639
The increase in Arctic rainfall also impacts both the Inuit and Athabaskans,
albeit in different ways. For the Inuit, the combination of melting sea ice,
melting permafrost, and increased coastal rainfall induces coastal erosion:
“Storm surges and erosion threaten Inuit homes, camps, communities and
cultural sites.”640 For the Athabaskans, the increased rainfall combines with
the water released by melting permafrost and snow to cause flash floods.
Floods can be particularly severe in the winter when rainfall can facilitate
snow melt and exacerbate flooding.641 The Athabaskan Petition cites an event
in Alaska where an entire village was destroyed by a flood brought on by a
combination of heavy snowfall and record high temperatures.642
The Inuit and Athabaskan petitions take different approaches to establishing
violations of their right to property. The Inuit Petition divides the right into
two distinct issues: the right to use and enjoy their traditional lands and the
right to use and enjoy their personal property. The Athabaskan Petition
Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580 at 24.
The Arctic Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581
at 51.
640 Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580 at 51–2.
641 The Arctic Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581
at 33.
642 Ibid at 33–4.
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combines these issues into a singular property right. Rather than break down
and compare the Inuit and Athabaskan approaches to property rights, the
following only looks at the Athabaskan Petition. As with the right to culture,
the Athabaskan Petition builds on the arguments and case law previously
cited in the Inuit Petition and is strengthened by the legal developments that
have occurred since the Inuit Petition’s rejection. The Athabaskan Petition’s
claim does not require a major re-interpretation of the American Declaration,
but does rely on the IA Commission continuing its recent practice of
interpreting

the

American

Declaration

through

both

the

American

Convention and the IA Court’s interpretation of the American Convention.
Recall that Canada is not a party to the American Convention so it would be
unusual for the IA Commission to apply it to Canada; however, in 2004 the
IA Commission explicitly used Belize Maya, a case based on the American
Convention and decided by the IA Court, to justify its interpretation of the
American Declaration’s right to property.643 In 2008 the IA Commission
elaborated on the relationship between the American Declaration and the
American Convention in Grand Chief Michael Mitchell v Canada.644 Here, the
IA Commission stated that the American Declaration should be interpreted
and applied in the context of developments in the field of international
human rights law, specifically the American Convention “which, in many
instances, may be considered to represent an authoritative expression of the
fundamental principles set forth in the American Declaration”.645 The IA
Commission went on to clarify “that while the Commission clearly does not
apply the American Convention in relation to member states that have yet to
ratify that treaty, its provisions may well be relevant in informing an
interpretation of principles of the Declaration”.646 On this basis, it would
643
644
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appear the Athabaskan petitioners can reasonably expect the IA Commission
to interpret the property rights of the American Declaration in the same way
as the IA Court has interpreted the property rights in the American
Convention.
The Athabaskan petitioners may be able to rely on the well-developed
property rights established by the IA Commission and IA Court, but it should
be noted that the petition does not share identical characteristics with the
majority of indigenous peoples’ property rights cases. Most Inter-American
property cases are based on the petitioners’ physical displacement or on the
degradation of their land by in situ activities. While the Athabaskan Petition
does mention of some specific instances of damage to property, the strongest
aspect of the Athabaskan’s property right argument is, possibly surprisingly,
the impact of climate change on the Athabaskans’ culture.
Rather than following previous cases that have focused on severe localized
damage, such as the destruction of a forest from logging,647 or the toxic
contamination of a community’s aquifer,648 the Athabaskan Petition relies on
a cumulative effect of various climate change impacts on their territory and
the effect of these impacts on their culture.649

Awas Tingni, supra note 591 where 62,000 hectares of forest were designated for
exploitation.
648 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 603 where 19 billion
gallons of waste water containing arsenic, lead, mercury, etc., was dumped without
treatment into aquifers ; and San Mateo v Peru, supra note 574 where a “toxic sludge” byproduce to mining poisoned a local community with heavy metals.
649 The Athabaskan Petition does mention certain specific instances of property damage that
is caused by climate change and could lead to violations of their property rights, but localized
cases of damage are unlikely to address the overall problem of climate change. Where climate
change is linked to a specific damage such as a flood or coastal erosion, a potential response
could be singularly directed at preventing the issue by erecting protective barriers rather
than by addressing the root causes of climate change. Therefore, it is in the best interest of
the petition to argue that climate change impacts multiple aspects of their cultural
relationship with their land and therefore the violation of their right to property can only be
resolved by addressing climate change itself.
647
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The Athabaskan petitioners can rely on the IA Commission’s decision in

Belize Maya and IA Court’s decision in Saramaka to establish a violation of
their right to property. From Belize Maya the Athabaskan Petition notes that
“the right to use and enjoy property may be impeded when the State itself, or
third parties acting with the acquiescence or tolerance of the State, affect the
existence, value, use or enjoyment of that property.”650 Similarly, Saramaka
explicitly establishes that the right to property under the American
Convention protects the connection between indigenous communities and the
natural resources necessary for their physical and cultural survival.651 Both

Belize Maya and Saramaka arose from significant localized environmental
damage, but the decisions could easily be applied to the Athabaskan Petition.
The Athabaskan Petition illustrates how their ability to use and enjoy their
property is impeded by the changes caused by climate change. Along with its
impacts on their culture discussed previously in this work, climate change
physically alters the land by, inter alia, drying wetlands; causing floods,
forest fires, and erosion; and melting permafrost.652
Athabaskans’ traditional means of transport, subsistence hunting and
gathering, food storage, and construction are all impacted by climate
change.653 The Athabaskans have always been dependent on caribou for food,
clothing and crafts, but climate change alters caribou habitat and poses risks
to the caribou population.654 Traditional hunting methods lose their
reliability as climate change alters the game migration routes relied upon by
the Athabaskans655 and increases the severity and frequency of storms
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Belize Maya, supra note 602, para 140.
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654 Ibid at 43–4.
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making hunting more dangerous.656 As climate change alters the land
through flooding, erosion, reduced ice, and increased storms and subsistence
hunting and gathering become dangerous, difficult, and ineffective,
Athabaskans are forced to shift to non-traditional food sources.657
In Saramaka the IA Court interpreted the right to property as protecting the
resources found in indigenous territories that are traditionally used for the
survival of that culture’s way of life.658 This should clearly apply to the
Athabaskans as their traditional way of life is heavily based on subsistence
hunting and gathering and climate change alters necessary natural resources
they rely upon.
The Inuit Petition predated both the decisions in Grand Chief Michael

Mitchell and Saramaka and these developments in the law should provide
the Athabaskan Petition with an objectively stronger argument establishing
how climate change violates their right to property. The only caveat to this
arises from the fact that the right to property is not absolute and the IA
Commission has justified its violation under certain conditions.
Under the American Declaration, all rights are limited by “the just demands
of the general welfare”.659 The IA Commission has clarified this to mean that
human rights “are subject to limitations that take into account the rights of
others and the interests of all”.660 From this, there is a potential response to
the Athabaskan Petition which would justify a property right violation if the
particular causes of climate change were in the best interests of the general
population of Canada.

Ibid at 47.
Ibid at 46–7.
658 Saramaka People v Suriname, supra note 139, paras 122–3.
659 American Declaration, supra note 531 Article XXVIII.
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Unfortunately, at this point in time, there is insufficient information to
discuss the strength of this argument in any meaningful way. It is difficult to
speculate what sort of societal interests Canada may claim in defense of its
climate change policies (although economic interests are likely to play a part).
What is clear is that Canada will likely argue that a violation of property
rights should be justified in the interest of society just as it successfully did in

Grand Chief Michael Mitchell.661
In Grand Chief Michael Mitchell the petitoners claimed that their right to
culture had been violated by the Canadian government’s application of
customs duties on goods the petitioners purchased in the United States.662
The petitioners argued that their traditional cultural practices include open,
duty-free trade, with tribes and merchants that predate the existence of the
border between the United States and Canada.663 In response, Canada
argued (a) that trade is a general practice of all cultures and therefore the
right to trade should not be considered a distinct aspect of the petitioner’s
culture and is therefore unworthy of protection under Article XIII.664 And (b)
that the right to culture is subject to reasonable limitations such that even if
a right to trade were recognized, it could be limited by reasonable taxes and
tariffs if they apply to all cultures without discrimination and benefit the
general public.665 Ultimately, the IA Commission determined that the right to
culture could protect the trade of culturally significant goods,666 but the
petitioner did not establish that the taxes and tariffs impeded trade in any
way.667 Importantly, the IA Commission reaffirmed the fact that all human
rights are subject to reasonable limitations and must take into account the

Ibid, para 59.
Ibid at 4.
663 Ibid, paras 25–27.
664 Ibid, paras 45–47.
665 Ibid, paras 59–60.
666 Ibid, para 79.
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interest of all.668 Grand Chief Michael Mitchell illustrates the IA
Commission’s willingness to restrict human rights when it is in the best
interest of society and Canada’s willingness to use that argument as a
justification of its actions.
Then, given the IA Commission’s previous treatment of the right to property
and the described relationship among Athabaskan culture, property and
climate change, it seems likely that the Athabaskans have a reasonable claim
to the fact that climate change violates their right to property. That said, this
does not mean that Canada has violated their property right – the petition
still has to establish that the Canadian government is responsible for climate
change. This work analyzes the Athabaskan’s claim that Canada is
responsible for climate change in Section 3.2.5, but prior to that it will
consider the other two rights highlighted by the Athabaskan petition: the
right to health and the right to subsistence.

3.2.3.2 The rights to health and subsistence

The Athabaskan’s rights to health and subsistence can easily be discussed
simultaneously as they are both associated with climate change inhibiting
the petitioners’ ability to maintain traditional hunting and gathering
practices. The petitioners claim that climate change affects their health in
various ways: by changing their diet, by increasing the potential of physical
harm, and by changing their environment so significantly that it affects their
mental health. They also argue that their inability to practice traditional
hunting and gathering violates their right to subsistence.669

Ibid, para 82.
The Arctic Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581
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The petitioners emphasize the effect of climate change on the northern
environment and ecology, in particular the changes in flora and fauna
prevent the Athabaskans from pursuing their traditionally self-reliant
subsistence lifestyle.670 Unfortunately for the petitioners, the American
Declaration does not contain any right to subsistence. The petition attempts
to argue that a right to subsistence exists based on its presence other
international human rights documents671 and references made by the IA
Court to the issue of subsistence,672 but these are unlikely to be adequate
foundations for the recognition of a new right.
The IA Court has referenced the role of subsistence hunting and gathering as
part of both indigenous peoples’ relationship with their traditional lands and
as a means of protecting their health, but these references have been directly
connected to violations of the petitioners’ rights to property and health, not a
right to subsistence. These references, even in conjunction with the presence
of a right to subsistence in third-party human rights documents are unlikely
to be a persuasive reason for the IA Commission to recognize a new human
right to subsistence. For one, the IA Commission does not have a history of
recognizing rights not found in the American Declaration and two, the
Athabaskan subsistence claims can easily be addressed as part of their right
to health, or potentially their right to property. Ultimately, there is no
compelling reason to consider it as an independent right violation.
The petition also argues that climate change alters the Athabaskan’s
environment in ways which are detrimental to the Athabaskan’s health: it
causes actual harm and increases the risk of potential harm. First, it inhibits
Ibid at 79–82.
Specifically International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16
December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 [ICESCR] Part 1 Article 1(2); International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 [ICCPR] Part 1 Article 1(2);
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN Doc A/RES/47/1 (2007)
[UNDRIP] Article 20.
672 See Xákmok Kásek Indegenous Community v Paraguay, Judgement of August 24, 2010,
Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 214 (2010) ; Yakye Axa, supra note 630.
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the Athabaskan’s ability to maintain their healthy traditional diet. Climate
change forces game animals into new, more distant regions; reduces herd
health and population; alters the distribution and variety of the flora
consumed as food and medicine; and increases the dangers associated with
hunting and gathering practices.673 Unable to maintain their traditional diet,
Athabaskans shift to a less healthy diet of processed foods which increases
their risk of cancer, obesity, cardiovascular disease and diabetes.674 They also
claim that their health is endangered by the overall increase in average
temperature associated with climate change allows new organisms to move
into Athabaskan territory bringing new pathogens, including: wildlife
diseases such as brain worm in deer; transferrable diseases such as Lyme
disease and rabies; and food-borne contamination causing intestinal
disorders and illness.675 Climate change also makes hunting and travelling
more likely to result in physical harm due to; inter alia, severe, unpredictable
weather; unstable ice; and landslides.676 Finally, The petitioners also warn
that climate change could have a negative impact on mental health because
of the stress caused by: unpredictable weather, destruction of culturally
significant sites, and an overall loss of culture.677
To establish how the impact of climate change on the Athabaskan’s health
constitutes a violation of their right to health, the Athabaskan Petition relies
heavily on Yanomami and the 1997 Report on Ecuador. The decision to cite
these cases is unsurprising as they both link the right to health with
environmental degradation; however, the type of harm cited in the
Athabaskan Petition is a distinct from the harms suffered in the relied upon
cases and the IA Commission may this significant.

The Arctic Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581
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Many of the Athabaskan petitioners’ references to violations of their right to
health are based on increases in risk to their health rather than specific
instances of harm. The Athabaskan petitioners cite increases in potential
harm when travelling or hunting due to dangerous conditions678 and the
increased risk of exposure to disease due to the northward migration of
pathogens,679 but increased risk is very different from actual harm. In

Yanomami and the 1997 Report on Ecuador the petitioners were subject to
specific instances of violence, disease, and health problems.680 Injuries
associated with Arctic hunting and travel cannot be wholly attributed to
climate change as these are inherently dangerous activities – the effects of
climate change may increase the potential for injury, but the IA Court and IA
Commission have not given any indication that they are willing to treat
incremental increases in risk to health the same as actual damage to health.
Similarly, neither the IA Commission nor the IA Court has considered a case
where environmental changes create a potential for new disease. The IA
Commission is certainly at liberty to consider a not-yet-violated right,681 but
an incremental risk to health does not establish a strong basis for finding a
violation of the right to health.
The Athabaskan Petition’s strongest argument in support of a violation of
their right to health likely arises from the impact climate change has on their
diet. The petitioners argue that climate change prohibits them from
maintaining their traditional subsistence diet, resulting in a measureable
increase in disease.682 An important component of this argument is that the
high cost of healthy “store-bought” food prevents Athabaskan’s from

Ibid at 76.
Ibid.
680 Yanomami, supra note 573; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note
678
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603 at 7.
681 As evidenced by its ability to grant precautionary measures.
682 The Arctic Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581
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consuming a healthy diet in the absence of traditional food sources.683
Although not cited by the petition, this situation is comparable to the one in
the 2010 case Xákmok v Paraguay in which an indigenous population was
similarly

restricted

from

pursuing

traditional

hunting,

fishing

and

gathering.684 These restrictions resulted in a poor quality diet that was also
limited by the population’s inadequate purchasing power.685 While the
American Convention does not possess a right to health, the IA Court in

Xákmok determined that the situation constituted a violation of the group’s
right to life under Article 4(1) of the Convention.686
The biggest distinction between the situation in Xákmok and the Athabaskan
Petition is that the indigenous group in Xákmok was physically prevented
from practicing their subsistence diet,687 whereas climate change simply
makes the Athabaskan subsistence diet more difficult to maintain.
Ultimately, this would seem like a minor distinction as the outcome is the
same: an inferior diet with associated health problems. Unfortunately for the
Athabaskan Petition, it did not claim a violation of their right to life and it
did not explicitly draw parallels between the violation of their rights to
health and the decision in Xákmok. It is unlikely that the IA Commission will
draw these connections for them.
Finally, the Athabaskan Petition argues that climate change will have a
negative effect on the petitioners’ mental health. Specifically, the petition
states that “[e]lders’ inability to accurately predict the weather, loss of
culturally significant sites like cemeteries, more dangerous travel conditions,
possibility of damage to homes, and shrinking of habitat that is vital for
subsistence are all sources of cultural and psychological stress for
Ibid at 49.
Xákmok Kásek Indegenous Community v Paraguay, supra note 672, paras 74 & 75.
685 Ibid, para 197.
686 Ibid, paras 215 & 217.
687 Ibid, paras 74–75 The indigenous community lived on private property and the owner
683
684
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Athabaskan peoples”.688 The petition does not go into detail on the gravity
and impact of the social and mental stress placed on the Athabaskans, but it
clearly argues that this violates their health: “weather related hazards can
cause social and mental stress, even trauma, for those who must relocate”.689
Pursuing a mental health claim is a novel approach by the Athabaskan
Petition. The American Declaration does not mention mental health, but it
does not explicitly exclude it from consideration. The American Convention
does guarantee every person the right to have his physical, mental, and
moral integrity respected,690 but this right is incorporated into the right to
humane treatment, not the right to health, and it pertains more to the
government’s treatment of detainees than it does to the general protection of
mental health. In order to find an explicit reference to mental health the IA
Commission would have to interpret the American Declaration using the San
Salvador Protocol to the American Convention. It provides that “[e]veryone
shall have the right to health, understood to mean the enjoyment of the
highest level of physical, mental and social well-being”.691 The use of the
protocol to interpret health under the American Declaration so as to include
mental health is not unreasonable as it would follow the principle the IA
Commission established in Grand Chief Michael Mitchell.692 Unfortunately
for the petitioners, even if the IA Commission were to determine that mental
health was included within the American Declaration’s right to health, the
right is relatively narrow. Article XI provides that:
Every person has the right to the preservation of his health through
sanitary and social measures relating to food, clothing, housing and
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medical care, to the extent permitted by public and community
resources.693

While it would not seem unreasonable to interpret this as including
protection of mental health, it would be a larger step to interpret the right as
providing a general right to health as provided by the San Salvador Protocol.
In Yanomami the IA Commission appears to give the right to health a very
broad interpretation. The IA Commission does not discuss the right in detail
and it appears to simply apply the right as one which gives a general right to
the preservation of health and well-being. Certainly the IA Commission could
interpret the right to health in the same way for the Athabaskan petitioners
and in such a situation the petitioners may have a persuasive claim that
climate change violates their right to health. However, Yanomami was
decided over thirty years ago and since then the IA Commission has shifted
away from recognizing this broad right to health and has shown a tendency
to subsume potential violations of the right to health in environmental cases
within a broad violation of the right to property.694
Overall, it is difficult to see how the Athabaskan petition establishes a
persuasive violation of their rights to health or subsistence. Certainly such a
finding is possible, but it would require the IA Commission to interpret the
American Declaration in creative ways or ways contrary to its recent
methods. It is much more likely that if the IA Commission were to consider a
potential human rights violation arising from the Athabaskan Petition it
would avoid addressing the complexities associated with interpreting the
right to health, the right to culture, or the right to right to subsistence, and
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would combine all of these rights claims into a violation of the petitioners’
right to property, exactly as it did in Belize Maya.695

3.2.4 The Commission’s practice of combining claims

In Belize Maya the IA Commission stated that “the right to property under
the American Declaration must be interpreted and applied in the context of
indigenous communities with due consideration of principles relating to the
protection of traditional forms of ownership and cultural survival and rights
to land, territories and resources”.696 It went on to say that “the land
traditionally used and occupied by these communities plays a central role in
their physical, cultural and spiritual vitality” and while the IA Commission
recognized that the petitioners’ rights to, inter alia, life, health, and religious
freedom,697 it did not discuss or analyse these violations independently.
Instead it explicitly combined all of these claims into a broad violation their
right to property.698 It seems likely that the IA Commission would do the
same with the Athabaskan Petition.
The petitioners in Belize Maya argued that their rights were violated in ways
very similar to those of the Athabaskans and the root cause of these
violations was an externally induced change in their environment. Belize

Maya was based on the effect of logging activities on important water
supplies, plant, and animal life and the impacts of those activities negatively
impacted the petitioners’ subsistence based lifestyle, traditional cultural
practices, and property rights.699

Belize Maya, supra note 602.
Ibid, para 115.
697 Ibid, para 155.
698 Ibid, para 156.
699 Ibid, para 31.
695
696

170

The similarities between the Mayan and Athabaskan cases are too strong to
support the idea that the IA Commission would ignore its methodology in

Belize Maya and consider each of the Athabaskans’ claims individually. Even
if it were to consider these Athabaskans’ rights claims independently, their
claims of violations of their rights to culture, health and subsistence are
uncomfortably weak whereas they have a strong stand-alone property right
claim. Although the Athabaskan Petition fails to establish four independent
rights violations, it does create a persuasive argument that climate change
impacts the Athabaskan people in a variety of ways which combined violate
their right to property under the American Declaration.
The Athabaskan Petition establishes a persuasive connection between
climate change and the violation of the petitioners human right to property;
the following seeks to determine if the petition provides an equally strong
connection between State action and climate change.

3.2.5 Black carbon emissions and Canada’s role in changing the environment
of the Athabaskan people

Even though both the Inuit and Athabaskan petitions deal with climate
change, the choice of the Athabaskan Petition to focus on the black carbon as
the cause of climate change could fundamentally alter the petitioners’
argument by likening it to regional pollution rather than a global issue.
The Inuit Petition focused on the total greenhouse gas emissions of the
United States emphasizing anthropogenic carbon dioxide as the primary
cause of climate change.700 The Inuit Petition acknowledged that climate
change is caused by global cumulative emissions, but it singled out the

700

Inuit petition pages 4 and 32
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United States as the nation responsible for their human rights violations
because it had: the highest emissions at the time, the largest proportion of
historical global emissions, and because it failed to take adequate actions to
curb emissions.701 The shortcoming of this approach is that it cannot directly
attribute specific emissions from the United States to the Inuit’s human
rights violations. Rather, the United States’ emissions, while significant, can
only be said to be a contributor to global climate change. In contrast, the
Athabaskan Petition focuses solely on Canadian emissions of “black carbon”
which, according to the petitioners, have a specific and direct effect on the
environment of the Athabaskan people.
Unlike carbon dioxide emissions, which disperse widely and have a global
impact, black carbon emissions in the Arctic have a specific and direct impact
on Arctic warming. According to the Athabaskan Petition black carbon
emissions are “short-lived” climate pollutants which remain in the
atmosphere for about one week and then settle to the ground.702 Black carbon
has a two-fold impact on the climate as it acts as a greenhouse gas while in
the atmosphere and it darkens the colour of the snow and ice which it falls
upon, increasing their ability to absorb heat and facilitating melting.703 The
short-lived nature of black carbon emissions means that immediate emissions
reductions could reduce near-term warming in the Arctic.704
The petition does not quantify the impact of black carbon on Arctic climate
change, but does describe it as “a particularly potent climate change forcer
over ice and snow regions”705 and it notes that “reducing black carbon along
with other short-lived climate pollutants, ‘could quickly decrease positive

Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580, ch IV(D).
Athabaskan petition page 9
703 The Arctic Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581
at 16 and 18.
704 AP page 14
705 The Arctic Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581
at 15.
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climate forcing and hence climate warming.’”706 According to the Athabaskan
Petition, Canada’s black carbon emissions cause Arctic warming and,
importantly, if it were not for these emissions, there would be less Arctic
warming.
As with the Inuit Petition, the Athabaskan Petition connects the actions of
the State with the emissions that cause climate change by citing the nation’s
failure to regulate and limit those emissions. In this way, the Inuit and
Athabaskan Petitions are quite similar. The Inuit Petition argued that
United States climate policy made no effort to reduce overall emissions. At
the time of the petition, US climate change policy focused only on reducing
greenhouse gas intensity707 and lacked any policies which would ensure
overall emissions reductions.708 The Inuit Petition argued that the United
States was responsible for climate change because of its historical GHG
emissions and its inaction on reducing current and future emissions.
Similarly, the Athabaskan Petition attributes Canada’s responsibility for
black carbon emissions with ineffectual regulation. According to the
petitioners, the primary sources of black carbon in Canada are: diesel
engines, residential heating stoves, agricultural and forest fires and certain
industrial facilities.709 The existing regulations of black carbon emissions are
complex and shared between federal and provincial jurisdictions, and the
Athabaskan Petition argues that these regulations are unsatisfactory. It also
highlights the fact that Canadian black carbon emissions are expected to
increase by 26 per cent above 2005 levels by 2030.710

Ibid at 18.
Watt-Cloutier & Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 580 at 105. Intensity targets
do not guarantee a reduction in gross emissions.
708 Ibid at 106 US initiatives also pursued research into emissions reducing technology, but
as the Inuit Petition points out, these efforts could not guarantee emissions reductions.
709 The Arctic Peoples of the Arctic Regions of Canada and the United States, supra note 581
at 16.
710 Ibid at 21.
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The Athabaskan Petition draws a much closer connection between the action
of the State and impact on the petitioners than the Inuit Petition. The Inuit
Petition focused on the largest emitter of a global pollutant and argued that
said State was responsible for causing the global problem which violated
their human rights. In contrast, the Athabaskan Petition focuses on a
regional pollutant which causes specific regional warming and that warming
violates their human rights. Where the Athabaskan Petition falls short is its
ability to connect black-carbon emissions in Canada to actual warming in
Canada and this omission may fundamentally undermine the Athabaskan
Petition.
Neither the Inuit nor Athabaskan petitions directly connect the emissions
occurring in a State to the environmental impacts that violate the human
rights of the petitioners. The Athabaskan Petition comes close to this by
arguing that Canadian emissions cause Arctic warming, but it does not make
it clear that Canadian emissions are uniquely responsible for warming in the
Canadian Arctic. The greenhouse gas emissions of the United States
certainly contributed to the climate change that negatively impacted the
Inuit petitioners, but so did the emissions of many other States around the
world. The Athabaskan Petition establishes that Canadian black carbon
emissions contribute to the Arctic warming and that Arctic warming violates
their human rights, but it does not quantify Canada’s impact; distinguish
Canada’s emissions from emissions of other Arctic States; or establish that
Canadian emission cause Canadian warming.
Then, when comparing the rejected Inuit Petition to the pending Athabaskan
Petition it is clear that the Athabaskan Petition provides a stronger, but
imperfect connection between the State, climate change, and the violation of
the petitioners’ human rights. The Athabaskan Petition’s claim that climate
change violates their right to property is more persuasive than the claim
made by the Inuit Petition due to developments in Inter-American human
174

rights law such as the decisions in Grand Chief Michael Mitchell and

Saramaka. The Athabaskans also potentially establish a closer causal
relationship between the State’s action and a rights violation, but holes
remain and the Athabaskan Petition does not draw a direct connection
between Canadian emissions and warming in Canada.
The Athabaskan Petition highlights many of the impacts of climate change
on Northern peoples and the Commission may ultimately find Canada in
violation of one or more of the Athabaskans’ human rights. At the same time,
it is very possible that the Commission to rejects the Athabaskan Petition
exactly as it did the Inuit Petition. If the Commission does not see a
connection between Canadian emissions and Canadian warming it could
easily conclude that the Athabaskan Petition does not establish that the facts
characterize a violation of the rights protected by the American Declaration.
The Athabaskan Petition represents arguably the “best-case” scenario for a
successful climate change case under the American Declaration. Certainly,
the petitioners’ case would be improved by a clear causal connection between
the black carbon emissions in Canada and warming in their region, but the
petition does present a strong case that climate change itself violates their
human rights.
While it may not present a perfect case for Canada’s violation of the
petitioners’ rights, it is not unimaginable that the petition ultimately
culminates with the IA Commission determining that the petitioners’ rights
have been violated. Such an outcome would certainly be an objective success
for the petitioners, but it needs to be noted that it would not guarantee
Canadian action on black carbon.
The American Declaration is a non-binding and respondent States are under
no legal obligation to adopt the IA Commission’s Recommendations. The
American Convention and Court do provide legally binding human rights, but
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Canada and the United States are not party to the American Convention and
they do not recognize the authority of the IA Court. States are certainly at
liberty to follow any Recommendations from the IA Commission, and the
Inuit Petitioners expected that a favourable decision for them would have
had “great moral value”,711 but Canada’s reaction to a successful Athabaskan
Petition on actual emissions is impossible to predict.
In light of this, it is reassuring to know that action is being taken on reducing
Arctic black carbon outside of the Inter-American human rights process. One
major effort here was the Arctic Council’s passage of the Framework for
Action on Black Carbon and Methane712 and an Expert Group on Black
Carbon and Methane. Although these are a relatively new document and
body, it does appear to be a promising mechanism for cooperative efforts to
reduce these potent greenhouse gases. The parties to the Framework for
Action include all of the nations with territory above the Arctic Circle as well
as indigenous groups including the Arctic Athabaskan Council and the Inuit
Circumpolar Council. The Framework of Action recognizes the need to limit
global average temperature increase to below 2 degrees Celsius and States
commit to develop clear inventories of black carbon; enhance actions to
reduce national black carbon and methane emissions; and engage in an
iterative process designed to continually strengthen national actions and
mitigation strategies.713
Upon filing the Inuit Petition, Sheila Watt-Cloutier said that it was done “not
in a spirit of confrontation – that is not the Inuit way – but as a means of
inviting and promoting a dialogue. Our purpose is to educate, not criticize,

Watt-Cloutier, Presentation at the Eleventh Conference of Parties to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change.
712 Arctic Council, Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions an Arctic
Council Framework for Action..
711

713
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and to inform, not condemn.”714 While it can be difficult to see how
petitioning the IA Commission and accusing a State of violating your
fundamental human rights is non-confrontational, it may be that actions
such as the Inuit and Athabaskan Petitions helped to compel nations to
participate and commit to the Framework of Action. Ultimately, the recent
efforts of the Arctic Council appear to be genuinely dialogue based and
capable accomplishing some emissions reductions well before the Athabaskan
Petition potentially results in a non-binding Recommendation from the IA
Commission. Inter-American human rights law certainly has a role in
protecting the environment and ensuring people’s rights are protected, but it
may not be the best mechanism for getting relief from climate change.

3.3 Point-source pollution and conservation

Point-source pollution and conservation are closely related in Inter-American
case law as many cases address both issues simultaneously. Most
environment related cases within the Inter-American regime arise from
situations where resource exploitation negatively impacts local communities,
particularly in ways which disrupt natural ecosystems through deforestation
and/or pollution. In these cases it is common for point-source pollution to
occur in tandem with a loss of conservation. The regime has only heard one
case which was singularly focused on promoting the conservation of an
unpopulated area, but it was unsuccessful and the regime does not appear to

Center for International Environmental Law “Inuit File Petition with Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights”.
714
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place an intrinsic value on ecosystem conservation.715 The following analyzes
the complex case law of the Inter-American human rights regime that has
arisen from various petitioning groups attempting to use their human rights
in

ways

which

simultaneously

reducing

pollution

and

promote

conservation.716
There are three characteristics of the Inter-American regime’s environmental
case law that complicate analysis: the role of indigenous groups, the tiered
system of rights protection, and the variety of claims. First, it needs to be
recognized that indigenous populations have played an important role in the
development of Inter-American human rights law and environmental
protection.717 Almost all environment-related cases brought before both the
IA Court and IA Commission have been brought indigenous groups and until
recently it might have appeared that indigenous people were uniquely suited
to bring such claims.
The Inter-American human rights regime clearly gives special consideration
to the rights of indigenous groups and this is explored in detail herein.
Recently, three cases have arisen with may extend the ability of nonindigenous people to bring environmental claims to the Inter-American
regime, but these cases have only been heard on their admissibility and their
future is unclear.718 While the majority of this analysis focuses on cases

In Metropolitan Nature Reserve v Panama, Case 11533, Report No 88/03, Inter-Am CHR,
OEA/SerL/V/II118 Doc 70 rev 2 at 524 (2003) the petitioners argued that the construction of
a road through a nature reserve violated their right to property. The petitioners did not have
an interest in the reserve beyond a general interest in its preservation for nature
conservation and the IA Commission determined that the claim was inadmissible for a lack
of individual victims and for being overly broad. The IA Commission specifically noted that
petitions filed for the common good are deemed inadmissible.
716 Technically, not all of the Inter-American cases deal with both pollution and conservation
– most do, but a few only address pollution.
717 See S James Anaya & Robert A Jr Williams, “Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
over Lands and Natural Resources under the Inter-American Human Rights System, The”
(2001) 14 Harv Hum Rts J 33; Jo M Pasqualucci, “Evolution of International Indigenous
Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System, The” (2006) 6 Hum Rts L Rev 281.
718 See Section 3.3.2 of this work
715

178

brought by indigenous groups, it is not clear that they are uniquely capable of
using their Inter-American human right to respond to environmental
problems, it may simply be that indigenous groups were simply the first to
protect the environment using the Inter-American human rights regime.
Second, as discussed in Section 3.1.1 of this work, the Inter-American human
rights regime consists of multiple tiers of human rights and human rights
protection. Not all members of the OAS have committed to all of the InterAmerican human rights documents and this can create different standards of
rights protection among OAS members. In theory two identical petitioners,
with two identical claims, can find themselves with drastically different
outcomes. The implications of the tiered system are not only seen in who
rights apply to, but also how rights are applied: for example, the IA
Commission can recognize the violation of a petitioner’s right to health in a
non-binding recommendation, but the IA Court cannot similarly recognize
the violation with a binding decision.719
The tiered nature of the Inter-American regime is further heightened by
Article 29(b) of the American Convention which specifies that the American
Convention will not be interpreted in any way which restricts the enjoyment
of any right if it is established in a stronger form by either national law or
international convention. Article 29(b) has been used in numerous decisions
of the IA Court and it potentially makes each of the IA Court’s decisions
unique to each State.720 In its environmental jurisprudence the IA Court has
frequently referenced the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No.

The right is recognized in the American Declaration (Article XI), so its violation can be
recognized by both the Commission and the Court, but the Court can only make binding
decisions based on the Convention (Article 62). The Protocol of San Salvador also provides a
right to health (Article 10), but the Protocol is specific to the fact that only violations of
Articles 8 and 13 may be adjudicated by the Court (Article 19(6)).
720 For instance, two identical claims arising in two nations which have equal commitment to
Inter-American rights could result in two different outcomes at the IA Court if one of the two
nations has a national law which establishes a higher standard of protection than exists in
the American Convention.
719
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169,721 applying it using both Article 29(b) and an influential human rights
document capable of influencing the IA Court’s interpretation of InterAmerican rights. This analysis discusses the IA Court’s application of ILO
169 and the tiered nature of the regime, but must also emphasize that
conclusions taken from certain cases may not be applicable to petitioners
living in other OAS member states.
The Inter-American environmental case law is also complicated by the
practice of petitions concurrently pursuing numerous rights violations. InterAmerican petitioners routinely attempt to claim a wide variety of human
rights violations arising from environmentally damaging activities. For
example in San Mateo v Peru the petitioners argued that the State’s refusal
to remove toxic waste from their land led to violations of their rights
enshrined by Articles 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26 of the
American Convention.722 While not all petitions cite fourteen different rights
violations, the lack of established Inter-American case law causes many
petitioners to claim multiple rights violations in hope of a successful claim.723
This makes it difficult to divide analysis by the rights claimed by the
petitioners. That notwithstanding, this analysis is divided in just such a
manner, distinguishing claims as they fall within two broad categories: cases
which emphasized property rights and those which focused on the petitioners’
health. This division is possible because even in cases where multiple rights
are cited, the IA Court and IA Commission tend to focus on one right in their
decisions. The next section of this work illustrates how the Inter-American
case law has made the right to property a comparatively clear and capable
right for providing environmental protection. In contrast, Section 3.3.2 looks
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C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169), 27 June 1989, 328 UNTS 247
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San Mateo v Peru, supra note 574, paras 14 & 31.
See Section 14.2 of this work
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at the relatively complex abilities of the rights to life, health and privacy to
respond to environmental challenges.

3.3.1 The Inter-American right to property

The Inter-American right to property is by far the most frequently cited right
in environment cases. The right is present in both the American Declaration
(Article XXIII) and American Convention (Article 21) and it has been used by
petitioners to establish a duty of national governments to attain permission
from indigenous populations before altering traditional lands.
Four important property cases have established State obligations to consult
and gain consent: Awas Tingni, Belize Maya, Saramaka, and Kichwa. In each
of these cases, an indigenous population was subject to their land being
altered by government sanctioned activities including deforestation, mining
and oil exploration. Based on the right to property, these cases illustrate: (a)
the IA Court’s use of Article 29(b) and ILO 169; (b) the IA Court’s method of
responding to cases with potentially multiple related rights violations; and (c)
the willingness of the IA Court to extend the reach of Inter-American rights,
potentially beyond what was envisaged by the American Convention’s
drafters.
In Awas Tingni, the petitioners argued that the Nicaraguan government
violated their property right by failing to formally recognize their ownership
of their traditional land and for granting logging concessions on said land.724
The IA Court agreed and stated that:
Indigenous groups, by the fact of their very existence, have the right
to live freely in their own territory; the close ties of indigenous people
724

Awas Tingni, supra note 591, para 104.

181

with the land must be recognized and understood as the fundamental
basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their
economic survival. For indigenous communities, relations to the land
are not merely a matter of possession and production but a material
and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve
their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations.725

The IA Court’s emphasis on the strong relationship between indigenous
people and their land is important not only because it forms the decision in

Awas Tingni, but also because it provides a guide for all future indigenous
property rights cases.726 In Awas Tingni the IA Court determined that the
petitioners’ right was violated by the “granted concession to third parties to
utilize the property and resources located in an area which could correspond,
fully or in part, to the [traditional lands of the Awas Tingni] which must be
delimited, demarcated and titled”.727 Importantly, the IA Court did not
explicitly require the indigenous population’s consent for such interference
and the ruling in Awas Tingni could be understood to mean that the logging
would be allowed, without the consent of the petitioners, as long as it
conformed with the State’s right to deprive a group or individual of their
property as described by Article 21(2) of the American Convention.728 The
status of the right to property and the obligation to gain consent was
disappointingly unclear.

Ibid, para 149.
The Court and Commission repeatedly emphasize the relationship between indigenous
populations and their traditional territory. It is reiterated in all of the cases mentioned in
this section as well as three Paraguayan cases somewhat related to the environment: Yakye
Axa, supra note 630; Sawhoyamaxa, supra note 631; Xákmok Kásek Indegenous Community
v Paraguay, supra note 672. These three cases all deal with indigenous populations
attempting to reclaim access to, or rights over, their traditional territory, while there may be
potential for the environment to benefit from the indigenous populations’ reclamation of
land, but it is not clear from the cases and therefore these cases are not addressed in detail
in this section.
727 Awas Tingni, supra note 591, para 153.
728 American Convention, supra note 543 Article 21(2):No one shall be deprived of his
property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social
interest, and in the case and according to the forms established by law.
725
726
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Following Awas Tigni, the IA Commission heard a similar claim arising from
the grant of logging and oil concessions on land traditionally, but informally,
held by an indigenous population in Belize.729 Here, the IA Commission
expanded on the need for consultation, but unfortunately, did not clarify the
issue of consent.
Belize is not a party to the American Convention and so the petitioners claim
in Belize Maya was based on various rights established by the American
Declaration, including: their right to life; right to religious freedom and
worship; right to family; right to preservation of health and well-being; and
their right to property.730
The IA Commission’s decision in Belize Maya, while ultimately a non-binding
recommendation, was particularly important for two reasons. First, the IA
Commission stated that the right to property of indigenous people could
encompass numerous issues including the group’s physical, cultural and
spiritual vitality and their right to equality and therefore the IA Commission
was willing to combine all of the petitioners’ aforementioned claims into a
single property right violation.731 Second, upon determining that the
petitioners’ property right had been violated, the IA Commission specified
that “the duty to consult is a fundamental component of the State’s
obligations in giving effect to the communal property right of the Mayan
people”.732 This partially clarified the IA Court’s ruling in Awas Tigni and set
the foundation for a binding obligation to consult.
In 2007, Saramaka v Suriname provided the IA Court with another
opportunity to clarify its position on consultation and consent. Here, the

Belize Maya, supra note 602, para 19.
Ibid, para 154.
731 Ibid, paras 155–6.
732 Ibid, para 155 The Commission established the duty to consult based on its interpretation
729
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of Article XX of the American Declaration and as an implicit component of Article 27 of the
ICCPR.
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petitioners argued that their property right had been violated by the State’s
grant of forestry and mining concessions in areas within their traditional
territory.733 The IA Court reiterated its position in Awas Tigni and clarified
that the right to property, as it applies to indigenous and tribal people,734
requires special measures to guarantee the physical and cultural existence of
the group in question.735 It went on to say that there is a need to protect the
lands and resources traditionally used by indigenous people to prevent their
extinction and that the right to property would be meaningless if indigenous
populations did not have control of the natural resources which maintain
their way of life.736 The IA Court stated that this control includes natural
resources unrelated to the indigenous population’s way of life (such as gold),
if the extraction of the resource had the potential to disrupt the resources
upon which they otherwise rely, such as fresh water.737
Although the IA Court clarified the right of indigenous and tribal populations
to control their natural resources, it also allowed the State to pursue resource
extraction within traditional lands as long as it undertook three safeguards.
First, with any development, investment, exploration, or extraction within
Saramaka territory, the State must guarantee the effective participation of
the Saramaka people, in a way that conforms to their customs and traditions.
Second, the Saramakas must receive a reasonable benefit from any such
operation. Third, the State must ensure that no concession will be issued

Saramaka People v Suriname, supra note 139, para 124.
The petitioners in Saramaka were a tribal group dating back to the 17th century. The
Court determined that the character of the tribal group was akin to an indigenous group and
granted them the same right to property. Ibid, paras 80–4.
735 Ibid, para 86.
736 Ibid, paras 121–2.
737 Ibid, para 155. Gold was determined not to be a part of Saramakan cultural identity, but
there was concern that gold mining could affect other natural resources necessary for
Saramakan survival such as fresh waterways.
733
734
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within Saramaka territory without an independent, and technically capable,
environmental and social impact assessment.738

Saramaka significantly elevated the ability of indigenous populations to
protect their environment from pollution and facilitate conservation. The
ruling prevented government from simply expropriating the traditional lands
for resource extraction. It does not give an indigenous population the ability
to prohibit all resource extraction, but it emphasizes that any action must
have the consent of the population and no action can place the group’s
survival at risk.
The current ability of the right to property to protect the environment of
indigenous people is created by combining the ruling in Saramaka with the
more recent ruling in Kichwa. Kichwa not only reinforces the decision of

Saramaka, but goes on to define the rights to consultation arising from the IA
Convention’s right to property. In the case, Ecuador granted concessions to a
third party to engage in oil exploration within the traditional territory of the
indigenous

Kichwa

people.739

These

concessions

allowed

significant

deforestation to facilitate the creation of seismic lines, camps and heliports.740
They also resulted in the destruction of at least one site of special spiritual
significance;741 and destruction of caves, water sources and underground
rivers relied upon by the community for clean drinking water.742 The
environmental impact of the oil exploration was relatively clear and the
indigenous status of the Kichwa people was not challenged by the State. The
case hinged on the Ecuador’s nationalization of resources, its denial of an
overall duty to consult, and its assertion that it had complied with any
potential duty to consult.

Ibid, para 129.
Kichwa, supra note 139, paras 64–5.
740 Ibid, para 92.
741 Ibid, para 104.
742 Ibid, para 105.
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The State formally gave the Kichwa people title to the land in question in
1992. This included the natural resources on the surface, but, according to
the IA Court excluded the “subsoil natural resources [that] are the property
of the State, which may exploit them without interference provided that
environmental protection standards are observed”.743 In 1996 a contract was
signed between the State Oil Company of Ecuador and a private consortium
to begin hydrocarbon exploration within Kichwa territory.744 The contract
required the private group to, inter alia, prepare and Environmental Impact
Assessment; make every effort to maintain the existing ecological balance;
and obtain any necessary permits from third parties which might be
necessary to access the area and conduct activities.745
The consortium tried on multiple occasions to negotiate access to the Kichwa
territory, often using questionable methods such as: directly contacting
community members in order to circumvent the community’s internal
governance institutions; offering health care in exchange for access; and by
intentionally dividing the community, manipulating the leaders, and carrying
out defamation campaigns to discredit the leaders and organizations.746 The
State did not deny the use of these methods, but argued that it was under no
obligation to engage in a prior consultation process, or to obtain free informed
consent, because the 1996 contract for exploration predated any such
obligation.747 The State argued that it was not until 1998, when it ratified
ILO 169 and adopted its 1998 Constitution,748 that it recognized the right of
indigenous

peoples

to

political

participation

in

regard

to

resource

extraction.749 The State went on to say that, despite the lack of obligation to

Ibid, paras 61–2.
Ibid at 64.
745 Ibid, para 67.
746 Ibid, paras 73 & 75.
747 Ibid, para 128.
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consult; the private consortium did inform the community of the project,
sought its consent, and produced an environmental impact assessment.750
The IA Court disagreed with the State’s assessment of its obligations, and
determined that ILO 169 applied to any impacts and decisions of the oil
projects which occurred after the ILO 169 came into force, even if they had
been contracted prior to its coming into force. Therefore, as of May 1999,751
the State was under an obligation to guarantee the prior consultation of the
Kichwa people.752
Having established an obligation to consult, the IA Court described what was
required to meet this obligation. In doing so the IA Court clearly relies on
ILO 169; however, the foundation upon which the IA Court built the
obligation for prior consultation is not entirely clear and this lack of clarity
may affect the application of the right in future cases.
Initially, it would appear that the IA Court’s decision to impose a duty to
consult only when ILO 169 came into force in Ecuador, would indicate that
the IA Court established this obligation using Convention Article 29(b).
Recall that the article requires the IA Court to apply the American
Convention in conformity with any related national or international laws
which provide a standard of rights protection which exceeds that of the
American Convention. Articles 6 and 17 of the ILO 169 establish the right of
indigenous populations to free and informed consultation, taken in good faith
and with the objective of achieving consent, in situations where there is a
potential transmission of land rights.753 When ILO 169 is read in conjunction
with the right to property under the American Convention it can establish a
right to prior consultation applicable to States party to both documents.
Ibid, para 130.
ILO Convention No. 169 was ratified by Ecuador in 1998, but did not come into force until
May 1999.
752 Kichwa, supra note 139, para 179.
753 ILO 169, supra note 721 Articles 6 & 17.
750
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However, this would not establish a right to prior consultation in the ten OAS
member states which are party to the American Convention, but not party to
ILO 169. While it is not entirely clear, the IA Court may have artfully
avoided this complexity by simultaneously using Article 29(b) to place an
obligation on Ecuador in Kichwa while also extending that obligation to all
parties of the IA Convention.
As part of its description of what constitutes prior consultation, the IA Court
makes multiple references to ILO 169, but it does not specifically invoke
Article 29(b). While it appears that the IA Court used Article 29(b) to
establish a specific obligation for Ecuador,754 it may also be the case that the
IA Court established the obligation using its other ability to interpret the
American Convention taking into account: Inter-American case law and
norms; state practice; and, the evolution of international law when
establishing the general obligation.755
The IA Court appears to consider the obligation to consult part of customary
law. Upon consideration of national and international law, the IA Court
states that “the obligation of States to carry out special and differentiated
consultation processes when certain interests of indigenous peoples and
communities are about to be affected is an obligation that has been clearly
recognized”.756 The IA Court does not use the phrase “customary law”, but
does call the obligation “a general principle of international law”.757 On this
basis, it is reasonable to believe that the IA Court currently considers the
right to prior consultation as a general component of the American
Convention, incorporated within the right to property. The IA Court has
described the obligation to consult as one which is obviously based on ILO
169, but it does not appear that the IA Court simply applied ILO 169 to
Kichwa, supra note 139, paras 172–3.
Ibid, para 177.
756 Ibid, paras 164–5.
757 Ibid, para 164.
754
755
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Ecuador using Article 29(b). The IA Court does not reference Article 29(b) in
its decision and, more importantly, the ultimate standard established by the
IA Court actually exceeds that created by ILO 169.758
Assuming the obligation to consult defined in Kichwa applies to all parties to
the American Convention, it builds significantly on the consultations
described in Saramaka.759 First, consultation must be in “good faith” with
“the aim of reaching an agreement”; negotiations are not a mere formality
and must establish a dialogue between the parties based on trust and
respect. Vitally, negotiations must be free from coercion by the State, its
agents, or third parties acting with the State’s acquiescence. Furthermore,
consultations are incompatible with bribery or intentional division of the
indigenous population.760 The IA Court also emphasized that this obligation
is the sole responsibility of the State and cannot be delegated to third
parties.761 These parameters theoretically guarantee that indigenous
populations will have their views considered ahead of any works which may
impact their lands, but Kichwa did not give indigenous groups the ability to
ultimately deny consent and prohibit activity. Unfortunately, the IA Court
has yet to really consider what happens if an indigenous population’s denies
consent.
The Inter-American right to property can be applied to indigenous
populations, in a way which links environmental protection to their
traditional land and the environmental conditions necessary for their
physical and cultural survival. The Inter-American regime supports

See Upasana Khatri, “Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in
the Context of State-Sponsored Development: The New Standard Set by Sarayaku V;
Ecuador and its Potential to Delegitimize the Belo Monte Dam” (2013) 29:1 American
University International Law Review, online:
<http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol29/iss1/4> at 206 Who argues that the ILO
Convention 169 should be revised to endorse the higher standard set by the Kichwa case.
759 See Saramaka People v Suriname, supra note 139, para 133.
760 Kichwa, supra note 139, para 186.
761 Ibid, para 187.
758
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indigenous property claims which protect the forests, waterways, and
ecosystems upon which indigenous people rely; however, the IA Court has not
established a clear ability of indigenous population to resist all incursions
onto their territory.
In Saramaka the IA Court referenced this issue and determined that “the
State has a duty, not only to consult with the Saramakas, but also to obtain
their free, prior, and informed consent”.762 However, this was only in regard
to “large-scale development” or “projects that would have a major impact on
Saramaka territory”.763 The IA Court did not distinguish a “large-scale
development” from one which does not require consent, but it did make it
clear that this distinction exists.764 Unfortunately, the need for consent is not
discussed in Kichwa, so while the issue of consent can potentially limit the
ability of indigenous populations to protect the environment using their right
to property, its application to small/medium-sized projects in unknown.
What can be taken from the cases relating to the right to prior consultation is
the ability of indigenous populations to place some limits on pollution and
provide some level of conservation. Activities that have a major impact on the
indigenous peoples’ territory require the consent of the indigenous
population. This consent must come as part of a very specific framework of
consultation established to ensure that the indigenous population is fully
informed of the impacts of the development and that consent is freely given.
In situations where the proposed activities will have a smaller impact on
indigenous territory, consent is not necessarily required, but consultation
with the intention of gaining consent is mandatory.

Saramaka People v Suriname, supra note 139, para 134.
Ibid.
764 Ibid, para 147 The State argues that it did not require consent for a logging concession
762
763

because it occurred on Saramaka territory devoid of traditional Saramaka sites. The Court
determined that consultation was always necessary, but it implied that consent was not
necessary required.
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The IA Commission and IA Court have yet to consider a case where consent
is appropriately sought, but not given. This case will eventually arise and it
is likely that the State’s responsibility will depend on the efforts taken to
minimize the environmental and cultural impacts of the activity as well as
the compensation provided to the indigenous group.765 There is a chance that
the IA Court could eventually grant a broad requirement that all activities
within indigenous land require consent in order to conform with the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,766 but this
declaration is not a legally binding international document and similar,
binding documents such as the ILO 169 do not provide a requirement for
consent.767 The IA Court’s position on consent is already relatively
progressive and the lack of discussion on the necessity of consent in Kichwa
may be indicative of the IA Court’s resistance to revisit the issue and solidify
its position in Saramaka. Kichwa hinges on the failure of the State to
properly consult and seek the consent of the indigenous population – it does
not consider whether or not consent would have been necessary had it been
properly sought.
Then, within the Inter-American regime, indigenous populations have the
ability to use their human right to property to deny activities on their land,
including those which pollute or have a negative impact on conservation as
long as those activities are large in scale or will significantly impact their
territory. Furthermore, indigenous populations have a potential ability to
minimize the impact of smaller projects through consultation and
negotiation.
Ibid at 129 & 158 The Court states that the State may restrict the property rights of the
Saramakas, but only if it ensures effective participation, benefit sharing, prior
environmental and cultural assessments, and the implementation of safeguards to protect
the land and natural resources.
766 UNDRIP, supra note 671 Article 32(1) which requires free and informed consent prior to
the approval of any project affecting the lands or territories or other resources of indigenous
people .
767 ILO 169, supra note 721. Article 6(2) states that consent must be the intention of
consultations, but it is not a requirement of action.
765
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Ultimately, the Inter-American human rights regime’s repeated emphasis on
the importance of protecting the territory of indigenous populations will
likely further expand the right to property to give those groups greater
authority over the exploitation of natural resources. The IA Court has used
the right to property to provide indigenous groups with the ability to prevent
certain activities from occurring on their territory, but the emphasis the IA
Court has placed on indigenous people’s right to property also has a
downside. The IA Court has connected the right to property so closely to the
need to preserve and protect indigenous peoples’ culture and population, that
it may unfairly limit the right as it applies to non-indigenous groups. Where
an indigenous people has a communal property right, it can prevent the
government’s large-scale development by withholding consent; however, if a
small town or community wants to block regional deforestation or mining due
to concerns that it will pollute or deforest areas which they have traditionally
enjoyed, they may not have the same strength of claim if they are not
formally seen as an “indigenous group”. Only recently have non-indigenous
groups brought environment related claims before the Inter-American regime
– most rely on one or more of their rights to life, health, and privacy, and all
have yet to be heard on their merits.

3.3.2 The Inter-American rights to life, health, and privacy

The rights to life and health have been cited in a number of pollution and
conservation related cases, but the potential of these rights to actually
protect the environment is yet to be known. While the right to life exists in
both the American Declaration (Article I) and the American Convention
(Article 4), the right to health only exists in the American Declaration. To
date, all of the cases combing these rights with environmental protection
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have only been considered by the IA Commission.768 The ability of these
rights to respond to environmental issues is greatly complicated by the
relative absence of case law: the rights to life and health have only been cited
in four IA Commission cases – and of the four cases only one has been
considered on their merits.
The first case to deal with environmental damage and its effect on health was

Yanomami v Brasil and it remains the only right to health case to be fully
analyzed by the IA Commission.769 In Yanomami the traditional territory of
an

indigenous

population

was

encroached

upon

by

the

Brazilian

government’s creation of a highway through their property.770 The highway
and its construction facilitated further incursion into Yanomami territory
with non-indigenous people introducing prostitution and disease, and
displacing the population from their ancestral lands: disrupting their culture
and traditions.771 The IA Commission determined that the government’s
failure to “take timely and effective measures on behalf of the Yanomami
Indians” resulted in violations the American Declaration’s rights to life,
liberty and personal security; residence and movement; and the preservation
of health and well-being.772
A number of points can be taken from Yanomami, but overall the case has
not had an overt influence on the Inter-American human rights regime. First,
it should be noted that the case was heard in 1985 and the judgment was
only 6 pages long (in comparison the IA Court’s decision in Kichwa was 93
A number of environmental cases, such as Kichwa have components of the rights to life
and/or health, but these typically arise from tangential issues to the environmental damage.
In Kichwa, the petitioners’ right to life was violated because the oil exploration company left
undetonated explosives buried on Kichwa territory (see Paras 248-9). While clearly a form of
pollution, the heart of the environmental claim in Kichwa dealt with the petitioners’ right to
property which encompassed all aspects of the incursion onto their territory. Similarly, in
Awas Tingni the petitioners claim that their right to life is violated, but the Court subsumes
this claim into a broad property right claim (Para 156).
769 Yanomami, supra note 573.
770 Ibid, para 2(f).
771 Yanomami, supra note 573 CONSIDERING Para 2.
772 Ibid THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, RESOLVES Para 1.
768
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pages). While its brevity makes Yanomami a relative pleasure to read, it did
not allow the IA Commission to elaborate on the subtleties of the rights to life
and health. The IA Commission treats Yanomami as a clear case of a right
violation and this is helpful for its petitioners, but less so for future
petitioners because the IA Commission gave no indication of the threshold
between an incidental impact on health and a violation of the right to health.
Another shortcoming of Yanomami is that the case is fundamentally out of
date. If the same facts were to arise today, modern petitioners would be
unlikely to pursue the same case as those in Yanomami. In 1985 Brazil had
not yet ratified the American Convention so the case could not progress to the
IA Court and the impact of the highway on the petitioners’ health made the
right to health established by the American Declaration a clear choice for
their petition. However, current Inter-American law should cause modern
petitioners to pursue their right to property if confronted with the same facts
as Yanomami.
If Yanomami were to arise today in Brazil, the petitioners should rely on
Brazil’s commitment to the American Convention and the ILO 169 to follow
the IA Court’s decisions in Sarayaku and Kichwa to establish a violation of
their right to property. The Yanomami people were not consulted nor did they
give consent to the incursion so they would have a strong reason to believe
that the IA Court would ultimately find a property right violation. If the facts
were to arise in a State not party to the Convention, the petitioners would
still be best advised to focus on a violation of their right to property, relying
on the IA Commission following Kichwa’s assertion that it is a general
principle of international law that requires consultation of indigenous
populations when conducting activities in their territory.773 Certainly, this
could be accompanied with a claim that the petitioners’ right to health had
also been violated, but in light of the volume of Inter-American law
773

Kichwa, supra note 139, paras 164–5.
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supporting indigenous property rights, specifically the IA Commission’s
decision in Belize Maya which stated that “the duty to consult is a
fundamental component of the State’s obligations”,774 it would seem
irresponsible not to make that the focus of a modern claim based on

Yanomami’s facts.
This logic is emphasized by the IA Commission’s recent consideration of the
admissibility of the petitioners’ claims in Raposa Serra Do Sol Indigenous

Peoples v Brazil.775 In 2010 the IA Commission considered the Raposa case
and its facts were similar in many ways to those of Yanomami. Here, the
petitioners were an indigenous population whose land has been incurred
upon by non-indigenous people and it led to “frequent incidences of violence
and severe environmental degradation affecting the lives and personal
integrity of the alleged victims”.776 These incursions had primarily taken the
form of settlers and farmers, particularly rice farmers, whose use of
agroindustrial chemicals, alteration of waterways and unauthorized creation
of slaughterhouses

caused significant environmental

damage.777 The

petitioners cited a number of rights violations arising from both the American
Declaration and American Convention including the rights to life, health, and
to property. While much of the focus of the IA Commission’s assessment
appears to be focused on the acts of violence toward the Raposa people,778 the
IA Commission’s decision to admit the case was based on: (1) the violation of
the petitioners’ right to property due to a failure to demarcate and protect
their ancestral territory,779 and (2) the violations of the petitioners’ rights to

Belize Maya, supra note 602, para 155 The Commission established the duty to consult
based on its interpretation of Article XX of the American Declaration and as an implicit
component of Article 27 of the ICCPR.
775 Raposa Serra Do Sol Indigenous Peoples v Brazil, Report No 125/10, Petition 250-04,
Inter-Am CHR, 23 October 2010 .
776 Ibid, para 2.
777 Ibid, para 15.
778 Raposa, supra note 775 See Paras 2, 10, 14 and 34.
779 Ibid, para 45.
774
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life, personal integrity, and inviolability of the home, arising from the
violence incurred by the petitioners.780
Although an admissibility case does not assess if a right has actually been
violated, the division of rights in Raposa emphasizes the right to property as
a primary mechanism for environmental protection within the InterAmerican regime. The IA Commission notes that the purpose of the petition
is the protection of the indigenous peoples’ right to property and the
petitioners expect that recognition of the right would allow them to remove
the non-indigenous population and halt the violence: the cause of the other
rights violations.781
In Raposa it is the right to property that has the potential to protect the
environment and failure to protect this right results in the physical harm to
the indigenous population and the violation of their other rights. The
petitioners in Raposa argue that large scale development projects occurred on
their land without proper prior consultation782 and if this can be established
the IA Commission is almost certain to find a property right violation
following Saramaka and Kichwa. For the petitioners in Raposa this would
surely be a welcome outcome. It illustrates how far Inter-American law has
come since Yanomami, but also illustrates how Yanomami should no longer
be seen as establishing a relationship between environmental degradation
and its impact on the rights to life and health.
The right to health under the American Declaration has been elaborated
upon by two other cases that specifically deal with the impact of pollution on
the rights to health. These cases are particularly interesting as the
petitioners in both cases are not indigenous people.

Ibid, para 46.
Ibid, para 34.
782 Ibid, para 10.
780
781
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In San Mateo v Peru the petitioners are not an exclusively indigenous
population783 and it is therefore the first Inter-American case to potentially
allow a non-indigenous group to protect their environment using human
rights. The case is based on pollution emitted from a field of toxic waste
sludge created by a mining operation near the town of San Mateo de
Huanchor. The waste constitutes a significant risk for the local population
and studies have shown high levels of arsenic and lead in their crops, as well
as high levels of lead, cadmium, mercury, arsenic and lead in the population
itself.784 These toxins have been linked with various impacts on the
community including: chronic dermatitis, liver dysfunction, hearing loss and
malnutrition;785 as well as psychological problems such as: changes in
memory, attention, concentration, anxiety, learning impairments, and
personality changes.786
In 2004 the IA Commission found the petitioners’ claim admissible and
recognized the potential violation of numerous rights established by the
American Convention, including the right to life, the right to humane
treatment,787 and the right to property.788 If the IA Court reaches a decision
on the merits of this case, it could establish a new avenue of environmental
protection within the Inter-American regime. It seems likely that the
petitioners are being wronged in some way by the pollution in San Mateo de
Huanchor, but it will be interesting to see which right(s) the IA Court sees as
violated and how they are applied to non-indigenous groups.

San Mateo v Peru, supra note 574, para 16.
Ibid, paras 21 & 23.
785 Ibid, para 24.
786 Ibid, para 22.
787 American Convention, supra note 543 Article 5(1) “Every person has the right to have his
783
784

physical, mental and moral integrity respected”.
788 The case is also deemed admissible on a number of other potential rights violations, but
these are associated with the failure of the Peruvian government to properly respond to the
pollution, not the pollution itself: for example the petitioners argue that their right to a fair
trial was violated by the slowness of the judicial system (Para 27).
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If the San Mateo case reaches the IA Court, and the IA Court decides to find
favourably for the petitioners, it will have to do so using the right to life,
humane treatment, or property. In the absence of a right to health in the
American Convention, the IA Court has shown a willingness to extend the
right to life beyond a binary interpretation of the right. In the IA
Commission’s assessment of the facts, the toxic sludge has not caused any
actual deaths in San Mateo de Huanchor and it is not clear that the
chemicals, while harmful, pose a risk of causing death. While this could pose
a problem if the right to life was rigidly interpreted, the IA Court already
recognized that the right to life encompasses a “right to a decent life”. In
Xákmok the IA Court found a violation of the petitioners’ right to life
stemming from malnutrition,789 but not death, and the IA Court could a
similar violation in San Mateo.
In contrast, if the IA Court were to find a violation of the right to humane
treatment (Article 5), it would be a significant step away from that right’s
initial purpose. Part 1 of Article 5 establishes that “[e]very person has the
right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected”, but Parts
2-6 pertain specifically to the treatment of people detained by the State.
When the Right to Human Treatment is read as a whole, it does not clearly
apply to the situation in San Mateo. Finally, the right to property certainly
could be used to protect the health of a person or group; however as a nonindigenous group the petitioners may not have the same strength of claim as
those in Awas Tigni, Saramaka, and Kichwa.
The case of Community of La Oroya v Peru790 is very similar to San Mateo
and while it has also only been heard by the IA Commission on its
admissibility, it may shed some light on the future direction of the InterAmerican regime’s understanding of pollution and health. In La Oroya a
789
790

Xákmok Kásek Indegenous Community v Paraguay, supra note 672, paras 197 & 217.
Community of La Oroya v Peru, Report No 76/09, Petition 1473-06, Inter-Am CHR, 5

August 2009 .
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town of non-indigenous people is affected by pollution from a nearby
metallurgical complex. The petitioners are exposed to high levels of lead,
arsenic, sulphur dioxide, and cadmium.791 They claim that these toxins cause
various health problems within the community including hearing loss,
respiratory problems, gastritis, vomiting, diarrhoea, calcium deficiency,
cancer, reproductive system damage, and neurological problems.792 The
petitioners argue that the pollution causes violations of their rights to the
right to life, humane treatment, and their Article 11 right to privacy.793 They
did not pursue a violation of their right to property.
The petitioners argue that excessive environmental contamination represents
an intrusion into their personal and family lives as pollution enters their
home, and violates their right to privacy.794 This argument clearly echoes
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. Under the ECHR the right
to privacy795 “severe environmental pollution may affect individuals’ wellbeing and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect
their private and family life adversely, without, however, seriously
endangering their health”.796 Pollution capable of affecting the health of
people in their homes can constitute a violation of the right to privacy in
Europe. However, the IA Commission rejected the petitioners’ claim to a
privacy right violation in La Oroya, simply stating that “the events described
would not represent a violation of Article 11 [the right to privacy] of the
American Convention.”797

Ibid, para 11.
Ibid, paras 19–20.
793 Ibid, paras 26–8.
794 Ibid, para 28.
795 ECHR, supra note 140 Article 8.
796 López Ostra v Spain, supra note 133, para 51; Also see Guerra and Others v Italy, supra
791
792

note 306, para 60“severe environmental pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and
prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and family
life adversely”.
797 Community of La Oroya v Peru, supra note 790.
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Then, if the similar cases of La Oroya and San Mateo are to have similar,
favourable decisions for their petitioners their health will need to be
protected by either the right to life, or the right to humane treatment.
Then, the recent case of Mossville Environmental Action Now v United

States798 further complicated this issue by placing renewed focus on the right
to privacy. In Mossville the petitioners are a predominantly AfricanAmerican community in Louisiana, claimed that the State authorized a
disproportionate number of industrial facilities in and around their
community. The pollution from these facilities has caused various health
problems

for

the

residents

including

nervous

system

problems,

cardiovascular problems, skin problems, and mental health problems.799
Blood tests on residents have shown that the average Mossville residents’
blood contained dioxin concentrations three times above the national average
and toxic chemicals in the air and water exceed quality standards established
by the State of Louisiana.800
The United States are not party to the American Convention so the
petitioners in Mossville based their claim on various violations of the
American Declaration. They argued that the pollution, and the particular
concentration of polluting facilities within their African-American community
constituted violations of their rights to life; equality; private and family life;
inviolability of the home; health; and property.801 Interestingly, the IA
Commission decided to only admit the case on two rights: the right to
equality and the right to private and family life (the right to privacy). The IA
Commission determined that the petitioners had not exhausted domestic
remedies with regard to their rights to life and health making those claims

798

Mossville Environmental Action Now v United States, Report No 43/10, Petition 242-05,

Inter-Am CHR, 17 March 2010 .
799 Ibid, para 10.
800 Ibid, paras 10 & 11.
801 Ibid, para 2.
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inadmissible.802 The IA Commission also noted that the petitioners’ claims of
violations of their property right and right to the inviolability of the home
were in support of their claim to a violation of their right to privacy, but not
independently argued as unique right violations, therefore they are also
inadmissible.803 The State conceded that, based on the presented facts, the
petitioners would not be able to bring a discrimination claim to national
courts and the IA Commission admitted this claim, but the IA Commission’s
most surprising decision was to admit the petitioners’ privacy claim.
The petitioners in Mossville explicitly based their privacy claim on the
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, which the IA Commission
summarizes as “a State’s failure to prevent a plant from polluting nearby
homes violated the right to privacy”.804 In its decision in Mossville, the IA
Commission acknowledges that the American Declaration must be considered
in the context of international human rights systems and developments in
the field of international human rights law.805 It also notes, but does not
elaborate on, the fact that it stated in La Oroya that it did not consider
allegations of “excessive environmental contamination represents an
intrusion into the personal and family life on individuals” a violation of the
Article 11 right to privacy under the American Convention.806 Objectively,
there is not a significant difference between the right to privacy as
established by the American Convention and American Declaration. The IA
Commission does not acknowledge any distinction between the two rights to
privacy; it simply concedes that the factual and legal allegations in Mossville
call for an examination on their merits.807

Ibid, paras 35–6.
Ibid, paras 43–4.
804 Ibid, para 43.
805 Ibid.
806 Mossville Environmental Action Now v United States, supra note 798 Note 37.
807 Ibid Note 37.
802
803
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The admissibility case of Mossville came one year after the case of La Oroya
and six years after San Mateo and it may be the case that the IA
Commission’s opinion on the right to privacy changed in the interim. The
petitioners and the IA Commission cite the European Court of Human Right’s
interpretation of the right to property in Mossville, but that interpretation
was well established by the time the IA Commission heard La Oroya and did
not change between La Oroya and Mossville.
With three similar pending cases, the IA Court and IA Commission will have
to clarify the relationship among environmental pollution, health, and
privacy, and the right to life. The Inter-American regime has certainly
challenged itself to simultaneously resolve San Mateo, La Oroya and

Mossville. These similar cases with dissimilar admissible rights not only
illustrate avenues for potential development of Inter-American human rights
law, but their similarities to European cases invite comparison between the
two regimes. While it may be tempting to advocate that the Inter-American
regime simply follows the more established European Court of Human
Rights, such an approach overlooks significant differences between the two
regimes. These differences extend beyond the courts’ decisions into the
regimes’ founding principles, modern structure and their abilities to influence
their members.
The next and final chapter of this work explores the points of comparison and
contrast that link the Inter-American and European regimes. It seeks to
highlight what each regime can take from the other and how each regime
should move forward in the future, specifically with regard to human rights
and the environment.
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Chapter 4: Comparing Regimes

When comparing the jurisprudence of two jurisdictions it is always tempting
to compare cases and judicial reasoning in order to conclude that one court’s
methods or decisions are “better” and should therefore be followed by the
other jurisdiction. One can then take the “better” approach, however he or
she would like to define “better”, and then recommend that the other court
reconsider its decisions and follow the court which got it “right”. Chapters 2
and 3 of this work detail the environmental jurisprudence of the European
and Inter-American human rights regimes and it would be easy to simply
choose a criterion for determining preferable outcomes, such as “outcomes
which provide greater environmental protection” and pick-and-choose
decisions from each regime which best meet the criterion. One could then
conclude that these “better” decisions should be followed by the other regime.
Unfortunately, such an approach would ignore the major challenges
associated with actually implementing a cross-jurisdictional transfer of
jurisprudential principles. There are huge differences between these two
regimes’ capacities, designs and operations which need to be considered
before anyone recommends that one court follow the other.
The focus of this chapter is to illustrate the underlying institutional
differences between the regimes and illustrate how they potentially affect the
regimes’ abilities to follow each other’s judgments.
Prior to conducting this comparison, it is helpful to recall the division in the
European human rights regime between the ECHR and the CFREU. While
both establish human rights in Europe, the ECHR is in many ways the more
important document with the richer history. Currently, the ECHR covers a
wider

array

of

European

laws,

including

national

laws

and

the

implementation of EU law, and is applied to a significantly larger number of
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European nations. The ECHR is also more naturally comparable to InterAmerican human rights as they were both created around the same time, for
the explicit purpose of protecting human rights, and have progressed through
many of the same political challenges.808 Furthermore, depending on the
ultimate resolution of the EU’s accession to the ECHR, it is foreseeable that
the ECHR could become Europe’s definitive human rights document with the
ultimate arbitrator of human rights being the European Court of Human
Rights.809 Finally, as discussed in Section 2.6 of this work, the CFREU lacks
adequate jurisprudence to truly know how and where it will be applied. On
this basis, this chapter focuses its comparison on the European human rights
framed under the ECHR to Inter-American rights established by the OAS.
The complex natures of the European and the Inter-American regimes allow
for a number of different areas of comparison. This work focuses is on the
differences which impact the regimes’ abilities to transfer jurisprudence and
protect the environment. To do this, Section 4.1 compares the early stages of
each regime highlighting the international politics at the time the regimes
were formed with a specific focus on the Inter-American principle of nonintervention. This founding principle does not have an equivalent in Europe
and its presence has placed the two regimes on very different evolutionary
paths. Section 4.2 considers the early application of each human rights
regime, specifically the impact early decisions had on participant and nonparticipant States. This section also looks at the changes to the regimes
caused by the American Convention and the entry into force of the European
Court of Human rights.
Section 4.3 shifts away from the chronological development of the two
regimes and focuses specifically on the challenges the two regimes face with
maintaining participation and enforcing compliance. Then, Section 4.4 looks
808
809

Whereas the CFREU was created as part of the pre-existing European Union.
See Section 7.3 of this work
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closely at the potential for judicial transfer and ultimately recommends that
one regime is better suited for progressively developing its law to facilitate
environmental protection than the other. It also looks at some potential next
steps of jurisprudential development in both regimes with the European
regime having an opportunity to go further in recognition of environmental
rights and the Inter-American regime being in a better position to focus on
institutional issues while clarifying its existing law.

4.1 The creation of the European and Inter-American human
rights regimes and the principle of non-intervention

The early human rights regimes in Europe and the Americas are similar in
many ways: both began at roughly the same time and establishing human
rights was one of the main purposes of the new regional organizations.810
Both the American Declaration and the ECHR aimed to protect a similar set
of human rights; both documents received wide regional support; and the
creation of both regimes has been associated with the protection of
democratic principles from the incursion of other political ideologies.811
Overall though, these similarities are overshadowed by major distinctions
between the two regimes. One of the largest distinctions actually predates
the creation of these regimes and is rooted in the principle of nonintervention. Non-intervention distinguishes not only the creation of the two
regimes, but has continued to influence each regime’s development and
modern application.

The CoE and the OAS, respectively
See Gordon Connell–Smith, “The Organization of American States” (1960) 16:10 The
World Today 447 at 454; Mikael Rask Madsen, “From Cold War Instrument to Supreme
European Court: The European Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International
and National Law and Politics” (2007) 32:1 Law & Social Inquiry 137 at 139–141.
810
811
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Perhaps no issue or principle has had a greater effect on distinguishing the
Inter-American regime from its European counterpart than the principle of
non-intervention. Section 3.1 of this work introduced how this principle arose
in the Americas as a key component of international relations due in part to
the tendency of the United States to intervene in regional issues. Initially,
the principle was only supported by Latin American States, but it gained
broad regional support in 1933, when the United States introduced its “Good
Neighbor Policy”.812
Prior to 1933, the United States had rejected the principle of nonintervention primarily because of their perceived national interest in
intervening in regional affairs. Even as Roosevelt publically supported the
Good Neighbor Policy, the United States maintained a military influence or a
political role in: Nicaragua, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and
Panama.813 The United States had a long record of using military force in
Latin American nations and it was unsurprising that those nations supported
a formal commitment to non-intervention as a means of protecting
themselves from the influence of the United States.814
The principle of non-intervention was formalized, without reservation, at the
1936 Special Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and
established that “intervention by one State in the internal or external affairs
of another State is condemned”.815 Since then, the principle has permeated
both Inter-American relations generally and specifically in regard to human
Gordon Connell-Smith & Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Inter-American
system (London; New York [etc.]: issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of
812

International Affairs [by] Oxford U.P., 1966) at 10 In 1890, at the First International
Conference of American States, “Latin American countries tried unsuccessfully to persuade
the United States not to intervene diplomatically on behalf of her nationals residing in their
territories”.
813 Wells, supra note 514 at 227–230.
814 Ibid at 230–1.

Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American
Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, (Washington :, 1937) at 228 As part of Appendix 53
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“XXVII. Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Co-operation” Section
3(b).
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rights. It is a founding principle of the OAS;816 it was recognized in the 1960s
as a particular challenge to efforts to strengthen Inter-American human
rights;817 its application waned in the 80s and 90s with the entry into force of
the American Convention; but, it has recently seen an informal resurgence
and clearly maintains influence in the modern Inter-American human rights
regime.
The principle of non-intervention was prioritized by the Inter-American
nations prior to any real discussions on human rights. It was formalized in
1936 as a general policy. It was expanded upon in 1945 at the Special InterAmerican Conference for the Maintenance of Peace by the Resolution on the
International Protection of the Essential rights of Man. This resolution,
contrary to its name did not address what we now consider to be human
rights. Instead, it focused on strengthening non-intervention by denouncing
the mistreatment of aliens in nations where they lack legal status.818 It
established a basic standard of protection for all people, such that nations
could not influence other nations by mistreating each other’s nationals.819
This early inclusion of the principle into regional policy foreshadowed its
placement as the founding principle of the OAS and its future influence; as
noted by Cabranes:
For at least a decade and a half after the end of the Second World
War, the subject of human rights was largely limited to occasional
lofty

and

vague

pronouncements,

while non-intervention

was

Bogota Charter, supra note 526 Article 3(e).
José A Cabranes, “Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the Inter-American System”
(1967) 65:6 Michigan Law Review 1147.
818 Resolution on the International Protection of the Essential rights of Man in Report of the
816
817

delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of
War and Peace : Mexico City, Mexico, Feb. 21 - Mar. 8, 1945. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1946) at 108 Preamble.
819 Cabranes, supra note 503 at 892; Also see Myres S McDougal, Harold D Lasswell & Lungchu Chen, “The Protection of Aliens From Discrimination and World Public Order:
Responsibility of States Conjoined with Human Rights” (1976) 70:3 The American Journal of
International Law 432.
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enshrined in the Charter of the OAS as the operative principle of the
Inter-American system.820

Non-intervention is an integral component of the Charter of the OAS. It is
mentioned variously in Articles 2(b), 3(e), 15, 17, 20, 21, and most clearly in
Article 19 which states that:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs
of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed
force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic,
and cultural elements.

As long as OAS members intended to adhere to this expression of the
principle of non-intervention, it would make it impossible for the regime to
institute strong (enforceable) human rights protection.
In order for a human rights regime to be effective, it needs the authority to
admonish nations that violate human rights. An effective human rights
regime necessarily interferes with internal affairs of its participant States
when they violate human rights. This interference can come in many forms
from condemnation, to sanctions, to forcible intervention, but a human rights
regime without the authority to intervene, or at least condemn, is the same
as not having a regime at all. On this basis it may not be surprising that the
American Declaration was greeted with little fanfare at the time it was
signed.
While today the American Declaration is lauded for being the world’s first
international human rights document, it received relatively little attention
from those working on Inter-American relations at the time it was drafted.
Prior to the Inter-American Commission’s actions in Dominican Republic in
820

Cabranes, supra note 503 at 893.
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1965, the American Declaration and the role of human rights in the Americas
was rarely given more than a passing mention.
Laurence Duggan’s 1949 book, The Americas: The Search for Hemisphere

Security,821 gives a rare and interesting insight into the early development of
human rights.822 He notes that after the Second World War the question
arose in the Americas as to how to support democratic institutions and
protect fundamental human rights; specifically, should nations intervene
where unpopular dictators deny basic human rights? In 1945 the Foreign
Minister of Uruguay responded stating that:
Peace is safe only where democratic principles of governments prevail.
The basic rights of man are part of these principles. Thus, though once
exclusively domestic concerns, they now affect international interests
and require international protection. In case of their violating in any
American republic, the community of nations should take collective
multilateral action to restore full democracy there. Such action is
really nothing more than the fulfillment of obligations freely assumed
by American republics, all of whom have proclaimed at interAmerican conferences their devotion to democracy and the rights of
man.823

The Uruguayan position was supported by Guatemala and Venezuela, which
both had new revolutionary governments, as well as Panama and the United

Laurence Duggan, The Americas: The Search for Hemisphere Security (New York: Holt,
1949).
822 Ibid.Laurence Duggan was one of the top officials of the United States Department of
State’s Latin American Division and many insights, such as the Uruguayan proposal on
intervention (mentioned below) and the response to it, are unfortunately unreferenced in his
book and difficult to trace to primary sources. That said, the book was particularly well
received at the time and praised for its comprehensiveness and impartiality, see Arthur P
Whitaker, “Review of The Americas: The Search for Hemisphere Security by Lawrence
Duggan” (1950) 19:2 Pacific Historical Review 163; James A Magner, “Review of The
Americas by Laurence Duggan” (1950) 6:4 The Americas 500. There are relatively few works
which discussed the creation of Inter-American human rights as they occurred and so some
concessions must be made with regard to rigorous reference to primary sources.
823 Duggan, supra note 821 at 203–4.
821
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States.824 However, the Uruguayan proposal was firmly rejected by the other
American States. Duggan summarizes the response of these nations as:
The inter-American co-operative community rests on two pillars, the
juridical equality of states and nonintervention (sic) in internal and
external affairs. Nonintervention was won after bitter experiences and
protracted struggles. It

must

be preserved inviolate.

If

the

intervention of one state is bad, the intervention of all is worse. The
United Nations Charter does not sanction intervention for the
protection of human rights. Moreover, existing inter-American
agreements provide an adequate procedure, namely, consultation and
agreement on what to do, to deal with situations which menace
peace.825

The majority of Inter-American nations took this position, preferring nonintervention to the protection of human rights, based on the notion that
“collective multilateral action” would simply become a euphemism for
intervention led and controlled by the United States. At the time, the United
States was the dominant industrial and military force in the Americas with a
history of intervening in other nations’ affairs when it suited its interests.
The Inter-American nations were concerned that the United States would
pressure other nations to support its preferred interventions while
simultaneously rejecting any attempts of nations to challenge the United
States’ own human rights record.826
Duggan points out that the Inter-American nations formally rejected the idea
of multilateral intervention with Article 19 of the Charter of the OAS, but
does note that the nations did “approve a Declaration describing and
affirming

[human]

rights”.827

He

acknowledges

Ibid at 204.
Ibid at 205.
826 Ibid at 206.
827 Ibid at 209.
824
825
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that

the

American

Declaration indicates that the nations “intend to co-operate in measures for
the protection of the basic rights of man”,828 but provides not further
discussion on what the American Declaration means, its potential, or its
importance. His work provides a detailed discussion of the challenges
associated with melding human rights protection with the principle of nonintervention and emphasises the importance Latin American nations placed
on non-intervention.829 This conflict between human rights protection and
non-intervention would become a reoccurring challenge of the Inter-American
human rights regime.
The principle of non-intervention first clashed with the protection of human
rights in 1959 at the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American
Republics. Here, a main topic of interest was reconciling non-intervention
with growing Latin American demands for action to promote representative
democracy and human rights protection.830 The new Cuban government
(established by Castro’s revolution) and the new Venezuelan government
(having recently forced out the military dictator Pérez Jiménez) were both in
favour of a general OAS policy to expel dictatorial governments from OAS
membership and enforcing human rights by way of intervention.831 However,
the United States and the majority of Latin nations preferred nonintervention over substantive changes to the role of the OAS.832 Ultimately,
the parties settled on the Declaration of Santiago, Chile833 which
simultaneously reiterated the principle of non-intervention and began the
process to establish the modern Inter-American human rights regime.

828
829

Ibid.
Ibid at 203–206.

Connell-Smith & Royal Institute of International Affairs, supra note 812 at 242; United
States Department of State, “Foreign relations of the United States, 1958-1960. American
Republics” (1960), online: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUSidx?type=header&id=FRUS.FRUS195860v05> at 333.
831 State, supra note 830 at 330.
832 Connell-Smith & Royal Institute of International Affairs, supra note 812 at 424.
833 “Declaration of Santiago, Chile” (1961) 55:2 The American Journal of International Law
537.
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The Declaration was accompanied with the Final Report of the Fifth Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This report recommended the
preparation of a subsequent report “on the possibility of establishing
adequate procedures to ensure, without constituting intervention in the
internal or external affairs of states, strict observance of the principle of nonintervention”.834 As it reiterated the importance of the principle of nonintervention it also recommended the drafting of a Convention on Human
Rights and the creation of an Inter-American Court for the Protection of
Human Rights.835 It also established the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and it charged with “furthering respect for such rights”.836
The Final Report of the meeting in Santiago emphasized the principle of nonintervention while providing greater support for human rights. Its
recommendations

ultimately

resulted in

the

drafting

the

American

Convention; a document which by design seriously challenged the principle of
non-intervention. At the same time, the IA Commission independently took
action in the Dominican Republic where it unquestionably intervened in
domestic issues to protect human rights. This push and pull between
strengthening human rights and emphasizing non-intervention was an
integral part of the Inter-American regime.
It has been speculated that the creators of the IA Commission never intended
it to have the authority to comment on specific State actions.837 After the IA
Commission’s humanitarian operation in the Dominican Republic the OAS
formally expanded the IA Commission’s authority, but limited its ability to
publically renouncing the human rights violations of OAS member states.

Final Report of the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 12-18
August 1959, 1960, OEA/SerC/115 [Final Report 1960] Section VII.
835 Ibid Section VIII(I).
836 note 833 Section VIII(II).
837 Cabranes, supra note 503 at 894 The formal authority allowing the IA Commission to
interevene in specific human rights situations was given to the IA Commission after its selfdirected in situ review of human rights in the Dominican Republic.
834
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When the American Convention was initially opened for signature it was
clear that it would undermine the OAS principle of non-intervention. The
American Convention has garnered a significant level of success, but it has
not received adequate support from the OAS nations to overcome the preestablished strength of non-intervention.
Clearly, nations which ratify the American Convention and consent to the IA
Court implicitly reject a strict adherence to the principle of non-intervention.
The IA Court’s role is to judge the actions of the participating nations. In
turn, these nations have committed to complying with the IA Court’s
judgments irrespective of national political, economic, or cultural interests.
The IA Court’s purpose is to directly intervene with the internal affairs of
States; therefore it directly violates the OAS Carter and the principle of nonintervention.838
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the regional division between protecting human
rights and the principle of non-intervention meant that the American
Convention did not receive immediate support. The San Jose Conference,
where the American Convention was signed, was only attended by 19 of the
(at the time) 24 OAS member states and only twelve of the attending States
signed the Convention.839 The four largest and most influential OAS
members, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and the United States, were notable nonsignatories. It took nine years for the treaty to come into effect.840 Ultimately,
most OAS members ratified the American Convention and recognized the IA
The Inter-American Judicial Committee made this point clear in Comite Juridico
Interamericano, “Estudio Sobre la Relación Jurídica Entre el Respeto de los Derechos
Humanos y El Ejercicio de la Democracia” (1959) Recomendacions e Informes: documentos
oficiales:v. VI p220-245, online:
<http://www.oas.org/es/sla/cji/docs/Derechos_humanos_democracia_votos_razonados_oct1959.pdf> where it determined that human rights protection in the Americas could only be
established with the creation of a new, comprehensive convention.
839 Thomas Buergenthal, “American Convention on Human Rights: Illusions and Hopes, The”
(1971) 21 Buff L Rev 121 at 121.
840 When Granada became the necessary eleventh ratification as per American Convention,
supra note 543 Article 74(2) in 1978.
838
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Court841 and, as participation increased, it was accompanied with a general
OAS-wide shift away from non-intervention.
By the early 1990s, OAS governments had begun to place a higher priority on
maintaining democratic governments than its long-held principles of
“sovereignty” and “non-intervention”.842 This shift in priorities allowed the
OAS to begin intervening in national activities where democracy itself was
challenged by unfair elections or coups.843 The OAS’s Unit for Promotion of
Democracy (UDP)844 began to provide external elections monitoring in the
1990s and electoral monitoring became an important part of the OAS
mandate.845
Recently the OAS, in conjunction with the US and/or the UN, has intervened
numerous times in Latin America to ensure democratic governance846 and
there is a general acceptance that democracy is an “integral part of a legally
binding agreement between states in the Western Hemisphere, which [can]
be exogenously enforced without threatening the states’ sovereignty”.847
Unfortunately, when it comes to protecting human rights, there are still
indications that OAS member states have yet to fully support the IA
Commission and IA Court. States have implicitly promoted a return to nonintervention, especially when decisions of the adjudicating bodies conflict
with government policies.

Canada and the United States being two very big exceptions to Convention participation.
Betty Horwitz, The Transformation of the Organization of American States: A
Multilateral Framework for Regional Governance (Anthem Press, 2011) at 43.
843 Hugo de Zela Martinez, “Organization of American States and its Quest for Democracy in
the Americas, The” (2013) 8 Yale J Int’l Aff 23 at 28.
844 Which is now the Office for the Promotion of Democracy
845 Horwitz, supra note 842 at 52.
846 Ibid at 53–56.
847 Ibid at 55–56.
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From June 2011 to March 2013, the OAS underwent a process to reform the
IA Commission, calling the effort: “Strengthening the IACHR”.848 During the
public consultation process, observers cautioned that the proposed reforms
would weaken the IA Commission’s ability to protect human rights.849 During
the reform process, many member states proposed reforms that illustrate the
high value they still place on non-intervention, especially where nations feel
that human rights are being prioritized above important national interests.
Of particular interest among States were efforts to limit the IA Commission’s
ability to grant precautionary measures and review the human rights
performance of individual nations.850
First, with regard to the IA Commission’s ability to grant precautionary
measures, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico all extolled
the value of the IA Commission’s precautionary measures while they
simultaneously advocated for their restriction.851
Prior to the reform process, the IA Commission had a wide general authority
to grant precautionary measures “to prevent irreparable harm to persons or
to the subject matter of the proceedings”.852 The reform process altered the IA
Commission’s Rules of Procedure to restrict the application of precautionary

IACHR standing for the “Inter-American Commission on Human Rights”; for more
information on the reform process see
<http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/strengthening.asp>
849 Carey Biron, “Pan-American Rights Commission ‘Under Threat’ | Inter Press Service”,
online: <http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/11/pan-american-rights-commission-under-threat/>.
850 Stephen Vasciannie, “Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Reform and the
Question of Universality, The” (2014) 21 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 409 at 414–6.
848

Compilation of Presentations by Member States on the Topics of the Working Group:
Texts Sent to the Secretariat of the Working Group by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Domincian Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, United States, and Uruguay as of
November 4, 2011, Special Working Group to Reflect on the Workings of the IACHR with a
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view to Strengthening the IAHRS 7 November 2011, OEA/SerG/GT/SIDH-17/11 rev 1
[Compilation of Presentations by Member States on the Topics of the Working Group: Texts

Sent to the Secretariat of the Working Group by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Domincian Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, United States, and Uruguay as of November
4, 2011] at 10–17.
852 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, 13 November
2009 [Rules of Procedure (Amended in 2013)] Article 25(1).
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measures to issues which “shall concern serious and urgent situations
presenting a risk of irreparable harm to persons or to the subject matter of a
pending petition”.853 The reforms go on to define the terms “serious
situation”, “urgent situation”, and “irreparable harm”.854
While the IA Commission’s precautionary measures have never been legally
binding, nations have routinely taken them seriously. One example of this is
the Brazilian government’s reaction to the precautionary measure requested
in relation to the Belo Monte dam. In April, 2011 the IA Commission used a
precautionary measure to request Brazil stop construction of the Belo Monte
dam until the project met certain conditions to protect the life and physical
integrity of the people of the Xingu River Basin.855 In May, 2011 the
Brazilian President ordered an immediate cessation of all relations with the
OAS and suspended, or threatened to suspend, its annual $800,000US
contribution to the IA Commission.856 The precautionary measure was reevaluated based on further information provided by the State,857 and the
measure was altered to allow building to continue and request that the

Rules of Procedure, supra note 551 Article 25(1).
Ibid Article 25(2).
855 Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River Basin, Pará, Brazil, PM 382/10, Annual
853
854

Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Ch 3, Para 32 (2011) .
856 See “Dilma retalia OEA por Belo Monte e suspende recursos”, Folha de SPaulo (30 April
2011), online: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/mercado/me3004201117.htm>; “Brazil
furious with Human Rights Commission decision cuts all relations”, online: MercoPress
<http://en.mercopress.com/2011/04/30/brazil-furious-with-human-rights-commission-decisioncuts-all-relations>; “Brazil hits back in anger over giant dam protest”, online: UPI
<http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2011/05/02/Brazil-hits-back-inanger-over-giant-dam-protest/88101304372349/>; Mari Hayman, “Brazil Breaks Relations
With Human Rights Commission Over Belo Monte Dam | Latin America News Dispatch”,
online: <http://latindispatch.com/2011/05/03/brazil-breaks-relations-with-human-rightscommission-over-belo-monte-dam/> see
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/me3004201117.htm for original article.
857 The Brazilian government provided the Commission with a classified 52-page document
supporting the creation of the damn in response to the initial precautionary measure CITE
and the Secretary-General of the OAS publically advocated for the Commission to review the
initial precautionary measure: “Comissão da OEA deve ‘revisar decisão’ sobre Belo Monte,
diz secretário-geral - Política”, online: Estadão
<http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,comissao-da-oea-deve-revisar-decisao-sobrebelo-monte-diz-secretario-geral,714786>.
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Brazilian government undertake actions to protect the Xingu Basin
communities.858 In response to the first precautionary measure, Brazilian
officials called the precautionary measure “precipitous and unwarranted” and
complained that it “threatened Brazilian sovereignty”.859
The Brazilian authorities did not cite the Belo Monte precautionary measures
in their reform communications, but their reaction to the precautionary
measure, and the effort made to limit the IA Commission’s authority to grant
precautionary measures, are clearly reminiscent of the principle of nonintervention. During the reform process States did not reference or advocate
for “non-intervention”, but efforts to limit the authority of the IA Commission
were obvious.860
Ultimately, it is unsurprising that nations whose interests conflict with their
international human rights obligations might take steps to reduce, or
eliminate, those international obligations. In retrospect it is somewhat
surprising that the Inter-American human rights regime has become so
robust having been founded on the principle of non-intervention. In contrast,
European diplomacy prior to and during the creation of the ECHR was not
hindered by adherence to the principle of non-intervention: European human
rights were established specifically in order to facilitate international
intervention.
The European political atmosphere prior to the creation of the ECHR was
starkly different from what it was present in the Americas. Western Europe
did not have a hegemon comparable to the United States in the Americas and
therefore there was no effort among nations to protect their national

Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River Basin, Pará, Brazil, supra note 855.
Hayman, supra note 856.
860 It should be noted that the ultimate impacts of the reforms are still unclear Vasciannie,
supra note 850 at 416 provides one of the few articles on the reforms and emphasizes the
need to wait to see how the reforms actually alter the IA Commission’s actions.
858
859
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independence from a single overly influential member.861 The ECHR was
initially drafted as a means to halt the spread of Soviet influence,
communism, and a potential rise of fascism,862 but this is very different from
the situation in the Americas. In Europe, there was an effort to establish a
human rights regime to protect democracy from external threats, but there
was no perceived need to protect ECHR members from one another. Unlike
the American Declaration, the ECHR was created with an explicit
mechanism to intervene in the interests of national governments.863
While not all European nations immediately adopted the ECHR, the general
progression of the ECHR in Europe has been one where human rights have
been generally strengthened and participation has gradually increased. The
Council of Europe was initially signed by only ten nations,864 but within a
year there were four more signatories865 and all fourteen CoE member states
then signed the ECHR when it opened for signature.866 France and the UK
were notably slow to allow individuals to petition the European Court, but
the general trend in Europe has been toward an increased commitment to
human rights and international intervention.
France did not ratify the ECHR until 1974 and did not allow individuals to
petition the European Court until 1981. The United Kingdom ratified the
ECHR in 1951, but did not consent to individual petitions of the court until
1967. In both instances, the delay in recognizing the European Court was
related directly to (a) the nations’ reluctance to relinquish their ultimate
WW1 and WW2 can be seen as Axis Powers, or maybe just Germany, attempting to exert
influence over the other nations in the region, but Germany’s losses in both wars deny its
status as a hegemon since it was ultimately unable to exert its desired influence.
862 Madsen, supra note 811 at 140.
863 The ECHR was, from the outset, intended to be a legally binding document with a court to
review proposed violations. The Inter-American regime did not have a similar document to
the ECHR until the American Convention came into effect.
864 Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom
865 Germany, Greece, Iceland, and Turkey
866 Most of these nations signed the ECHR on November 4, 1950 with the exception of
Sweden and Greece which signed on the November 28, 1950.
861

218

authority over the interpretation of “civil rights” and (b) both nations had
colonies which arguably lacked the human rights protections afforded by the
ECHR.867 Eventually these issues were overcome and these nations, along
with 45 other European nations ratified the ECHR and accepted the
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.
The European human rights system has generally developed toward
increasing support of human rights and integration. Participation in the
ECHR has steadily increased and there have no major efforts to weaken its
effectiveness. In contrast, the Inter-American regime began with broad
regional participation, but as efforts to strengthen human rights progressed,
participation was reduced: the Universal Declaration had the highest
participation, but it progressively declined through the American Convention
and San Salvador Protocol.
The principle of non-intervention had a major impact on the initial design of
the Inter-American regime and while it is no longer emphasized as it once
was, it clearly maintains an influence in the modern regime. Ultimately, the
principle of non-intervention weakens the effectiveness of the Inter-American
regime. It implicitly provides an excuse for reduced participation and the
pursuit of reforms that undermine the effectiveness of the regime.
The impact of this principle has contributed to a clear disparity in strength of
the two regimes. Further contributing to this disparity is the treatment of the
earliest cases considered by each of the regimes’ primary adjudicating bodies.
Section 4.2 explains how the early decisions of these bodies have negatively
impacted early adoption of the regimes.

867

See Madsen, supra note 811 at 145–6.
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4.2 How early decisions of human rights tribunals influenced
participation and foreshadowed each regime’s adjudicatory style

There many of factors which influence a nation’s decision to initially join, and
ultimately support, a given human rights regime. National and regional
politics can certainly play a role, as can the influence of charismatic leaders,
and the design of the regime itself. While Section 4.1 focused on the impact of
regional politics, in particular the principle of non-intervention, this section
focuses on the effect of the regional adjudicating bodies on national
governance and the willingness of States to subject themselves to external
scrutiny.
The American Declaration, American Convention and the ECHR protect a
similar set of rights. There are slight variations in the language and notable
differences in the procedures for bringing a claim, but ultimately both
regimes generally set out to protect the same rights. That the regimes share
these rights in principle does not, however mean that the same rights are
going receive the same protection and interpretation in practice. How the
regimes’ tribunals interpret the meaning and application of each right has an
enormous effect on what it really means for a nation to participate in the
regimes.
During the early stages of both the ECHR and the Inter-American regimes,
member states and States considering membership would have been
watching the regimes’ adjudicating bodies closely to see what would
constitute a rights violation and how it impacted the State in question. In his
2007 analysis of the development of the European Court of Human Rights,
Madsen describes how one of Europe’s supreme adjudicating bodies began as
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a relatively modest court and in this way gained the support of regional
governments.868
Madsen cites two early European cases as building regional confidence in the
new European human rights regime. One is an inter-state complaint by
Greece that the UK government committed human rights violations in
Cyprus, which at the time was a British colony.869 The other is Lawless, an
Irish case pertaining to the detention without trial of a suspected member of
the Irish Republican Army (IRA).870 As two of the earliest disputes brought
before the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court
of Human Rights, their outcomes would provide the first indications of the
jurisprudential style of the European regime.
In Greece v the United Kingdom, the Greek authorities alleged that the
British administration authorities in Cyprus had violated numerous human
rights of the Cyprian people, including: inter alia, torture, arbitrary arrest,
and violation of privacy and private property.871 The application was resolved
through a friendly settlement and importantly the European Commission of
Human Rights determined that, in response to the friendly settlement, it
would refrain from expressing its legal opinion on the initial Greek claims.872
While today the decision to refrain from analysing the Greek claims seems
normal, Madsen points out that at the time it was a pivotal decision of the
European Commission of Human Rights. It illustrated the commission’s
willingness to defer to national diplomacy over human rights law.873
Following Cyprus, the European Commission of Human Rights and European
Court heard the Lawless case in which an Irish citizen, G.R. Lawless, argued
868
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of Human Rights).

Lawless v Ireland (No 3), No 332/57 (1 July 1961) (European Court of Human Rights).
Cyprus, supra note 869 at 6 paragraph (b).
872 Ibid at 219.
873 Madsen, supra note 811 at 150.
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that his arrest violated Article 5 of the ECHR (the right to liberty).874 Lawless
admitted to being a member of the IRA and had been arrested and detained
for five months without trial.875 In their analysis of the facts, both the
commission and court determined that Lawless’ detention had violated his
Article 5 right,876 but the European Court of Human Rights held that the
detention was justified under Article 15 which allows ECHR members to
derogate from the ECHR in case of a public emergency which threatens the
life of the nation.877
In both Cyprus and Lawless, the adjudicating bodies of the ECHR illustrated
their willingness to defer potential findings of human rights violations to the
interests of participant nations. In Cyprus, the European Commission on
Human Rights certainly could have given its opinion on the facts and
publically admonished the UK for violating a variety of rights of the Cyprian
people. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights could have
determined that being detained for five months without trial went beyond
reasonable measures to protect the life of the nation. Instead, these early
decisions were generally favourable to national interests.
While it is difficult to be sure of the impact of these early cases on ECHR
participation and acceptance, Madsen’s argument is persuasive. It seems
reasonable to believe that nations cautious of joining a new supra-national
regime would be more receptive of an adjudicating body that tended to
support national concerns, rather than appearing overly sympathetic to
applicant’s potential rights violations. In contrast, had the first European
human rights cases indicated that the court would establish a relatively low
threshold of what constituted a breach of the ECHR, it seems probable that it
would have had a chilling effect on membership. Madsen argues that the
Lawless, supra note 870 at THE LAW paras 8-9.
Ibid, s IV para 20.
876 Ibid at THE LAW paras 9 & 15.
877 Ibid at THE LAW paras 22 & 47.
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European human rights regime established itself early as “reliable,
respectable, and legally conservative” and this led to its high participation.878
In contrast, the Inter-American regime has established itself as having a
relatively progressive interpretation of rights, rather than as a conservative
institution. If Madsen’s interpretation of impact of early jurisprudence is
applied to the Inter-American regime, it can explain how the early cases of
the IA Commission may have inhibited participation and the adoption of the
American Convention. Many of the early cases brought before the IA
Commission illustrated a willingness to strictly enforce the region’s human
rights.
The first major action of the IA Commission was to unilaterally strengthen
Inter-American human rights. Prior to the IA Commission having the clear
authority to conduct in situ investigations of national human rights, the IA
Commission undertook such investigations.879 In its first five years of
existence, the IA Commission reported on the human rights situations in
Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. These early reports were based
solely on information provided by individual complaints. The States did not
contribute to the investigation of rights violations, but rather provided formal
responses to the IA Commissions findings.880 Writing at the time, Scheman
notes that the IA Commission made it clear that it could only weigh the
information made available to it and that it made “the unmistakable
inference that, should governments choose to supply more complete

Madsen, supra note 811 at 151.
See Cabranes, supra note 503 at 895–6 initially the American Commission was designed
as a “study group”, but its mandate quickly grew to where it was “literally on the firing line
of human rights”.
880 Informe Sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos en la República de Cuba, 20 March
1962, OEA/SerL/V/II4 doc 2 [Report on Cuba 1962], ch 3; Report of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights on its Activities in the Dominican Republic, 28 October 1966,
OEA/SerL/V/II15 doc 6 Rev [Report on the Dominican Republic 1966], ch 3.
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information, the report can serve equally as their forum”.881 Ultimately, these
early reports did not serve as a forum for States; instead they illustrated
serious human rights violations.
In 1965 the IA Commission was granted authority to hear and comment on
individual petitions, while it took years before any of these cases were heard
on their merits, the ultimate outcome of many of these early cases were
serious indictments of national human rights records. In 1973 the first cases
were decided on their merits. These cases are similar in terms of their
procedures, outcomes, the types of rights violated.
Relatively soon after the creation of the IA Commission, the governments of
many Inter-American member states shifted from being open democracies to
dictatorships.882 These dictatorships drove much of the early work of the IA
Commission as it considered petitioners claims that their rights had been
violated.883 The work of the IA Commission at this time was complicated by
the failure of the States in these early cases to provide the IA Commission
with requested information necessary for the IA Commission to analyze the
cases.
The failure of respondent nations to participate with these early IA
Commission cases highlights a number of troubling issues. Overall, it
illustrates an unwillingness of nations to participate in the Inter-American
human rights regime and to potentially be held accountable for violating the
American Declaration. There is also a tacit implication of a rights violation
when the States refuse to participate in the IA Commission’s review. It also

L Ronald Scheman, “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights” (1965) 59:2 The
American Journal of International Law 335 at 341.
882 Such as military dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay; as well as
hereditary dictatorships in Haiti; Communist dictatorships in Cuba; a dictatorship in
Paraguay, and successive military coups in Bolivia and Guatemala.
883 David Padilla, “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of
American States: A Case Study” (1993) 9:1 American University International Law Review,
online: <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol9/iss1/5> at 97.
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implies that the respondent nations might be willing to violate the same
rights again. The non-binding nature of the American Declaration and the
lack of binding authority of the American Commission allowed participant
nations to choose their level of participation because there are no explicit
ramifications for non-participation or violating human rights.
The inability of the IA Commission to effectively enforce the American
Declaration placed decision makers in the IA Commission in a difficult
position. They could strictly interpret the American Declaration on the basis
that all human rights violations should be recognized, even if an effective
resolution was unlikely. Or, the Commission could take a softer approach to
human rights violations in the hopes that narrow interpretations of rights,
interpretations which favoured national interests, would increase overall
participation with the regime. This latter approach is arguably the one taken
by the early decisions of European Court, but unfortunately it is likely that
the content of the cases heard by the IA Commission prohibited it from also
taking a soft approach to the rights violators.
A notable difference ECHR and Inter-American regimes, which is external to
the design and operation of the regimes themselves, is the type of human
rights which have been violated in the two regimes. While it would be
difficult to empirically rank the seriousness or severity of human rights
violations, it is also difficult to dispute that the forced disappearances, longterm detention of political dissidents, and extrajudicial killings, which
occurred in the early years of the Inter-American regime, are of a more
serious nature to the types of rights violated in the early ECHR cases. Even
the political handling of some of the pivotal early cases illustrate a difference
in the function of the two regimes: in the ECHR, the UK government acted to
resolve the Greek government’s claim by way of a friendly settlement; in
contrast, in the first five Inter-American cases the respondent nations failed
to fully participate in the IA Commission’s review.
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Due to the severity of the rights violated by nations in the Inter-American
regime, the IA Commission had a limited ability to take a soft approach to
potential violations. In Lawless, the applicant was a self-admitted member of
the IRA; a group which specifically intended to carry out acts of violence in
order to end British sovereignty in Northern Ireland.884 Prior to the detention
which served the basis for his ECHR case, Lawless was arrested on two
occasions for possession of firearms and possession of documents that
outlined guerrilla warfare.885 Ultimately, Lawless was detained without trial
from 13 July to 11 December 1957;886 the European Court determined that
his detention was a violation of his human rights, but that it was justified as
an emergency measure.887 In contrast, the five cases heard by the IA
Commission in 1973 were based upon (i) a union leader who was allegedly
tortured and murdered by the Brazilian government;888 (ii) the mistreatment
of Cuban political prisoners including torture and death;889 (iii) the arbitrary
arrest, disappearance, and possible death of a Haitian citizen;890 (iv) the
killing of a Nicaraguan family by the National Guard;891 and (v) the arbitrary
arrest and detention without trial (with some detentions lasting over a
decade) of Paraguayan citizens.892
Based on the facts presented in these early reports of the European Court of
Human Rights and Inter-American Commission there is simply no way to
Lawless, supra note 870 at FACTS paras 4-6.
Ibid at FACTS para 19.
886 Ibid at LAW para 1.
887 Ibid at THE LAW para 30.
888 Brazil Case 1683, [1974] OEA/SerL/V/II32, doc3 rev2 (Inter-American Commission on
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890 Haiti Case 1761, [1973] OEA/SerL/V/II30, doc9 rev1 (Inter-American Commission on
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891 Nicaragua Case 1688, [1972] OEA/SerL/V/II28, doc20 rev1 (Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights).
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compare the gravity of the cases in each regime. There is no way to massage
the facts of the Inter-American cases in order to reach a decision that could
support the respondent nations - at least no way to do so while providing any
substantive support for the principles of the American Declaration. While the
European Court of Human Rights was able to gain the support of the
European nations by using a “soft touch” in its interpretation of the ECHR,
the IA Commission had no ability to do the same.
Again, it is difficult to know the impact these early cases had on the ultimate
participation and reception of these two human rights regimes. However, it
does not seem unreasonable to speculate that some of the OAS nations which
are reluctant to commit to the American Convention are reluctant because
they do not want to be subject to the IA Court. That said, parties to the
American Convention have illustrated that an initial commitment to the
American Convention and the IA Court does not always mean an everlasting
commitment. Adding to the differences between these two regimes is the
divergence in commitment of the parties to the regimes and the differing
levels of compliance to the decisions of the regimes’ adjudicating bodies.

4.3 Participation and compliance

When the American Convention was opened for signature, it was not
immediately embraced by all OAS members. At the time, it was speculated
that this lack of participation was be attributed to its being too broad and
burdensome and that OAS nations where simply unprepared to commit to
protecting so many rights at one time.893 None of the “big four” American
nations were early adopters of the Convention: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and
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the United States894 and those nations maintain an apparent unease with the
regime as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico all recently advocated for the
reforming and restricting the IA Commission;895 the United States has yet to
ratify the American Convention. Furthermore, Brazil, along with three other
States, have denounced or threatened to denounce the American Convention
so clearly there are still those who believe that commitment to the InterAmerican regime may be too broad and burdensome.
Recently there has been an increase in nations considering denouncing some
aspect of their Inter-American human rights commitments. As mentioned in
the Section 4.1, Brazil notably threatened to remove itself from the OAS after
the IA Commission’s precautionary measure regarding the Belo Monte dam
project.896 Similarly, in 1999 Peru stated its intention to withdraw from the
IA Court, while remaining a party to the American Convention.897 At the
time, Peru planned to withdraw from the court to avoid several contentious
cases,898 but the IA Court determined that the American Convention does not
permit States to withdraw their recognition of the IA Court.899 Peru chose to
remain a party to the American Convention and the eventual outcome of the
case in question was that the Peruvian government violated various rights of
the petitioners.900 Unfortunately, unable to withdraw from the IA Court and
unwilling to withdraw from the American Convention, the government of
Peru simply chose to ignore the IA Court’s decisions.901
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In contrast to Brazil and Peru, two nations, Trinidad and Tobago902 and
Venezuela,903 went beyond discussing potentially denouncing the American
Convention and actually did so in 1998 and 2012, respectively.904 First,
Trinidad and Tobago renounced its ratification of the American Convention
based on the government’s desire to apply the death penalty to a number of
convicted murderers.905 Some of these individuals were in the process of
bringing claims of human rights abuses to the IA Court, but the Government
of Trinidad and Tobago requested that the IA Commission expedite its
procedures to conform to the government’s timelines. The IA Commission was
unable to meet the timeline set by the government and the State concluded it
was “unable to allow the inability of the Commission… to frustrate the
implementation of the lawful penalty… in Trinidad and Tobago”.906 Trinidad
and Tobago went on to execute at least three individuals who had ongoing
cases before the IA Commission.907
Venezuela’s

denunciation

of

the

American

Convention

followed

an

unfavourable decision from the IA Court which held that State authorities
violated a prisoner’s right to personal integrity and for subjecting the
applicant to inhuman and degrading treatment.908 The prisoner, Mr. DíazParties to the American Convention, supra note 545 Trinidad and Tobago Denunciation.
Letter to His Excellency Mr. José Miguel Insulza, Secretary General of the OAS,
Washington D.C., Minister of Popular Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivian Republic of
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Venezuela, 6 September 2012, Caracas available at
<http://www.oas.org/DIL/Nota_Rep%C3%BAblica_Bolivariana_Venezuela_to_SGEnglish.pdf
> [Venezuela’s letter of denunciation].
904 Strictly speaking the term “denunciation” only means a public condemnation and differs
from “renunciation” and “withdrawal”; however, the OAS uses the term “denunciation” to
signify an effective withdrawal from the American Convention.
905 Natasha Parassram Concepcion, “Legal Implications of Trinidad & Tobago’s Withdrawal
from the American Convention on Human Rights, The” (2000) 16 Am U Int’l L Rev 847 at
849.
906 Parties to the American Convention, supra note 545 Trinidad and Tobago Denunciation.
907 Concepcion, supra note 905 at 849; Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 13 April 1999,
OEA/SerL/V/II106 Doc 6 rev [Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights], ch III(D) para 90.
908 Díaz-Peña v Venezuela, Judgement of June 26, 2012, Inter-Am Ct HR, (Ser C) No 244
(2012) , para 57.
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Peña, was convicted by the Venezuelan court for participating in the bombing
of the Consulate General of the Republic of Colombia and the Office of
International Trade of the Kingdom of Spain.909 Prior to his trial, Díaz-Peña
was held by the Venezuelan authorities for over two years during which time
he was held in conditions the IA Court characterized as “extremely deficient”
and lacked access to natural light, ventilation, and sanitary installations.910
Furthermore, during his detention it was shown that Mr. Díaz-Peña “suffered
a serious progressive deterioration in his health and that medical assistance
services were not provided opportunely, adequately, and completely”.911
The Venezuelan government did not react well to the IA Court’s decision. The
government saw Díaz-Peña as the author of serious terrorist attacks and
then President Hugo Chavez accused the IA Court of “supporting terrorism”
by deciding in favour of Díaz-Peña.912 The State cited numerous reasons for
withdrawing from the American Convention, including: unfavourable IA
Court decisions;913 a perception that it had been unfairly singled out by the
IA Commission; and a belief that the IA Commission “manipulated
international law to hold violators of [Venezuelan] laws blameless and turn
them into sham victims of unfounded violations of their human rights”.914
The withdrawal of Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago from the American
Convention along with threatened withdrawals of Peru and Brazil illustrate
the uneasy relationship between the Inter-American human rights regime
Ibid, paras 56 & 87.
Ibid, para 140.
911 Ibid.
909
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the American Convention in such a way as to not be bound by it, see: Emercio Jose Aponte
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on Human Rights, The” (2014) 8 Vienna J on Int’l Const L 3 However, neither the OAS nor
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and its members. As with the first cases heard by the IA Commission, the
human rights violations that precipitated these nations’ reactions would have
been difficult for the IA Court to ignore. Trinidad and Tobago arguably
wanted to execute prisoners without giving them due process. Peru violated
the applicants’ rights to a fair trial and judicial protection: the applicants,
three of Peru’s Constitutional Court justices, were impeached because they
determined that the Peru’s Constitution prevented the President for running
for re-election.915 Venezuela withdrew citing numerous cases in which they
were found to have violated individuals’ rights to, inter alia, inhuman and
degrading treatment;916 freedom of speech;917 the right to a fair trial and the
deprivation of personal liberty.918 In these cases, the rights violations were
not trivial and the IA Court had little ability to ignore these violations in
hopes of appeasing these nations in order to maintain their commitment to
the American Convention.
The actions of these Inter-American nations illustrate two important
distinctions between these two human rights regimes: one is the severity of
the rights violations that can occur in the Americas; the other is the relative
ease with which a nation can exit the American Convention. Recently the
United Kingdom indicated an intention to exit the European human rights
regime, but the consequences of this will be decidedly different from the
consequences experienced by Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.
In 2013 then British Prime Minister, David Cameron, said that Britain may
have to pull out of the European Convention on Human Rights in order to
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extradite foreign criminals.919 At the time, the government considered a
temporary withdrawal from the ECHR to permit the deportation of Abu
Qatada.920 Abu Qatada had been convicted in absentia in Jordan for
conspiracy to cause explosions and the British government wanted to deport
Abu Qatada to Jordan for these crimes.921 However, the European Court of
Human Rights ruled that, because Abu Qatada had a pending retrial in
Jordan, which would be based on evidence obtained by torture, the UK would
violate Article 6 of the ECHR by knowingly sending the applicant to have an
unfair trial.922
Abu Qatada was ultimately deported after Jordan and the UK signed a treaty
agreeing the evidence obtained from torture would not be used against
him.923 However the political damage had already been done and
withdrawing from the ECHR has been an explicit component of the
government’s platform.924 The government’s 2015 manifesto said that the UK
must “curtail the role of the European Court of Human Rights, so foreign
criminals can be more easily deported from Britain”.925 A key interest is to

James Kirkup, “Britain may need to withdraw from European Convention on Human
Rights, says Cameron”, (29 September 2013), online:
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920 Hannah Kuchler, Jane Croft & Kiran Stacey, “UK weighs leaving human rights treaty”,
Financial Times (24 April 2013), online: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/73e4ac7e-acd7-11e2b27f-00144feabdc0.html>.
921 Press Association, “Abu Qatada deported from UK”, online: the Guardian
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/07/abu-qatada-deported-from-uk>“The
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charges for “insufficient evidence”, see: “Abu Qatada cleared of terror charges”, online: BBC
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make the British Supreme Court “the ultimate arbiter of human rights
matters in the UK”.926
The UK government has proposed plans to pass a British Bill of Rights which
would simultaneously “remain faithful to the basic principles of human
rights”, as established by the ECHR,927 while at the same time “break the
formal link between the British courts and the European Court of Human
Rights”.928 The ECHR can be denounced by member states,929 but, no nation
has done so and the exact impact of denunciation is unclear. This lack of
clarity comes from the ECHR, unlike the American Convention, being tied to
a number of other European organizations.
First, membership in the CoE is clearly dependent on a commitment to the
ECHR so it would appear that withdrawing from the ECHR would also mean
withdrawal from the Council of Europe.930 While EU membership is not
formally contingent on membership in the CoE, EU membership is closely
related to membership in the CoE and commitment to the ECHR. EU
membership explicitly requires countries to have “achieved stability of
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for and protection of minorities”.931 Being party to the ECHR helps to
indicate this commitment to respect to human rights. In 2007 the European
Commission (the EU body) stated:
In the negotiations for the accession of new Union members, respect
for the [ECHR] and the case‑law of the European Court of Human
Rights is treated as part of the Union acquis.

Ibid at 60.
Ibid at 73.
928 Ibid at 60.
929 ECHR, supra note 140 Article 58.
930 PA Res 1031, supra note 157, para 9.
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Any Member State deciding to withdraw from the Convention and
therefore no longer bound to comply with it or to respect its
enforcement procedures could, in certain circumstances, raise concern
as regards the effective protection of fundamental rights by its
authorities…932

It is unclear how the UK could simultaneously withdraw from the ECHR,
deport individuals such as Abu Qatada to face unfair trials and/or torture,
and maintain the respect for the ECHR and the European Court’s case law
expected by the European Commission. To this point, a senior UK judge
noted that deporting suspects to nations that carry out torture would violate
both the ECHR and the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.933 EU
membership is not explicitly contingent on being a member state to the
ECHR, but if the UK was to withdraw from the ECHR its human rights
record may come under scrutiny from the European Commission.934 Initially,
UK suggestions to withdraw from the ECHR might have been a political
move to appear tough against terrorism. In April 2016 the Cameron
government stated that it was not in favour of withdrawal from the ECHR,
but at the same time, Theresa May – the UK’s current Prime Minister – was
a strong advocate for withdrawal.935 The UK’s future participation in either
the EU or ECHR is very uncertain, but in either case withdrawal is sure to be
complicated and disruptive to the UK and Europe.

Parliamentary questions, 26 January 2007, OJ C 293, 05/12/2007 [European Commission
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The UK helped to build the CoE and draft the ECHR, as a historically
influential European power and one of the dominant European economies; it
would be strange for the UK to withdraw from the ECHR. It appears to be in
the UK’s best interest to maintain its participation in the ECHR, CoE and
EU. In contrast, the America’s largest and third-largest economies (the
United States and Canada, respectively) appear to have no major drive
toward ratifying the American Convention.
The United States has signed the American Convention,936 Canada has not,
and neither nation has come close to ratifying it. It is not precisely clear why
these nations have resisted ratification; the United States being in a
particularly peculiar position as it took a lead role in drafting the document
in such a way as to facilitate US ratification.937 Unfortunately, while both
nations are outwardly supportive of the American Convention and the IA
Court, neither appears willing to be held accountable to either.
US ratification of the American Convention has not been a recent topic of
interest, but work in the 1990s points to why ratification remains unlikely.
Ratification of any treaty requires approval of two-thirds of the US Senate
and the Senate has a history of being reluctant to act in any way which
reduces national sovereignty.938 The United States has ratified very few
human rights treaties,939 but these sparce ratifications have

been

accompanied with reservations that limit the treaties’ application. US
reservations generally fall into two categories: (i) adherence to a human
rights treaty should not alter existing US law or practice and (ii) the US will
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not submit to the jurisdiction of international courts to decide disputes
arising from the application of a human rights treaty.940 In practices, these
two principles limit the US from committing to the American Convention in
any real capacity. The IA Commission has already found the US in violation
of various rights under the American Declaration and the nation has been
reluctant to alter its laws and practices.941 Also, ratifying the American
Convention without recognizing the authority of the court dramatically
undermines the impact of ratification. Although the US government has not
explicitly stated that the principle of non-intervention underlies its resistance
to ratify the American Convention, national practice certainly implies that
non-intervention, or a desire to maintain national sovereignty, is an
important component of US policy and limits its willingness to ratify.
In 2003 Canada’s Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights published
its report on Canada’s potential ratification and adherence to the American
Convention on Human Rights.942 The primary recommendations of the report
were that “Canada take all necessary action to ratify the American
Convention” and that upon ratification “Canada recognize the jurisdiction of
the IACrHR on all matters relating to the interpretation or application of the
Convention”.943 Unfortunately, the report’s justification for why Canada
should ratify the American Convention does not persuasively establish
advantages for Canada beyond human rights interests. It notes that
ratification would strengthen the human rights regime, increase human
rights protections for Canadians, improve women’s rights regionally,
Louis Henkin, “U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator
Bricker” (1995) 89:2 The American Journal of International Law 341 at 341.
941 The United States was found in full compliance in only 1 of 22 Commission
Recommendations made in the last eleven years. See Annual Report 2015, Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, available at
<http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2015/TOC.asp> [Annual Report 2015], ch 2(D) page
120.
942 Public Works and Government Services Canada Government of Canada, “Enhancing
Canada’s role in the OAS : : YC32-0/372-4E-PDF - Government of Canada Publications”, (1
July 2002), online: <http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/397899/publication.html>.
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stimulate United States participation, and clarify Canada’s human rights
commitments.944 While these are certainly noble reasons for ratification, they
are also indicative of how little value there is in ratification: nations have no
non-human rights incentive to participate in the American Convention.
In contrast, European nations generally place a high value on participation in
the ECHR, CoE and the EU. By joining the EU nations integrate into one of
the world’s largest economies gaining equal access to the EU Common
Market.. It also provides freedom of movement, strengthened rights, and
political stability. It is by no means perfect, but Scotland945 and Greece946
recently made serious efforts to maintain their membership in the EU and
seven other States are currently working to gain EU membership.947 It seems
that most countries would prefer to be in the EU rather than out and this
generally binds them to participate in the ECHR. For those nations which are
not interested in EU membership, there are other benefits associated with
being party to the ECHR.
The Council of Europe does not establish an economic zone and although it
has implemented some regional treaties which are not human rights based,
its primary role is as a human rights organization.948 While it can be difficult
to pinpoint exactly why States reduce their own sovereignty in order to join
the ECHR, the massive influx of CoE membership after the fall of the Soviet
Union provides some indications of the perceived benefits of membership.
Ibid, ch IV (D).
In 2014 Scotland held a referendum on independence from the UK. A major issue of the
debate was whether or not it would be able regain/retain its membership in the EU. See
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, “How Easily Could an Independent Scotland Join the EU?” (2014)
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 46/2014.
946 Greece has undergone multiple restructurings and bailouts in order to retain its
membership in the EU and the Eurozone. See Helena Smith, “Grexit back on the agenda
again as Greek economy unravels”, (6 March 2016), online: the Guardian
<http://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/mar/06/grexit-back-on-the-agenda-economyunravels-reforms>.
947 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo,
Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey.
948 See Section 6.6.1 of this work
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From 1990 to 2002 around twenty formerly Soviet Bloc nations joined the
CoE.949 At the time, many of these new democracies had challenging human
rights records, but the CoE believed that States could transition into strong,
human rights respecting, democracies more quickly if they were included in
the CoE rather than isolated.950 For these new members, participation in the
CoE and ECHR illustrated their shared values and legitimizing their new
democratic regimes. It also served to further their ambitions to join other
regional groups such as NATO and the EU.951 Russia also became a member
of the CoE at this time, but as it was unlikely to join either NATO or the EU,
the benefits of CoE membership included stronger trade ties to Europe, an
institutional connection to its former Soviet Bloc partners, and acceptance as
a new democracy.952 CoE membership also facilitated closer ties with the EU
since the European Commission works jointly on numerous programs.953
In contrast, participation in the OAS does not offer similar benefits to its
members. There are a few regional trade organizations in the Americas which
have similarities to the EU in design,954 but there is no single market as
there is in Europe and none of the regional organizations are as
comprehensive as the EU. Importantly for these purposes, there is no
regional economic organization in the Americas whose participation is

This number varies based on how you count nations. Czechoslovakia joined the Council of
Europe in 1991, but it dissolved in 1992 and both the Czech Republic and Slovakia joined the
Council of Europe in 1993. Similarly, the nation of Serbia and Montenegro joined in 2003,
but with Montenegro’s independence in 2006, Serbia remained a member of the CoE and
Montenegro officially joined in 2007.
950 R Harmsen, “The European Convention on Human Rights after Enlargement” (2001) 5:4
The International Journal of Human Rights 18 at 21–22.
951 Pamela A Jordan, “Russia’s Accession to the Council of Europe and Compliance with
European Human Rights Norms” (2003) 11:2 Demokratizatsiya 281 at 281.
952 Ibid at 285.
953 See Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Europe and the European
Union, 2007, available at <http://www.coe.int/t/der/docs/MoU_EN.pdf> [Memorandum of
Understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union].
954 LAIA, CARICOM, NAFTA and Mercosur are notable
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contingent upon, or even associated with, OAS membership or participation
in the Inter-American human rights regime.955
Similarly, it cannot be said that nations participate in the OAS in order to
illustrate their “Americanness” or validate themselves as a democracy.956
Even if OAS participation were highly valued by nations, OAS participation
itself would not establish significant human rights protection: CoE
participation requires commitment to the ECHR and its binding court; OAS
membership is not contingent upon commitment either the American
Declaration or American Convention.957
The OAS and the CoE do not have the same socio-political role in their two
regions and therefore are fundamentally incapable of playing the same role
as enforcer of regional human rights. On this basis, it is unsurprising that
the ECHR is generally seen as having a higher rate of compliance than the IA
Court.958 Compliance with human rights regimes is ideologically linked with
participation and, based on the preceding analysis, parties have more to gain
from participation in the CoE than the OAS. On this basis, one would expect
that a reduced pressure to participate in the Inter-American human rights
regime would correspond to a lower level of compliance with the decisions of
the IA Court and IA Commission. Unfortunately, as analysis moves beyond

955 Furthermore, none of the economic organizations in the Americas offer human rights
protection.
956 Although this was an early purpose of the OAS, see Connell–Smith, supra note 811 at
454, there is little to indicate that it plays a role today.
957 Bogota Charter, supra note 526, ch III.
958 See Darren Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, “Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European
and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights” (2010) 6 J Int’l L & Int’l Rel 35; Courtney
Hillebrecht, “Rethinking Compliance: The Challenges and Prospects of Measuring
Compliance with International Human Rights Tribunals” (2009) 1:3 J Human Rights
Practice 362; Basch et al, supra note 577; Cecilia M Bailliet, “Measuring Compliance with
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Ongoing Challenge of Judicial
Independence in Latin America” (2013) 31:4 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 477; Alexandra
Huneeus, “Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to
Enforce Human Rights” (2011) 44 Cornell Int’l LJ 493.
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theory to practice, it becomes clear that actually comparing the compliance
rates of the Inter-American and ECHR regimes is notoriously difficult.

4.3.1 Comparing compliance

Independently determining and analyzing the true compliance rates to the
European Court of Human Rights and the IA Commission and IA Court is a
task well beyond the scope of this work and numerous authors have already
engaged in this research and illustrated its challenges. Comparing
compliance is challenging because: (i) the regimes are very different; (ii) the
datasets are huge; and (iii) the concept of “compliance” is itself difficult to
define. For these reasons authors working in this field have consistently been
forced to limit their analysis in ways which makes accurately comparing the
regimes difficult.
When determining the compliance rates of these two regimes, analysts first
have to contend with the problem of defining compliance itself. Judgments of
the IA Court tend to provide States with a clear list of actions which they are
to undertake in order to comply with the court’s decision. Unfortunately,
many of these mandated actions are not given strict or obvious time frames
so questions naturally arise as to how to categorize compliance if a State acts
extremely slowly or, in cases where timeframes are given, acts reasonably
quickly, but outside the mandated timeframe.
Another issue is quantifying partial compliance when a State implements a
subset of the obligations placed upon it by the IA Court. If a State completes
seven out of eight obligations, how does this compare to a State which only
completes one out of ten? Both States are neither in full compliance nor
complete non-compliance, but they are also not at comparable levels of partial
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compliance. Measuring partial compliance becomes even more complicated in
Europe since judgments of the European Court of Human Rights do not
contain a finite list of actions to be conducted by the States. In Europe,
decisions are capable of ordering a specific monetary payment to the
applicant, but it is the State which ultimately chooses the means by which it
complies with the ECHR.959
The CoE’s Committee of Ministers is tasked with supervising the execution of
European Court of Human Rights judgments,960 including satisfaction
payments and implementing measures to prevent repeat violations. On one
hand, satisfaction payments are relatively easy to track, but as the caseload
of the court grows, the ability of the Committee of Ministers to track
measures to prevent repeat violations becomes increasingly difficult.961
Two of the more detailed analyses of compliance with these regimes do
conclude that the compliance in Europe is generally higher than to the IA
Court, but these conclusions come with caveats. The work of Basch et al.
looks at the remedies ordered by both the IA Commission and IA Court that
arise from violations of the American Convention by States which have
explicitly recognized the authority of the court.962 Their analysis looks at
compliance of each individual order, rather than judgments as a whole and
determines that between June 2001 and June 2006, States fully complied
with orders 36% of the time, partially complied 14% of the time, and were in
complete non-compliance 50% of the time.963 However, the authors concede
that their determination of compliance was based the IA Commission’s
evaluations of compliance. These evaluations consider compliance with

Guerra and Others v Italy, supra note 306, para 74.
ECHR, supra note 140 Art 46.
961 Hawkins & Jacoby, supra note 958 at 53; Council of Europe Committee of Ministers,
Supervision of the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 2008, 2nd
959
960

annual report (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2009) at 7.
962 Basch et al, supra note 577 at 11.
963 Ibid at 18.
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respect all ordered measures in a judgment and not each individual order.964
In some reports the IA Commission made explicit references to partial
compliance to specific orders, but in many cases the authors had to
independently

distinguish

compliance,

partial

compliance,

and

non-

compliance based on other sources of information.965
Hawkins and Jacoby provide a different analysis of compliance. These
authors specifically looked at partial compliance in both the European Court
of Human Rights and the IA Court and, looking at each judgment as a whole,
determined that only 6% of IA Court cases were resolved to full
compliance.966 The authors found that 83% of judgements were in partial
compliance, leaving 11% in non-compliance.967 The authors then compare this
to judgements of the European Court of Human Rights and, while they do
note that there are small areas of significant non-compliance and partial
compliance, they generally conclude that most European States fully comply
with judgements.968 While the authors find high compliance in Europe, they
limit their conclusions in two ways.
First, the authors note that the dramatic rise in European Court of Human
Rights caseload could expand the scope for partial compliance as it becomes
more difficult for the Committee of Ministers to monitor compliance.969
Second, since European Court judgements do not mandate States to take
specific actions beyond payment to victims, determining compliance can be
more subjective.970 States may comply with judgements to the satisfaction of

964
965

Ibid at 12.
Ibid.

Hawkins & Jacoby, supra note 958 at 37 & 4 based on 81 compliance reports dating to
June 23, 2010.
967 Ibid at 37.
968 Ibid at 38 & 66.
969 Ibid at 54–56.
970 Ibid at 84.
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the Committee of Ministers, but may not actually be in line with court
opinions.971
The data on compliance with either the Inter-American or ECHR regimes is
imperfect, but it is indicative of the ECHR having a higher rate of overall
compliance than its Inter-American counterpart. This higher rate of
compliance is in line with the idea that compliance is related to participation,
and that there is less pressure to participate in the Inter-American regime
than there is in the ECHR. Furthermore, building a human rights regime on
the principle of non-intervention limits the regime’s ability to enforce its own
decisions in situations where rights are violated.972

4.4 Transferring jurisprudential principles in practice

The cumulative effect of non-intervention, early case law, and contrasting
compliance rates creates a chasm between the Inter-American and European
human rights regimes that inhibits either regime from adopting the judicial
principles of the other. While the courts of both regimes have shown a
willingness to creatively interpret their human rights documents in order to
provide environmental protection, the two regimes function very differently
in practice. The European Court of Human Rights has been a relatively
conservative court and it enjoys a relatively high level of compliance. In
contrast the IA Commission and IA Court have traditionally been more
progressive and aggressive in the way they protect human rights and this has
arguably led to lower levels of participation and compliance.973

Ibid at 81–83.
See Basch et al, supra note 577.
973 See Leiry Cornejo Chavez & Andreas Føllesdal, “Fragile Democracies, Strong Human
Rights Courts? Comparing European and Inter-American Cases – Special Section
Introduction” (2013) 31:4 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 471.
971
972

243

Brazil, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela have all illustrated a
willingness to rebuke the Inter-American human rights regime if judgments
are not aligned with national interests. The Athabaskan Petition is certainly
an interesting case in terms of incorporating climate change into a human
rights claim, but Canada’s non-participant status to the American
Convention means that any recommendation by the IA Commission will be
non-binding. Furthermore, if the IA Commission does find in favour of the
Athabaskan people, the likelihood of Canada eventually acceding to the
American Convention seems even lower as Canada is unlikely to want to be
bound by a similar decision by the IA Court.
Attaining a high level of compliance is especially important for the InterAmerican regime because it tends to deal with particularly egregious rights
violations and because its decisions often issue “non-repetition” orders so as
to prevent future violations.974 Unfortunately, partial compliance is common
in the Inter-American regime975 and partial compliance is in many ways the
same as non-compliance: either rights are fully respected or they are not.976
Full compliance with IA Court decisions generally occurs “only in exceptional
cases, after a long period of time”.977 In contrast, while partial compliance
also occurs under the ECHR, most indications are that full compliance is the
norm.978
Then, based on the importance of compliance and the difference between the
rates of compliance in the two regimes, there is a strong argument for the
idea that increasing its rate of compliance should be a top priority for the
Inter-American regime. In their analyses of compliance rates, some authors
volunteered suggestions on how rates could be increased: some cited
Huneeus, supra note 958 at 506.
Hawkins & Jacoby, supra note 958 at 83.
976 Bailliet, supra note 958 at 479 Bailliet goes on to call non-compliance an additional
violation of the American Convention. .
977 Basch et al, supra note 577 at 28.
978 Hawkins & Jacoby, supra note 958 at 74.
974
975
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increased monitoring of compliance,979 others sought to focus on the
relationship between the national courts and those of the regime,980 and
others suggested that domestic actors have the strongest influence on
compliance and should therefore lead efforts.981 Ultimately, these authors all
concede that their proposals are not guaranteed to increase compliance982 and
really there are no mechanisms for improving compliance without
simultaneously weakening the IA Court.983
Determining how to increase compliance in the Inter-American regime, while
retaining strong human rights protection, is beyond the scope of this work.
There is a delicate balance to be struck between having strong adjudicating
bodies that vocally admonish human rights violators and a regime whose
decisions are respected and followed by the member states.
Three cases, Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa, and Xákmok, illustrate the challenge
faced by the IA Court in striking a balance and enforcing State compliance.
In each case the Paraguayan government was found to have violated the
petitioners’ rights of either property or life and mandated that the traditional
lands of the indigenous populations be returned to the petitioners.984 The IA
Court’s decisions in these cases pushed the boundaries of Inter-American
human rights law and the interpretation of the American Convention in

Basch et al, supra note 577 at 32.
Huneeus, supra note 958 at 520.
981 James L Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, “Reevaluating Regional Human Rights
Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court” (2008) 102:4
The American Journal of International Law 768 at 792; Hawkins & Jacoby, supra note 958
at 84.
982 Basch et al, supra note 577 at 30 the authors describe their recommendations as
“hypotheses associated with the possibility of increasing compliance”; Huneeus, supra note
958 at 518 “a policy of engaging national courts... will not result in full compliance any time
soon, if ever”; Cavallaro & Brewer, supra note 981 the authors consistently state that their
recommendations “may” increase compliance.
983 Huneeus, supra note 958 at 519 notes that compliance could be increased simply by
eliminating injunctive relief and providing only on compensation, but the author also notes
that the severity of many Inter-American rights violations are not suited to simple monetary
compensation such as a “deliberate and ongoing forced disappearance of a loved one”.
984 These cases are discussed in detail in Section 12.3 of this work.
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order to protect the rights of disenfranchised populations. Certainly the
applicants in each of these cases were deprived of their property, but as the
American Convention does not provide an explicit right to culture, the IA
Court could have simply mandated financial compensation. On one hand, the
decision to return the land in question to the applicants seems to be the
proper decision of the IA Court based on the way these populations were
wronged, but on the other, as of 2015 Paraguay was still not in compliance
with the IA Court’s decisions. The land in question has not been returned to
any of the applicants.985 The petitioners have also not been paid the financial
compensation ordered by the IA Court, but in general Inter-American
member states do comply with orders to pay financial compensation.986
The IA Court’s decisions in these cases support a strong interpretation of
human rights, but the utility of these decisions must be questioned when the
relevant governments do not act. The impacts of inaction are made sadly
obvious by the 2007 compliance review of Sawhoyamaxa in which the IA
Court noted that Paraguay’s non-compliance with the original judgment in
the case led to the death of four individuals, three of them children, and the
hospitalization of at least five children.987
There is a strong argument for striving to strengthen compliance with InterAmerican judgments; it should be one of the top priorities for the regime. To
that end, while it is unclear how exactly to increase compliance, it does seem
clear that new creative interpretations of human rights which expand human
Cases of the Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek Indigenous communities v
Paraguay Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Inter-American Court of
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Human Rights of June 24, 2015 (Only in Spanish) (Inter-American Court of Human Rights),
available at <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/yakie_24_06_15.pdf> at 35, 41–45
on the failure to provide funds to acquire lands in question for Sawhoyamaxa and Yakye Axa
communities.
986 Bailliet, supra note 958 at 488.

Cases of the Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek Indigenous communities v
Paraguay Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Inter-American Court of
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Human Rights of December 14, 2007 (Only in Spanish) (Inter-American Court of Human
Rights), available at
<http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/yakyeaxa_%2014_12_07.pdf>, para 11.
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rights protection are likely have a detrimental impact on efforts to increase
compliance. The Inter-American regime lacks the ties to external bodies such
as the EU or NATO which help to pressure nations into compliance in the
European regime. The persistent impact of the principle of non-intervention
and the value the regimes members place on sovereignty undermine its
ability to aggressively pursue progressive environmental rights. Where the
regime can make progress is in developing and clarifying its human rights
law. The following section explores two areas where Inter-American human
rights law could be clarified to improve environmental protection. Then, focus
shifts to Europe and its ability to progressively modify its human rights in
order to provide a broad and important right to protect the environment.

4.4.1 Opportunities to develop and clarify Inter-American human rights

The Inter-American regime is not in a strong position to make drastic
changes

to

its

interpretation

of

human

rights

to

provide

greater

environmental protection. Making major progressive changes would risk
further weakening participation and compliance; however, there are smaller
developments that the regime should make to clarify the law and improve
environmental protection. There are two areas of Inter-American human
rights law that can easily be clarified by the IA Court to improve legal
certainty and allow individuals to confidently rely on the regime’s rights.
As discussed in Section 3.3.1 of this work, Saramaka established that States
have a duty to consult and obtain the free and informed consent for projects
that would have a major impact on the territory of indigenous people.988 The
IA Court failed to say what constituted a “major impact” or if consent is
required for projects which are not “large-scale”. In Saramaka the IA Court
988

Saramaka People v Suriname, supra note 139, para 134.
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acknowledged that the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples was supported by Suriname989 and provides that:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous
peoples concerned through their own representative institution in
order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of

any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources,
particularly in connection with the development, utilization or
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.990

The IA Court did not explain why it distinguished its decision from the
standard set in the UNDRIP, so that under the American Convention,
consultation and consent are necessary for “large-scale development” rather
than “any project”. The major focus of the decision in Saramaka was on the
how consultation and consent must be obtained rather than when it is
necessary.
The IA Court will need to clarify when consent and consultation are
necessary and ideally it will adopt the standard of the UNDRIP. A clear
standard protecting the territory of indigenous populations from all projects
that affect their lands would prevent States from continually testing the
unclear standard set in Saramaka. Without clarification, States may pursue
projects they determine to be smaller than “large-scale” believing that they
do not require consultation and consent. Unnecessary damage may be done to
the environment and indigenous populations while States test the boundaries
of the IA Court’s decision. Furthermore, the standard established in the
UNDRIP is not unreasonable.
The IA Court has already acknowledged that indigenous people deserve the
protection of a strong right to property:

989
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Ibid, para 131.
UNDRIP, supra note 671 Article 32(2) emphasis added.
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For indigenous communities, relations to the land are not merely a
matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual
element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural
legacy and transmit it to future generations.991

The UNDRIP provides a clear, enforceable standard for when consultation
and consent is necessary and the declaration has received the support of all
parties to the American Convention992 and all OAS members, except the
United States.993 While the UNDRIP is non-binding, it establishes a clear
and workable standard for consultation and consent which should be adopted
by the IA Court.
Another necessary and pressing area where the Inter-American regime will
need to clarify the law is in relation to non-indigenous people’s ability to
protect their environment using human rights. The court previously provided
a strong interpretation of the right to property to a non-indigenous, tribal
people, in Saramaka, but in that case the court acknowledged that the
population shared similar characteristics with indigenous people994 and so
treated them likewise. In the pending cases of San Mateo, La Oroya, and

Mossville, the petitioners generally do not have the characteristics of
indigenous populations and the IA Court and IA Commission will have to
determine if and how these populations can use human rights to protect their
environment.
Awas Tingni, supra note 591, para 149.
Colombia initially abstained from supporting the declaration, but signed and supported
the declaration in 2009, see Andrej Mahecic, “Colombia’s support for UN Declaration on
Indigenous People welcomed”, online: UNHCR
<http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2009/4/49f1bc356/colombias-support-un-declarationindigenous-people-welcomed.html>.
993 Canada initially voted against the declaration, but removed its objector status in 2016; see
“Canada now full supporter of UN Indigenous rights declaration”, online: CBC News
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/aboriginal/canada-adopting-implementing-un-rights-declaration1.3575272>.
994 Such as having social, cultural and economic traditions different from other sections of the
national community, identifying themselves with their ancestral territories, and regulating
themselves, at least partially, by their own norms, customs, and traditions. See Saramaka
People v Suriname, supra note 139, para 79.
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In each of these three cases, the petitioners’ communities are negatively
impacted by nearby sources of pollution. The pollution is detrimental to their
health and the petitioners have brought various claims under the American
Declaration and American Convention. The IA Commission has determined
that all three cases are admissible, but each for different potential rights
violations. If the IA Court and IA Commission determine that the petitioners’
rights are violated in all three cases it will have to do so with some delicate
interpretation of the law.
The situations in the two cases before the IA Court, San Mateo and La Oroya,
are very similar, but their cases are only both admissible under their rights
to life and humane treatment. Section 3.3.2 of this work explained why it
may be difficult to apply the right to humane treatment to these cases, it
typically applies to the treatment of people detained by the State, but the IA
Commission may be intentionally creating an avenue for the IA Court to
extend its application to the petitioners as a new means of responding to
environmental degradation and its impact on health.
In its report on the admissibility of San Mateo, the IA Commission provides
no discussion on the potential violation of the petitioners’ right to humane
treatment. The petitioners were never detained and there is no justification
given for the petitioners’ claim that the right was violated or reference by the
IA Commission as to why that claim was specifically admissible. In La Oroya,
the IA Commission makes one reference to the petitioners’ claim that their
right to human treatment was violated by “the manifest physical harm to the
health of the alleged victims” and “continual anxiety and fear of the dangers
they face every day”.995 Then, without further elaboration on the petitioners’
claims or the application of the right the IA Commission concludes:
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Community of La Oroya v Peru, supra note 790, para 27.
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[T]hat the alleged deaths and/or health problems of alleged victims
resulting from actions and omissions by the State in the face of
environmental pollution generated by the metallurgical complex
operating at La Oroya, if proven, could represent violations of the
rights enshrined in Articles 4 [life] and 5 [human treatment] of the
American Convention.996

This interpretation of the right to humane treatment is not beyond the text of
the right, it provides that “every person has the right to have his physical,
mental and moral integrity respected”, but it does go beyond the general
application of the right to individuals mistreated in State custody.
The IA Court certainly could apply the right to humane treatment to the
situations in San Mateo and La Oroya, but doing so would unnecessarily
create a new standard of protection. If the IA Court decides to find that the
rights of both sets of petitioners have been violated due to the health impacts
of the nearby pollution it would be best for the it to do so using the
petitioners’ right to life.
Applying the right to life would maintain consistency in Inter-American
human rights law by following the principle laid down in Xámok which
extended the right to life to include the “right to a decent life”.997 The IA
Commission acknowledged the right to a decent life in La Oroya,998 but San

Mateo predated the decision in Xámok so the right to a decent life had not yet
been established. In Xámok, the petitioners’ right to a decent life was violated
by the State because the indigenous population was prohibited from
accessing their traditional lands which forced them into poverty. They
suffered malnutrition, exposure to disease from lack of clean water, and an
inability to access healthcare.999 The source of the petitioners’ health
Ibid, para 76.
Xákmok Kásek Indegenous Community v Paraguay, supra note 672, para 217.
998 Community of La Oroya v Peru, supra note 790, para 26.
999 Xákmok Kásek Indegenous Community v Paraguay, supra note 672, paras 194–217.
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997
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problems in San Mateo and La Oroya differs from Xámok, but the health
impacts are arguably greater. In both cases the petitioners suffer from, inter

alia: elevated lead and cadmium levels; dermatitis; liver dysfunction;
respiratory problems; hearing loss; and malnutrition.1000 While both cases are
complex and this work does not pretend to be an exhaustive analysis of the
petitioners’ and States’ positions, it seems clear that the IA Court could, in
principle, find violations of the petitioners’ right to a decent life in both cases.
The third pending case, Mossville, complicates the situation slightly as the
petitioners similarly have their health negatively affected by nearby sources
of pollution, but their case was only admitted to the IA Commission based on
potential violations of their rights to equality and privacy. The petitioners in

Mossville also claimed a violation of their right to life, but the IA Commission
determined that they had failed to exhaust domestic remedies to pursue that
violation, therefore making the claim inadmissible.1001 Certainly the IA
Commission could follow Xámok, and potentially San Mateo and La Oroya,
and conclude that the negative effects of pollution on health is generally a
violation of the right to life thereby limiting the ability of the petitioners in

Mossville to have a successful claim. However, the IA Commission appears to
entertain the idea of interpreting the American Declaration’s right to privacy
in the same way as the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the
ECHR right to privacy.
The ECHR, American Convention, and American Declaration rights to
privacy are very similar:
ECHR Article 8(1)
Everyone has the right to respect of his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
San Mateo v Peru, supra note 574, paras 21–5; Community of La Oroya v Peru, supra
note 790, paras 15–20.
1001 Mossville Environmental Action Now v United States, supra note 798, paras 35–6.
1000
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American Convention Article 11(2)
No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his
private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or the
unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.

American Declaration Article V
Every person has the right to the protection of the law against abusive
attacks on his honor, his reputation, and his private and family life.

In La Oroya the petitioners forwarded an argument that their right to
privacy was violated in a in identical way to the petitioners in the European
case of Fadeyeva,1002 but the IA Commission rejected this idea simply stating
“that the events described would not represent a violation of Article 11 of the
American Convention”.1003 However, the IA Commission in Mossville
explicitly referenced the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights,
including Fadeyeva, and stated that:
[I]n applying the American Declaration, it is necessary to consider its
provisions in the context of the international and inter-American
human rights systems more broadly, in the light of developments in
the field of international human rights law…1004

Interestingly, there were no major developments in ECHR law in the 7
months between the IA Commission’s decision in La Oroya and Mossville, but
in that time the IA Commission appears to have become more willing to
entertain the idea of following the European Court of Human Right’s
interpretation of the right to privacy.
It is incredibly tempting under these circumstances to recommend that the
IA Commission adopt the principle laid out in European cases such as LópezCarlos Arrieta et al, Petición de Caso - Comunidad de La Oroya (2006) at 33–4.
Community of La Oroya v Peru, supra note 790, para 76.
1004 Mossville Environmental Action Now v United States, supra note 798, para 43.
1002
1003
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Ostra and Fadeyeva. Expanding the right to privacy to protect individuals
from the health impacts of severe environmental pollution has worked well in
Europe and its development over multiple cases would provide the InterAmerican regime with a clear path for integrating the principle into its law.
Applying this expanded right to privacy in the Inter-American regime is also
likely to be the best means for providing redress to the petitioners in

Mossville given their current circumstances, but it may not be the best path
forward for the regime itself.
This work has cautioned against dramatically expanding Inter-American
human rights law, at least until the regime can address some of the issues it
appears

to

have

with

compliance

and

maintaining

participation.

Furthermore, the Inter-American regime is already potentially in the process
of establishing protection for health through “the right to a decent life”.
Developing its own law, while slower and more labour intensive than simply
adopting European law, allows the Inter-American regime to gradually
develop its own right and set its own thresholds regarding to how and when
to apply the right. It will allow the adjudicating bodies to determine what
constitutes “a decent life” and when a State is liable for violating a
petitioners right. A gradual approach may be preferable for States as they
may believe that their legal councils will be able to influence the law as it
develops in consecutive cases. In contrast, adopting the European standard
relinquishes a significant amount of control over the development of the law.
In Tatar the European Court of Human Rights expanded the right as applied
in Fadeyeva to include the Precautionary Principle and a potential right to
broad environmental protection. While the next section of this work
advocates that the European court should pursue and develop the ideas it
presented in Tatar, these developments may not be right for the InterAmerican regime and may be too much too quickly.
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Sections 4.1 to 4.3 of this work illustrated the major differences in these two
regimes and recommended that under the circumstances, the European
regime is in a better situation to make larger progressive developments in its
law whereas the Inter-American regime should focus on strengthening the
regime and clarifying existing areas of law. As stated herein, the InterAmerican regime should clarify when an indigenous population’s consultation
and consent is required for projects taking place on their territory and the IA
Court should give particular consideration to the standard established by
Article 32(2) of the UNDRIP. The regime should also clarify the situation it
has created for itself with San Mateo, La Oroya, and Mossville, but it must
carefully consider the broader impacts of adopting the European Court of
Human Right’s interpretation of the right to privacy and weigh the
advantages of developing its own interpretation of the potentially similar
right to a decent life.

4.4.2 Expanding human rights in Europe: a human right to a healthy home
environment

As introduced in Section 2.3.1 of this work, the ECHR has developed
jurisprudence to expand the rights to property and life in ways which provide
applicants means to respond to localized pollution. One of the strongest
mechanisms for environmental protection comes from one of the European
Court of Human Right’s decisions in López-Ostra, Guerra, and Tatar. These
decisions expand the ECHR the right to privacy to protect individuals from
environmental pollution if it may affect their health and well-being at home;
it can broadly be called a “right to a healthy home”. Tatar, the most recent of
these cases, builds on the right, incorporating the Precautionary Principle
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and bringing ECHR jurisprudence towards what could become a variation on
a right to a healthy environment.
A right to a healthy environment already has some support in Europe. Its
recognition by the European Court of Human Rights would be consistent with
Recommendations of the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly and the right’s
presence in European Constitutions and national laws. As of April 2016, the
right to a healthy home found in Tatar has not been considered or elaborated
upon by the court, so the exact application of the right’s most recent iteration
is unclear. When the court does reconsider this right, it should look back on

Tatar and take advantage of an opportunity to further expand the right from
its inception in López-Ostra, using Tatar, to its logical next step.
In Tatar, the court came very close to a general recognition of a right to a
healthy environment. Unfortunately, an official English transcript of the
decision has never been released, but in the official French decision the
European Court said:
Elle estime toutefois que malgré l’absence d’une probabilité causale en
l’espèce, l’existence d’un risque sérieux et substantiel pour la santé et
pour le bien-être des requérants faisait peser sur l’État l’obligation
positive d’adopter des mesures raisonnables et adéquates capables à
protéger les droits des intéressés au respect de leur vie privée et leur
domicile et, plus généralement, à la jouissance d’un environnement
sain et protégé.1005

Or, translated:
It considers, however, that despite the absence of a causal likelihood
in this case, the existence of a serious and substantial risk to the
health and welfare of the applicants posed to the State positive
obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures able to protect

1005

Tatar c Roumanie, supra note 134, para 107.
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the rights of respect for their private life and their home and, more
generally,

to

the

enjoyment

of

a

healthy

and

protected

environment.1006

The court’s statement that there is a positive obligation on States to protect
an individual’s enjoyment of a healthy and protected environment is a
significant shift from its previous interpretation of the ECHR.
The European Court of Human Rights has yet to expand on what it meant by
“enjoyment of a healthy and protected environment”. On one hand, it could
simply be that unofficial translations of the French decision are simply
inaccurate and misrepresent the intention of the court.1007 If the court were to
clarify that what has been translated as “healthy and protected environment”
was only intended to be “healthy and protected home environment”, then the
law would not shift from where it was prior to Tatar. It would simply
reiterate the general provision for health in the home as established by

López-Ostra. This would be a missed opportunity for the court to build upon
Tatar and increase environmental protection.
The ECHR does not provide a general right to health – a right only arises
when an applicant’s health is affected when they are in their home or on their
property. Restricting this right to health to the applicant’s home and property
creates an odd situation in which an individual’s health is only protected in a
small fictitious bubble. Today many people live in cities and communities

Translation provided by Google Translate, available at <translate.google.com>
However this seems unlikely as the official press release does conclude that the European
Court concluded that the Romanian Authorities failed to take suitable measures to “protect
the rights of those concerned to respect for their private lives and homes, within the meaning
of Article, and more generally their right to enjoy a healthy and protected environment.
SeeRegistrar, “Press release: Chamber Judgment in Tatar v Romania” 61, 27.1.2009
European Court of Human Rights, online:
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-26158102848789&filename=003-2615810-2848789.pdf&TID=ihgdqbxnfi> at 3.
1006
1007
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where their private dwelling only accounts for a small fraction of “where they
live”.
Under the current interpretation of the ECHR, an individual’s health is
protected while they are in their home. If they live in an apartment adjacent
to a park, their health is not protected from potential pollutants they may be
exposed to in the park. It would be common today for people to interpret their
“home” not only as the building where they sleep at night, but also the
community in which they live. López-Ostra and Tatar provide the European
Court of Human Rights an opportunity to broaden the aspects of the right to
privacy that establish protection at home, and move incrementally toward a
right to a healthy environment.
The ECHR cases which establish a right to health, López-Ostra, Guerra,

Fadeyeva,1008 Giacomelli,1009 Dubetska,1010 and Tatar, are all based on the
applicants’ Article 8 right to privacy. In these cases, the applicants’ health
was endangered or negatively impacted while they were in their homes and
the court consistently noted that the rights violations occurred as the
applicants’ were prevented from enjoying their homes, private life, and family
life. While it would appear that these decisions are limited to impacts
occurring within an applicant’s dwelling, it is important to note that Article 8
is not explicitly connected to a narrow definition of home as meaning a
person’s actual dwelling. Article 8 simply states:
ARTICE 8
Right to respect for private and family life
1. Everyone has the right to his private and family life, his home and
correspondence.

Fadeyeva v Russia, supra note 307.
Giacomelli v Italy, supra note 308.
1010 Dubetska and Others v Ukraine, supra note 309.
1008
1009
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2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and
is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.

Article 8 is not a property right: it is a right to private and family life, home
and correspondence. It would not be a major reinterpretation of Article 8(1) to
broadly interpret “family life” and “home” as concepts which extend beyond
the walls of a person’s dwelling to include the community in which people’s
family life occurs. It is not unreasonable for someone to refer to their town or
neighbourhood as their “home”. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to narrowly
provide protection to an individual when they are in their dwelling, but not to
extend it to the areas where they work, shop, attend school, recreate, or
conduct numerous other aspects of a normal life.
The European Court of Human Rights has already extended the privacy
protection component of Article 8 to apply beyond an individual’s dwelling
and extend it to an individual’s business office.1011 In Niemietz v Germany,
the court specifically refutes a narrow definition of “home”, noting that the
French text of the ECHR uses word “domicile” in Article 8 and that “domicile”
has a broader connotation than the English word “home”.1012 The court does
not elaborate on the French meaning of the word “domicile”, but does extend
Article 8 protection to the applicant’s workplace.1013 While Niemietz
pertained specifically to the right to “private life” under Article 8, the court
clearly extended the “domicile” or “home” component of Article 8 and this

Niemietz v Germany, [1992] No 13710/88 (European Court of Human Rights), para 29.
Ibid, para 30.
1013 Ibid, para 29.
1011
1012
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should allow all aspects of Article 8 to extend, at a minimum to the workplace
and potentially to the community in which one lives.
A broader definition of home could then be coupled with the cases that
established right to health, specifically Tatar, to create a right which protects
and individual’s health in their “home environment”.
This right, “a right to a healthy home environment”, would likely differ from
what many think of as a “right to a healthy environment”, but precisely
contrasting these rights is difficult since the “right to a healthy environment”
lacks a universally accepted definition. Few authors advocating a right to a
healthy environment actually provide a clear definition and scope of the
right. Most simply reference the right as it has been documented in
international declarations and national legislation.1014 Boyd, whose extensive
writings encourage greater recognition of the right, notes that the right it
inherently vague and it is designed for its precise meaning to evolve over
time.1015 While this is not necessarily a problem, Boyd rightly notes that most
human rights are vague, it does make it difficult to say if “a right to a healthy
home environment” is the same as the commonly advocated for “right to a
healthy environment”.
Atapattu and Lee provide two of the rare elaborations on what they believe is
meant by a right to a healthy environment. Atapattu advocates for a right to
a healthy environment which would be violated by activities which created an
unhealthy environment based on a standard of health established by a
regional

or

international

authority,

such

as

the

World

Health

In his survey of European nations, Boyd finds that Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Belgium,
Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Greece, Hungary,
Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Ukraine all recognize a right to a healthy
environment either as part of their constitution or in their legislation. See Boyd, supra note
32, ch 9 and 10.
1015 Ibid at 34.
1014
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Organization.1016 She also notes that the right to a healthy environment must
be independent from other existing rights.1017 Lee recommends defining the
right such that it would be violated:
As a result of a specific course of state action, a degraded environment
occurs, with either serious health consequences for a specific group of
people or a disruption of a people’s way of life.1018

If the European Court of Human Rights were to extend Article 8 to include a
right to healthy home environment, this right would differ from Atapattu and
Lee’s concepts of the right to a healthy environment. For one, it would be
depended on another human right, specifically the right to respect for private
and family life. Furthermore, it would differ from Lee’s right as it would build
on Tatar such that it would not be a test for “serious health consequences” or
a “disruption of a people’s way of life”, instead it would be based on “the
existence of a serious and substantial risk to health and welfare of the
applicants”.1019 Tatar establishes a relatively low threshold for placing a
positive obligation on States to maintain a healthy environment. This lower
threshold could risk the ECHR member states rebuking the court’s creation
of the right to a healthy home environment, so to reduce this risk the court
would be wise to limit the geographic scope of the right.

Tatar blurs the definition of home and the associated right to health – prior
to Tatar, protection only applied to health when the pollution affected an
individual’s health while they were in their dwelling. In Tatar, the concept of
“home” is directly linked to “a healthy and protected environment”. This
could and should be used by the court to expand the definition of home to one
Sumudu Atapattu, “Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted: The Emergence
of a Human Right to a Healthy Environment under International Law, The” (2002) 16 Tul
Envtl LJ 65 at 111.
1017 Ibid at 73.
1018 John Lee, “Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a
Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law, The” (2000) 25 Colum
J Envtl L 283 at 339.
1019 Tatar c Roumanie, supra note 134, para 107.
1016
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encompassing an individual’s environment. It seems reasonable for the court
to consider one’s home environment to consist of the spaces where a person
spends the majority of their time: their dwelling, their place of work or
school, and their town or neighbourhood.
This expanded interpretation of “home” and the creation of a right to a
healthy home environment would be in accordance with the prior
Recommendations and statements by the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly and
Committee of Ministers. In 1990 the Parliamentary Assembly recommended
that every person have a right to “an environment and living conditions
conductive to his good health, well-being and full development of the human
personality”.1020 In 2003, it recommended that member states “recognize a
human right to a healthy, viable and decent environment which includes the
objective obligation for states to protect the environment”.1021 Then in 2009, it
recommended formalizing a right to a healthy environment, specifically
noting that “Man has the fundamental right to… adequate conditions of life,
in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and wellbeing”.1022
These repeated calls by the Parliamentary Assembly are strikingly similar to
the European Court of Human Rights’ phrasing in Tatar which protects the
applicant’s private life, home, and the enjoyment of a healthy and protected
environment. It must also be noted that the Committee of Ministers
responded to the Parliamentary Assembly’s repeated Recommendations one
year after the court’s decision in Tatar. In their response, the Committee of
Ministers said that it recognized the importance of a right to a healthy, viable
and decent environment,1023 but in its opinion, the right was already being

PA Rec 1130, supra note 98, para 6.
PA Rec 1614, supra note 179, para 9(ii).
1022 PA Rec 1885, supra note 99 at (5).
1023 CM Reply to PA Recs 1883-1885, supra note 192, para 7.
1020
1021
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protected through the European Court’s evolving interpretation of the
ECHR.1024
It is not unreasonable to think that the Committee of Ministers comments in
2010 were in direct response to the recent decision in Tatar. The Committee
of Ministers recognized the value of a right to a healthy environment, saw
that the European Court of Human Rights was in the process of creating one
with Tatar, was pleased with the direction the court had taken, and felt there
was no need to draft a new protocol. With Tatar the court was gradually
working to establish a relatively narrow right to a healthy environment: it
would protect the areas where people live, but would not extend protection to
the environment in general as to encompass places where nobody lives or
where people visit temporarily.
Limiting the scope of protection to the environment or “home area” to an area
within a reasonable proximity of a person’s dwelling would keep ECHR law
roughly in line with previous decisions. In Hamer the court made it clear that
the ECHR does not provide a general protection of the environment,1025
especially when the area in question is uninhabited by people.1026 Following

Hamer, it would not make sense to extend a right to a healthy home
environment beyond areas where people actually “live” so as to include areas
where they may “visit”. Granted, this would reduce the rights ability to
provide general environmental protection, but the European Court of Human
Rights has had success maintaining compliance while slowly developing the
relationship between human rights and the environment. Establishing a
right which placed an obligation on governments to ensure that no places in
Europe posed a risk to an individual’s health would be a huge shift in the law
and place a heavy burden on member states.
Ibid, para 9.
Hamer, supra note 138, para 79.
1026 The “environment” in Hamer v Belgium was a forested area in which people were not
1024
1025

allowed to reside.
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Importantly, the creation of a right to a healthy home environment can easily
be justified under the two leading human rights theories: natural law and
positivist law.1027 As discussed in Section 1.2 of this work, numerous
advocates for a right to a healthy environment justify the right based on
natural law. Boyd, Hayward, Shelton, Birnie and Boyle all contend that a
right to a healthy environment meets the criteria of a human right following
natural law principles: it is universally applicable to all, possesses a moral
basis, and serves the dignity of all human beings. While a European right to
a healthy home environment is not as broad as a general right to a healthy
environment, it is a component of the larger right and should be justified as
easily.
If a right to broad environmental protection can be justified, then a right to
specific localized protection should also be justifiable under the same
rationale. It is certainly unfortunate that a European right to a healthy home
does not provide universal protection, but in a perfect world it would be
applied globally, as with all human rights. The right to a healthy home
environment possesses the same moral basis as a general right to a healthy
environment it also serves the dignity of all humans and should be
universally applied. More broadly, a right to a healthy home environment can
easily be justified as a “human need”, the standard advocated by Bay.1028
Expanding the ECHR right to property to incorporate a broader definition of
“home environment” would provide the individuals with a protection that is
practical (if the area is limited in scope), universal, and of paramount

With regard to legal positivism, the the preceding discussion of the creation of the right
based on Tatar, Niemietz, an expanded interpretation of Article 8, and the comments of the
CoE’s Committee of Ministers, provides the justification of the right under positivist legal
theory. Laws are made and developed by humans and the preceding explains how the
development of a right to a healthy home environment can be explained as a simple evolution
of ECHR law.
1028 Bay, supra note 6 at 62.
1027
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importance, and this is in accordance with the natural law principles of
Cranston.1029
Expanding the right to health at home through Tatar and Article 8 would
certainly open the court to a broader range of point-source pollution cases –
particularly those arising from health impacts at work and in communal
areas such as neighbourhood parks. Depending on how a broader right to
health is formulated and applied, it might also open the ECHR to cases
arising from the impacts of climate change and force the ECHR to consider
cases akin to the Inuit and Athabaskan petitions seen by the Inter-American
Commission.

4.4.3 An expanded right to health and climate change

If Tatar and Article 8 were interpreted by the European Court of Human
Rights to create a right to a healthy home environment, it could make it
easier for individuals to bring climate change related cases to the court. A
right to a healthy home environment would allow applicants to enforce an
obligation on States to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect
the health and welfare of those applicants in their “home environment”. This
would create an opportunity for a European applicant to bring a strong
climate change related case if the applicant’s situation was akin to that of the
Athabaskan petitioners.
Both the Athabaskan and Inuit petitions pose strong arguments for the idea
that climate change poses serious and substantial risks to the petitioners’
health and welfare in their “home environment”. For these arguments to be
the strongest, “home environment” must be defined relatively broadly and

1029

Cranston, supra note 7 at 13–14.
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encompass not only dwellings, but also the area where they “live” and “work”.
For the Inuit and Athabaskan people, it is not unreasonable to conclude that
they “work” in the areas where they hunt and forage. The European Court of
Human Rights has shown a willingness to extend the definition of “home” to
an individual’s office – the place where that person earns a living for his or
her own subsistence.1030 The Inuit and Athabaskan peoples’ subsistence is
similarly earned by hunting and foraging on particular areas of land and that
area should be given equivalent protection.
The Athabaskan and Inuit petitions both establish that climate change poses
serious threats to their health and welfare. Section 3.2 of this work discussed
both petitions in detail, in particular why the Inuit petition was ultimately
disappointing and why the Athabaskan petition is arguably stronger than the
Inuit petition and therefore has a higher likelihood of success before the IA
Commission. It is important to note that neither petition could be brought to
the European Court of Human Rights per se as the applicants do not reside
in a member state to the ECHR, but if Tatar has expanded ECHR law, a
European applicant in similar circumstances to those petitioners would have
a stronger case before the European Court than the Athabaskan petitioners
have before the IA Commission.
The American Declaration does not provide a strong right to health and the
Athabaskan petitioners have based their claims on the rights to culture,
property and subsistence. The Athabaskan petitioners have also had to draw
a causal connection linking the actions of the Canadian government to the
environmental impacts that have violated their rights under the American
Declaration. In contrast, Tatar established that European applicants can rely
on a right to health under Article 8 without the need of a causal relationship
between State actions and real health impacts. In Tatar, the European Court
specifically noted that the State was under an obligation even though there
1030

Niemietz, supra note 1011.
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was no causal connection between the State’s action and the pollution.1031
Furthermore, the pollution in Tatar did not cause actual deterioration of
health, but simply created a “serious and substantial risk to the health and
welfare of the applicants”.1032
If they were able to bring a claim in Europe, the Athabaskan petitioners
would have a strong case of an Article 8 violation under Tatar. Following

Tatar the Athabaskans would not have to establish a causal link between
climate change and a violation of their rights and, based on their petition, it
is clear that warming weather poses a serious and substantial risk to their
health and welfare. If European applicants were able to mount a similar
claim such that climate change places their health and welfare in serious
risk, they would equally have a strong case under Article 8, Tatar, and a
right to a healthy home environment. Potential applicants may include
Europe’s northern indigenous populations who maintain a subsistence living,
such as the Sami of Scandinavia or one of the numerous indigenous peoples of
Russia. This is not to say that applicants would be limited to northern or
indigenous people. Climate change is projected to pose serious risks to many
coastal populations and it could cause serious risks to the health of numerous
people who are not necessarily indigenous.
One obvious response to the idea that Article 8 and Tatar could be applied in
a way which holds States responsible for climate change would be to argue
that small States with low historical greenhouse gas emissions are not
responsible for climate change and are also incapable of preventing it. While

Tatar makes it clear that a rights violation can occur irrespective of the State
actually causing the harm, the design of the ECHR provides some protection
to States. Climate change cases under a right to a healthy home environment
could open States to a large number of claims, but the design of the ECHR’s
1031
1032

Tatar c Roumanie, supra note 134, para 107.
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rules of procedure prevents States from actually having to address climate
change in order resolve a potential rights violation.
When the European Court of Human Rights finds a rights violation, it is the
State’s responsibility to determine how it will remedy the situation and
prevent further violation. This provision will mean that States held in
violation of a right to a healthy home environment would not be obligated to
actually improve the environment by mitigating climate change. At the same
time the provision would help protect vulnerable populations and potentially
provide them access to climate change adaptation or, in the most extreme
cases, relocation. Obviously, from a humanitarian perspective, the ideal
situation is one where people negatively affected by climate change are
provided relief. This relief could come in the form of climate change
mitigation, adaptation or relocation and there is value in establishing a
mechanism for providing this sort of relief since, as discussed in Section 2.4 of
this work, the ECHR currently lacks a good mechanism to respond to climate
change.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions

Inter-American and European human rights provide useful, if limited,
mechanisms for responding to environmental challenges. While the rights
protected by both regimes are similar on paper, the application of these rights
varies significantly between the two regimes. They also developed along very
different paths and their authority is perceived differently in the two regions.
These factors have made the European regime more effective and given it a
greater ability to use regional human rights to provide environmental
protection.
Both the ECHR and American Declaration were drafted after World War 2 in
efforts to create regional unity, strengthen democracy, and prevent future
conflict. The Inter-American regime was first, but the European regime had
greater authority. The ECHR was drafted based on the United Nations
Declaration on Human Rights, sharing many of its characteristics, and going
beyond the UN Declaration by creating a court where individuals could bring
claims against States and to which States would be bound. In contrast, the
American Declaration was non-binding and had no mechanism for
individuals to challenge States’ actions. The principle of “non-intervention”
was thoroughly ingrained in the regional politics of the Americas and the
Inter-American regime was constrained by this principle when it drafted the
American Declaration and it has felt its effects ever since. Non-intervention
arguably delayed the adoption of the American Convention, reduced
participation to it, and it retains an influence in the regime with regard to
participation and compliance.
In Europe the human rights regime benefitted early from various factors
which allowed the ECHR to become the foundation of a very strong regime.
Early cases were capable of being treated lightly by the regime’s adjudicating
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bodies so States could perceive the regime as one which supported human
rights while being sympathetic to their interests. The CoE has positioned
itself as a body to which States seek and value participation and the
mandatory commitment to the ECHR as a prerequisite for joining the CoE
has further strengthened participation and compliance.
Combined, these and other factors have allowed the ECHR to be applied by
numerous applicants to directly or indirectly protect the environment. The
ECHR’s right to privacy is particularly capable of providing relief from
pollution when it negatively affects an individual’s health. The right to life
has been used in Europe to establish an obligation on States to protect
individuals from recognized risks even if they arise from natural disasters.
Although untested, this application of the right to life may provide a means
to oblige States to take action on climate change, if only as a way of ensuring
that peoples’ lives are not placed at undue risk from foreseeable weather
events brought on by climate change.
The

European

regime

also

places

a

particularly

high priority

on

environmental conservation, at times placing conservation efforts above
fundamental human rights. The European Court of Human Rights has yet to
elaborate on which rights along with the right to property can be overridden
by conservation policies, but the fact that environmental conservation can
override any human rights illustrates how far the European law since it was
drafted in the absence of any consideration for the environment and early
decisions which downplayed the value of a clean environment.
The gradual development of ECHR rights and their ability to provide
environmental protection has recently culminated in the possible creation of
a variant of a right to a healthy environment. Following Tatar, Niemietz and
the language of Article 8, the European Court of Human Rights has
potentially established a broad right to a healthy home environment. The
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right would protect the environment in places where people spend the
majority of their time: their local communities; where they work, go to school,
and recreate.
The right to a healthy home environment is the next step for the European
human rights regime. It would not only expand environmental protection and
human rights in Europe, but it would also progress the broader international
discussion on the relationship between the environment and human rights.
Numerous individuals and international bodies have advocated for a
recognized right to a healthy environment and the court’s recognition of a
right to a healthy home environment would be a logical, important, and
defensible step in that direction. With the support of the CoE’s Committee of
Ministers, Parliamentary Assembly, and numerous European States, the
European Court of Human Rights is in an ideal position to expand the right
to privacy in this way and to not do so will be a missed opportunity.
In contrast to the European regime, the Inter-American regime, the IA
Commission, and IA Court have been faced with particularly challenging
human rights violations, nations reluctant to abandon the principle of nonintervention, States willing to abandon their commitment to the regime if
faced with unfavourable decisions, and an overall inability to oblige States to
comply with recommendations and decisions. Even faced with these
challenges, the Inter-American human rights regime has managed to provide
individuals with mechanisms to use human rights to protect their
environment. Indigenous populations have a particularly strong right to
property which they have used to protect their environment from resource
exploitation, deforestation and pollution. Recent cases have also illustrated
the potential for non-indigenous groups to also use the human rights to
protect their communities from pollution.
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The Inter-American human rights regime also has one of the most interesting
and potentially powerful climate change related cases pending a decision on
its admissibility. The Athabaskan petition, if admitted to the IA Commission
is a near ideal case for those interested in using regional human rights to
respond to climate change and its outcome will have a major impact on the
Inter-American regime and its member states.
The Inter-American regime unfortunately appears to struggle with ensuring
compliance and States have illustrated a willingness to publically challenge
and rebuke the regime. While there is great potential for the Inter-American
regime

to

provide

applicants

with

favourable

decisions

related

to

environmental matters, the regime needs to find a way to improve
compliance so that wronged applicants receive real reprieve from violations
and not just paper judgments. To this end, the next developments of InterAmerican human rights law and its relation to the environment should be
minor. The IA Court has established that States must consult and gain the
consent of indigenous populations when undertaking large-scale projects on
their territory and the court should further expand this right to “all projects”.
The IA Court and IA Commission also have three similar pending cases and
they may force the regime to define the right of non-indigenous people to
have their health protected from local pollution. One option will be for the
Inter-American regime to follow the European Court of Human Rights and
use the right to privacy to establish a right to health, but this may not be the
best option for the regime and a more gradual development of the regime’s
developing “right to a decent life” may be best for the health and stability of
the regime, even if it fails to protect some early petitioners.
European human rights under the ECHR and Inter-American human rights
provide

established

and

growing

mechanisms

for

responding

to

environmental challenges. While they are incapable of addressing all aspects
of environmental degradation – they are effective in particular circumstances
272

and are continually developing the law to provided increased protection. This
work has explored both regimes, their respective strengths and weaknesses,
and recommended avenues for future development. Hopefully both regimes
will be able to continue to strengthen the relationship between human rights
and environmental protection and provide individuals with enforceable rights
and clean environments.
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